Local economic inequality in the UK: patterns, determinants,









Local economic inequality in the UK: patterns, determinants, 
and behavioural consequences 
 
 
Joel H. Suss 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science of the London 







I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London 
School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have 
clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out 
jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that 
full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written 
consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of 
any third party. 
I declare that my thesis consists of 48,324 words (including references and annexes). 
Statement of co-authored work 
I confirm that Chapter 5 was co-authored with Thiago R. Oliveira. I confirm that I wrote 67% of 






I develop a novel, geographically granular measure of economic inequality in the UK based on 
data covering tens of millions of residential properties. The size of this data allows me to 
describe and understand the consequences of local inequality in the UK for the first time. 
The first paper in my thesis explores patterns of local economic inequality, both contemporary 
levels and changes over the last couple decades. The paper also examines whether salient 
features of the local environment affect people’s perceptions of economic inequality. Across two 
surveys, I find that discrepancies in housing quality are indeed a salient aspect affecting people’s 
perceptions. 
I then examine the determinants of inequality at different spatial resolutions, from the city down 
to the neighbourhood level. I find that local composition of skills, housing tenure, and amenities 
are all important factors. 
The third, fourth and fifth papers in my thesis examine the consequences of local inequality for a 
number of important individual and group behaviours. First, I examine whether local inequality 
affects pro-social spending, providing new insight into a question that has produced conflicting 
findings. Across two studies covering the US and UK, I find that local inequality interacts 
positively with income – higher income individuals are more generous in areas of higher 
inequality, probably because they come into contact with poorer individuals more often. 
Second, in a paper co-authored with Thiago Oliveira, I explore whether variation in 
neighbourhood-level inequality in London affects the prevalence of police stop and search 
behaviour. We find a positive relationship, supporting criminological theories on police 
behaviour and social order maintenance. 
Finally, combining data on economic inequality with data on local ethnic composition from the 
UK census, I examine whether patterns of residential diversity and segregation affects political 
behaviour. Using Brexit as a case study, I find strong evidence in support of contact rather than 
conflict theory – neighbourhood economic and social diversity reduces support for Brexit, but 
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Economic inequality is widely considered to be among the defining policy issues of our time. In 
the United Kingdom (UK), recent years have seen economic disparities become the focus of 
much interest from both members of the public and policymakers, for example giving rise to the 
Occupy London movement in 2011 (Haldane, 2012; Yagci, 2017), and to the foundation of the 
UK Wealth Tax commission in 2020 (Advani, Chamberlain, et al., 2020). The widespread 
interest in the topic of economic inequality reflects the fact that both income and wealth are 
distributed relatively unequally in the UK. Overall, the average income of the richest quintile is 
estimated to be approximately six times that of the poorest (ONS, 2021), and the level of wealth 
inequality is almost twice that of income (Crawford et al., 2016), if not more (Advani, Bangham, 
et al., 2020). Examinations of regional inequality paint an even starker picture – statistics suggest 
that the UK is one of the most regionally unbalanced countries in the developed world 
(Carrascal-Incera et al., 2020; McCann, 2020). 
Economic inequality has been the focus of much scholarly attention. Broadly speaking, research 
on economic inequality can be divided into two categories: exploration of the causes of 
inequality, and examination of its consequences. For example, in the former category, Thomas 
Piketty famously described trends and causes of country-level inequality in his book, Capital in 
the Twenty-First Century (2014). Other studies focus more specifically on the causes of 
inequality for individual countries (Alvaredo et al., 2018; Marchand et al., 2020; Piketty & Saez, 
2014). For example, in the UK research has examined links between fiscal (Blundell et al., 2018; 
Hills, 2015; Joyce & Sibieta, 2013) and monetary policies (Mumtaz & Theophilopoulou, 2017) 
and inequality. 
Studies focusing on the consequences of inequality have become relatively more numerous in 
recent decades (Cavanaugh & Breau, 2018), as concerns about the implications of rising 
inequality have risen. For example, papers have looked at the consequences of inequality for 
health (Kawachi & Kennedy, 1999; Pickett & Wilkinson, 2015; Subramanian & Kawachi, 2004; 
Wagstaff & Van Doorslaer, 2000), subjective wellbeing (Alesina et al., 2004; Delhey & 




trust (Gustavsson & Jordahl, 2008; Hastings, 2018; Olivera, 2015; Uslaner & Brown, 2005), 
among many other outcomes. 
A shortcoming of the literature exploring the consequences of inequality for behavioural 
outcomes is that scholars tend to treat inequality as a macro phenomenon, with the geographical 
resolution at which it is typically measured at the country or region-level. Local inequality – 
i.e. economic inequality within neighbourhoods – has been largely neglected as a focus of 
measurement and study, although there are good reasons to think that it is important. 
Indeed, this thesis aims to re-focus attention on local inequality and its implications for important 
social, economic and political behaviours. In what follows, I first provide the theoretical and 
conceptual basis for focusing on local economic inequality. I then provide an overview of the 
papers which comprise this thesis before briefly discussing the country of focus. 
1.1 Why local inequality matters 
The central contention of this thesis is that local inequality has important behavioural 
implications. But why would local inequality matter? I aim to answer this question in this 
section, making use of theoretical and conceptual work, as well as nascent empirical findings, 
from across the social sciences. 
To begin with, it is worth taking a step back and considering ‘neighbourhood-effects’ more 
broadly, i.e. whether local contexts matter in general. There are a number of separate but related 
strands of literature which testify to the importance of local contexts for individual outcomes. In 
other words neighbourhoods matter. Local contexts have been shown to affect a range of 
outcomes, from voting behaviour (Johnston et al., 2004) and redistributive attitudes (Bailey et 
al., 2013; Bertrand et al., 2000), to mental (Aneshensel & Sucoff, 1996) and physical health 
(Block et al., 2004). Work on the potential causal mechanisms running from neighbourhoods to 
individual outcomes finds that, among other pathways, local contexts foster social networks, are 
sources of social contagion and comparison, and serve as primary arenas for observation and 
accumulation of knowledge about the world (G. C. Galster, 2012). 
Seen from the vantage point of the broader ‘neighbourhood effects’ literature, local economic 
discrepancies are an important contextual feature. The identified ‘neighbourhood’ mechanisms 




view is supported by social psychological theoretical work on relative deprivation (Runciman, 
1966) and social comparison processes (Festinger, 1954). 
Relative deprivation theory highlights the importance of local comparisons and reference groups 
for individual emotional and behavioural outcomes (see H. J. Smith et al., 2012 for a systematic 
review). Individuals compare themselves with other people or groups around them, and in this 
way those living in unequal neighbourhoods and who are relatively worse off may feel deprived 
compared with similar individuals living in a more equal setting. Feelings of deprivation then 
translate into negative emotional responses, e.g. anger, and affect inter-group relationships (H. J. 
Smith & Huo, 2014), economic behaviour (Kim et al., 2017), and political preferences (Brown-
Iannuzzi et al., 2015). From this perspective, social comparison processes are fundamental to 
how we make sense of our standing in our communities and societies, and local neighbourhoods 
are a primary setting where these comparisons are made. 
Relatedly, the field of economics has also incorporated the idea of local social comparisons in 
relation to income discrepancies, just with different terminology and methodology. Research on 
the ‘relative income hypothesis’ (Duesenberry, 1949) finds that what our neighbours earn has an 
influence on how we feel and our economic behaviour (Hagerty, 2000; A. Kuhn, 2011; Luttmer, 
2005; Senik, 2009). For example, Luttmer (2005) finds that having relatively less income than 
the average in a local area reduces subjective wellbeing. A. Kuhn (2011) find that households are 
more likely to increase consumption when their neighbour wins the lottery. 
The literature on inter-group contact also provides valuable insight on the importance of local 
inequality. Contact theory suggests that local ethnic or racial diversity reduces the distance 
between different groups, fostering social networks and mitigating stigmatisation (Allport et al., 
1954; Pettigrew et al., 2011; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), whereas ‘conflict’ theory suggests the 
exact opposite (Blalock, 1967). These theories can be extended also to the economic dimension, 
where inequality has been argued to increase social distance between economic groups (Côté et 
al., 2015; Duquette & Hargaden, 2019), inducing greater stigmatisation (Durante & Fiske, 2017; 
Lamont et al., 2014) and class ‘awareness’ (Newman et al., 2015). On the other hand, positive 
inter-group contact between rich and poor, which might arise from economically integrated 
neighbourhoods (G. Galster, 2007), might reduce misconceptions by promoting cross-class 




These various strands of theoretical work all suggest an important role for local economic 
inequality, via what I will call the interpersonal channel. Put simply, local inequality affects the 
social networks and social comparisons that people make. 
Note that the above discussion suggests that the effect of local inequality on behaviour is 
ambiguous, i.e. it might lead to ‘good’ or ‘bad’ outcomes. To bring this to life, let’s take as a 
hypothetical thought experiment two rich individuals who are the same in every respect except 
one lives in an economically heterogeneous neighbourhood while another lives in a gated 
community segregated from poorer individuals. We might expect that the first rich person 
develops greater empathy for those poorer and is more generous as a result of being in constant 
contact with them, especially if their circle of friends includes those relatively poorer (see 
Chapter 4). On the other hand, local inequality might elicit behaviour which might not be 
beneficial – for example, as the theoretical framework discussed in Chapter 5 suggests, police 
might be more likely to exert 'social control', stopping and searching individuals more frequently 
in the presence of higher local inequality. 
Either way, whether ‘good’ or ‘bad,’ the interpersonal channel suggest that local economic 
discrepancies matter for individual behaviour. A nascent body of empirical work reinforces this 
argument, demonstrating that local inequality does indeed affect a broad range of social, political 
and economic behaviours, for example support for redistributive policies (Sands, 2017; Sands & 
Kadt, 2020), intergenerational mobility (Chetty & Hendren, 2018b, 2018a), subjective wellbeing 
(Carr, 2013; Ifcher et al., 2019), crime (Brush, 2007; Kelly, 2000; Morenoff et al., 2001; 
Whitworth, 2013), and labour market outcomes (Ioannides & Datcher Loury, 2004). 
Moreover, experimental evidence spanning multiple disciplines – sociology, political science, 
economics, and the behavioural sciences – shows that observable manifestations of inequality in 
small-scale settings affect individual attitudes and behaviour (Butler, 2016; Hauser et al., 2016; 
Kuziemko et al., 2014; Nishi et al., 2015; B. K. Payne et al., 2017; Trump, 2016). While these 
experimental studies are conducted in artificial lab settings or online and do not therefore fully 
reflect how inequality is actually experienced day-to-day, they nevertheless point to the 
importance of salient, localised forms of inequality. Taken together, it is clear that local contexts 




1.2 A critique of macro-level inequality measurement 
Nevertheless, despite the theoretical arguments and empirical findings outlined above, in many 
social science disciplines where the outcome of interest is some individual or group-level 
behaviour, inequality is oftentimes measured at a much more aggregated geographical level. 
Cavanaugh & Breau (2018) confirm this point by carrying out a systematic review of inequality 
studies and noting the spatial level of analysis used. The authors find that there are far fewer 
studies conducted below the country and regional level than at or above. 
This is a problem for understanding the effect of inequality on behaviour for two reasons: studies 
which focus on macro inequality implicitly assume either that i) the macro-level is the 
appropriate level at which inequality is 'treated', or that ii) people are generally aware of or 
accurately perceive national-level inequality. There are reasons to doubt these assumptions. 
First, a more disaggregated focus can reveal variation that is obscured by macro-level measures 
of inequality. Should we expect the experience of inequality in London to be similar to that of 
nearby Luton, for example? According to estimates of economic inequality presented below in 
Chapter 2, inequality in London (the most unequal city in the UK) is 74.5% higher than Luton 
(the most equal). The absolute difference in the Gini coefficient, a commonly used measure of 
inequality, is 0.152, larger than the difference between that of the United Kingdom and Norway 
(0.10)1, exemplars of unequal and equal countries respectively. Zooming in further, the 
difference between the most unequal and equal neighbourhood in London, taken as the Middle 
Super Output Area (MSOA)2, is a whopping 0.45, demonstrating the very different contextual 
circumstances residents face within the same metropolitan setting. Given this wide sub-national 
variation, it is questionable whether national-level inequality is an appropriate spatial unit for 
understanding the impact of inequality on behaviour. 
Second, while individual judgments about national inequality are important for their attitudes 
and behaviour, e.g. by affecting their social mobility or opportunity beliefs (McCall et al., 2017), 
and redistributive preferences (Cruces et al., 2013; Hauser & Norton, 2017; A. Kuhn, 2019), it is 
not the case that individuals have an accurate understanding of the actual extent of inequality in 
 
1 Author’s calculations from OECD (2020) figures for income inequality in 2019, available publicly here: 
https://data.oecd.org/inequality/income-inequality.htm. 
2 MSOAs are census areas that are roughly similar in population size (M = 7787, SD = 1600), and are built up from 




society. Indeed, people are wildly inaccurate when it comes to judging inequality (Chambers et 
al., 2014; Gimpelson & Treisman, 2018; Hauser & Norton, 2017; Kiatpongsan & Norton, 2014; 
Norton & Ariely, 2011). Instead, evidence suggests that local income inequality is associated 
with people’s perceptions of national inequality (Minkoff & Lyons, 2019; Xu & Garand, 2010).3 
In other words, local inequality is an important driver of what people believe about the amount 
of inequality in their country. This second mechanism through which local inequality matters for 
behaviour can be thought of as an information channel. While the social comparisons that are 
made as part of the interpersonal channel clearly confer informational content as well, this 
channel can be thought of as distinct as it relates to how local contexts affect aggregate 
perceptions, which by themselves affect behaviour. 
How, then, are judgments of inequality formed? This is an important question for which there is 
not much evidence. Recent theoretical work by Phillips et al. (2020) suggests that physical 
attributes of the built environment – e.g. schools, public spaces, cars and houses – provide 
important informational cues. This makes sense from a behavioural science perspective. Rather 
than being rational agents with perfect information about aggregate inequality levels, individuals 
make judgments based on their more immediate surroundings and what they are able to observe 
(cf. also the literature on ‘neighbourhood effects’ mentioned above which suggests that local 
neighbourhoods are where knowledge about the world is accumulated (G. C. Galster, 2012)). We 
rely on observation of physical cues because we tend not to know what our neighbours or 
colleagues make – it is considered impolite to ask people about how much they earn or are 
worth, for instance. 
Of course, other factors also affect our information gathering processes, for example Phillips et 
al. (2020) suggest that interpersonal comparisons and media consumption are relevant, and there 
are potentially other important variables, for example travel for work or time spent in other 
contexts, and individual differences which affect how people values and pay attention to 
inequality (Ho et al., 2015; Waldfogel et al., 2021). 
 
3 In other areas as well, individuals utilise local information when forming judgments about macro variables, 





In short, there are two broad channels through which local inequality might affect behaviour. 
First, via interpersonal networks – local inequality affects the types of people that we come into 
contact and form friendships with. Who we encounter and socialise with affects who we compare 
ourselves to and therefore has important implications for our outlooks, beliefs and, ultimately, 
behaviour. Second, local inequality conveys information. We make judgments about aggregate 
inequality based on what we observe around us, in particular salient features of the physical 
environment (amongst other sources), and this then affects how we see the world. 
1.3 An overview of the thesis 
While the importance of local, contextually-relevant inequality is becoming ever clearer, much 
remains to be understood. This is especially true in the case of the UK, where there is simply a 
lack of information on local economic inequality. This is primarily due to data availability. 
Studies exploring neighbourhood-level inequality are generally situated in the US, Canada, and 
other countries which gather census information on income or wealth. The UK does not ask 
residents about their income or wealth as part of its decennial census, and therefore lacks 
granular information with which to measure local inequality (Hills et al., 2010; N. Lee et al., 
2016). Existing surveys and administrative data are also not up to the task, given the low number 
of observations for the former, and the incomplete nature of the latter (e.g. many people do not 
file tax returns – see M. Kuhn et al. (2020) who make this point for the US). 
Against this backdrop, I aim to advance our understanding of local economic inequality in the 
UK, exploring its patterns, determinants, and consequences. 
In Chapter 2 I examine patterns of local economic inequality. I do so by gathering housing 
value information for over 26 million UK addresses to develop a measure of local inequality in 
the UK. In the absence of sufficiently granular and detailed data on income or household wealth, 
using housing values provides reasonable estimates of local economic inequality (Alfani, 2021; 
Kohler et al., 2017). The size of the data allows me to reliably estimate economic inequality at a 
resolution that has been hitherto impossible. I then test whether housing value inequality is 
associated with people’s perceptions of inequality across two surveys: Wave 3 of the British 
Election Study (BES; N = 34,808), which includes a module on perceptions of local 
neighbourhood inequality, and a representative sample of UK participants that I recruited via 




values is salient – what people see around them, housing in particular, affects what they believe 
about economic inequality. Assessing local inequality using housing values therefore provides a 
geographically granular and perceptually salient measure with which to explore patterns of 
inequality in the UK. I conclude this chapter, by providing a contemporary picture of inequality 
in cities, towns, and neighbourhoods across the UK, as well as how inequality has changed over 
the twenty years from 1999-2019. 
In Chapter 3, I contribute to our understanding of the determinants of local economic 
inequality. Recent years have seen a number of studies exploring the determinants of urban or 
regional inequality, with papers covering the US (Florida & Mellander, 2016; Glaeser et al., 
2009), UK (N. Lee et al., 2016) and Canada (Bolton & Breau, 2012; Marchand et al., 2020). 
However, no study currently exists which looks at the determinants of neighbourhood-level 
inequality – i.e. we have limited understanding of why some local areas are more unequal than 
others. I find that local educational attainment is a key factor associated with greater inequality 
(echoing work at the urban and regional level), as is the presence of amenities – e.g. rivers, listed 
buildings, and parks and playgrounds. 
Armed with the geographically granular and perceptually salient measure of economic inequality 
developed in Chapter 2, in Chapters 4 to 6 I examine the consequences of local inequality for a 
number of important individual and group behaviours. 
In Chapter 4, I examine whether local inequality affects pro-social spending, providing new 
insight into a question that has produced conflicting findings (Côté et al., 2015; Hermanni & 
Tutić, 2019; Schmukle et al., 2019). Using Wave 8 of Understanding Society, a large household 
survey in the UK (N = 36,715), I find that local inequality interacts positively with income – 
higher income individuals are more generous in more unequal neighbourhoods rather than less. 
These findings are supported by analysis of US tax data on charitable donations and ZIP-level 
inequality information (N = 133,870). 
In Chapter 5, in work co-authored with Thiago R. Oliveira, I explore whether variation in 
neighbourhood-level inequality in London affects the prevalence of police stop and search 
behaviour. We hypothesise that police stop and search behaviour has less to do with reducing 
prevalence of crime (for which the empirical evidence is scant), and more to do with social order 




We find robust evidence to support this hypothesis – inequality triggers heightened stop and 
search activity on the part of the police, controlling for crime rates and other important factors. 
In Chapter 6, combining data on economic inequality with data on local ethnic composition from 
the UK census, I examine whether patterns of residential diversity and segregation affect 
political behaviour. Using Brexit as a case study, I find strong evidence in support of ‘contact’ 
(Allport et al., 1954) rather than ‘conflict’ theory (Blalock, 1967) – neighbourhood economic and 
social diversity reduces support for Brexit, but the opposite is true for segregation. This finding 
echoes other work that indicates that spatial segregation can increase anti-immigrant and populist 
sentiment and voting outcomes, alongside other negative outcomes (Bolt et al., 2010; Johnston et 
al., 2002; Kearns & Parkinson, 2001). 
Viewed as a cohesive whole, the empirical contributions of this thesis demonstrate the need to 
and benefits of examining inequality at the local level. The measure developed in Chapter 2 
enables, for the first time in the UK, the analysis of patterns of inequality within neighbourhoods. 
Chapter 3 provides evidence for why certain local areas are more unequal that others. Finally, the 
findings in Chapters 4 to 6 suggest that local economic inequality is linked to both private and 
public sphere behaviours, with important implications for individuals and society. As outlined in 
Chapter 7 – the critical discussion and conclusion – the contributions of this thesis can be built 
upon in future work to shed further light on important social science research questions regarding 





2 Measuring local, salient inequality in the UK 
Abstract: Nascent research across social science disciplines finds that local economic inequality 
is an important driver of attitudes and behaviour. However, due to a lack of granular data on 
income and wealth in the UK, measuring local economic inequality has been impossible. I 
address this measurement gap by exploiting data on housing values for over 26.6 million 
addresses – nearly the universe of residential properties in the UK – producing a fine-grained 
measure of local inequality for the first time. Across two surveys, I demonstrate that housing 
inequality is substantively associated with perceptions of income inequality, suggesting that 
housing value inequality is salient to individuals. Finally, I examine patterns of inequality from 
the city down to the neighbourhood-level, revealing some striking facts: first, there is far larger 
variation in inequality at the neighbourhood-level than at the level of cities and above, pointing 
to varied experiences and encounters with inequality that is obscured by taking a macro focus. 
Second, inequality has declined at the local level on average from 1999 to 2019. 
2.1 Introduction 
Economic inequality is a topic that has been extensively studied in the social sciences. Recent 
years have seen a renewed emphasis on measurement, with scholars increasingly taking a local-
perspective, measuring inequality at relatively fine geographical resolutions (see, for example, 
Chetty & Hendren, 2018a), and demonstrating links between micro-manifestations of economic 
inequality and individual attitudes and behaviour (DeCelles & Norton, 2016; Sands, 2017; Sands 
& Kadt, 2020). This movement towards local inequality has happened primarily in North 
America, where income data is provided as part of the census (Baum-Snow & Pavan, 2013; 
Bolton & Breau, 2012; Florida & Mellander, 2016). Some countries, notably the UK, do not 
collect extensive income information from its residents, thereby making it more difficult to 
reliably measure economic inequality at the local level. This constraint has led researchers of 
inequality in the UK to limit their focus on the regional level (Carrascal-Incera et al., 2020; 
Corrado & Corrado, 2011; Gough, 2018; Hills et al., 2010), with the exception of N. Lee et al. 




This paper remedies this shortcoming by exploiting a large volume of housing value information 
to develop a measure of local economic inequality. The information comes from Zoopla, an 
online property price aggregator in the UK that provides price estimates, and the Land Registry 
of England and Wales, which is a ledger of realised residential property sales. Combined, I have 
real and estimated housing value data for over 26.6 million UK addresses. To put this number in 
perspective, the total number of UK addresses delivered to by the Royal Mail is around 29 
million.4 In other words, I have data for over 91% of all residential houses in the UK. The size 
and coverage of the data allows me to reliably estimate economic inequality at a resolution that 
has been hitherto impossible, providing a contemporary picture of inequality in cities, towns, and 
neighbourhoods across the UK, as well as changes over the the twenty year period from 1999 to 
2019. 
Using this data, I first test whether housing value inequality affects inequality perceptions, 
providing evidence as to the salience of local inequality derived from housing data. I test this 
relationship using two surveys: Wave 3 of the British Election Study (BES), which includes a 
module on perceptions of local neighbourhood income inequality, and a representative sample of 
UK participants (age, gender, and income) that I recruited via Qualtrics (N = 1,003). I find that 
housing value inequality is indeed associated with perceptions, even after controlling for a 
number of known correlates, for example political orientation and education. The second survey 
allows me to replicate findings from the first as well as include additional controls known to be 
important for inequality perceptions, in particular Social Dominance Orientation (Ho et al., 
2015) and Personal Relative Deprivation (Callan et al., 2011), which are missing from the BES. 
The Qualtrics survey also includes a free text box for respondents to explain how they formed 
their perceptions. Quantitative text analysis reveals that a key feature for respondents’ 
assessments of local inequality is the quality and discrepancy of local housing stock. Altogether 
these findings suggest that inequality based on housing values is salient – what people see 
around them, housing in particular, affects what they believe about economic inequality. This is 
the first empirical evidence, as far as I am aware, of a relationship between features of the built 
environment and perceptions of inequality. 
 





This finding also overcomes a key weakness of using housing data to measure inequality. 
Housing, although closely linked with wealth in general (M. Kuhn et al., 2020), does not 
necessarily correspond to traditional measures of economic resources here because the data does 
not distinguish owners from renters. Thus housing value inequality might not correspond with 
actual levels of income or wealth inequality. Instead, inequality of housing values should be 
thought of in perceptual terms – it measures salient economic inequality rather than objective 
economic inequality. This is important because a growing body of work demonstrates that 
perceptions of inequality, rather than actual levels, are important drivers of attitudes and 
behaviour (Cruces et al., 2013; Hauser & Norton, 2017; A. Kuhn, 2019). 
In the second part of this paper, I describe patterns of local inequality in the UK. I adopt a multi-
scalar approach (Cavanaugh & Breau, 2018) to do so, going from UK cities down to highly 
disaggregated neighbourhoods. All 77 cities in the UK (defined as having a population of at least 
100k residents in the last census) are included in the analysis, as are all 519 towns (defined as 
having a population of at least 10k but less than 100k). Finally, given the immense size of the 
data, I explore neighbourhood-level inequality for the whole of the UK. For neighbourhoods, I 
take the Lower Super Output Area (LSOA) or the nearest equivalent in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland (Data Zones and Super Output Areas respectively). LSOAs are census boundaries 
standardised in terms of population size, containing an average of 1,400 residents. The Zoopla 
data provides an average of 539 housing values per LSOA for 2019. The Land Registry provides 
coverage of 70.15% of LSOAs in England and Wales for the years 1999 and 2019.5 I also 
examine alternative definitions of ‘neighbourhood’ to mitigate issues arising from the Modifiable 
Areal Unit Problem (see, for example, Openshaw, 1984), i.e. that measures of local inequality 
might be sensitive to choices around aggregation. 
The data reveals substantial variation in neighbourhood inequality. Indeed, inequality in the UK 
is far more dispersed within cities than between them. For example, neighbourhood inequality in 
London ranges from 0.042 to 0.649, which is far larger than the difference between London as a 
whole, the most unequal city in the UK, and Luton, the most equal (0.152). More generally, 
urban areas in the UK tend to exhibit extremes – neighbourhoods of extremely high and 
 
5 I drop all areas for which there is less than 50 values, leaving a total of 41,742 LSOAs (or 98% of the total number 





extremely low levels of inequality, sometimes side-by-side. This suggests that the experience of 
inequality within urban settings varies substantially, with concomitant consequences for people’s 
attitudes and behaviour. The data also reveals that urban and neighbourhood inequality has 
declined on average over the last couple decades in England and Wales. However, there is 
substantial variation in this change – there are pockets of substantial increases in inequality, 
notably in Central London, Greater Manchester and the North East. 
In what follows, Section 2 presents the background to this paper, Section 3 details the data on 
local inequality in the UK, Section 4 explores the link between these measures and people’s 
perceptions of inequality, Section 5 provides an anatomy of inequality in the UK, and Section 6 
concludes by discussing the paper’s overall contributions and limitations. 
An interactive map to explore and download the data is available online: 
https://github.com/jhsuss/uk-local-inequality. 
2.2 Background 
This paper builds on existing literature which helps motivate the use of housing values to 
estimate local inequality and emphasises the importance of perceptually salient measures of 
inequality. 
2.2.1 Measuring inequality using housing values 
As residential housing assets make up a large majority – approximately 60% – of overall UK 
household wealth6, inequality based on housing values can best be thought of as a measure of 
wealth inequality (see also, Causa et al., 2019; M. Kuhn et al., 2020). Indeed, there is a strong 
correlation between reported housing wealth and overall household wealth in the UK’s Wealth 
and Assets Survey (𝑟 = 0.79). Housing values have been used as a proxy measure of accumulated 
wealth and both individual and neighbourhood socio-economic status in previous work 
examining their links to health and educational outcomes (Connolly et al., 2010; Leonard et al., 
2016; Ware, 2019). 
 
6 Author’s calculation from total UK household wealth (not including private pension wealth) from the ONS Wealth 






Moreover, while using property values to measure inequality would be considered novel from 
the point of view of contemporary inequality scholars, it is a conventional approach used by 
economic historians interested in understanding patterns of economic inequality far back in time. 
In the complete absence of census data, household surveys or other records, historians instead 
rely on archaeological remnants of ancient housing to provide inequality estimates (Alfani, 2021; 
Kohler et al., 2017). Examining distribution of house sizes has been used to construct inequality 
measures for Britain stretching as far back as the Iron Age (Stephan, 2013), and information on 
property tax and rent values has been used to construct inequality measures for medieval and 
pre-industrial European societies Soltow & Van Zanden (1998). Taken together, in the absence 
of sufficiently granular, detailed data on income or household wealth, using housing values 
provides reasonable estimates of local economic inequality. 
2.2.2 Perceptions of inequality 
A burgeoning academic literature stresses the importance of perceptions of inequality. A number 
of studies demonstrate that perceived economic inequality differs substantially from actual levels 
(Chambers et al., 2014; Gimpelson & Treisman, 2018; Hauser & Norton, 2017; Kiatpongsan & 
Norton, 2014; Norton & Ariely, 2011). Moreover, there is an emerging consensus among 
scholars across disciplines that perceptions of inequality are an important factor shaping attitudes 
and behaviour (Ansell & Cansunar, 2020; Nishi et al., 2015; B. K. Payne et al., 2017; Trump, 
2016), more so than actual levels in some domains, for example redistributive preferences 
(Bamfield & Horton, 2009; Bobzien, 2020; Choi, 2019; Cruces et al., 2013; A. Kuhn, 2019), and 
social mobility beliefs (Davidai, 2018). 
How do individuals form these perceptions? Recent theoretical work by Phillips et al. (2020) 
suggests three different types of informational cues are important: 1) interpersonal comparisons 
(see also Kraus et al. (2017), and for a more general take G. C. Galster (2012)); 2) media 
attention; and 3) physical attributes of the built environment – e.g. schools, public spaces, cars 
and houses. While empirical evidence exists to support the first two channels (see, for example, 
Dawtry et al., 2015; Diermeier et al., 2017), as far as I am aware there has not yet been any 
empirical work that examines whether physical attributes affect inequality perceptions. I provide 




2.3 Data on local inequality in the UK 
I exploit information on housing values to produce measures of local inequality in the UK. The 
data comes from two sources: 1) the online UK property aggregator Zoopla, and 2) the Land 
Registry of England and Wales. 
The data from Zoopla was gathered in September 2019 and provides point in time value 
estimates for over 22.9 million addresses in the UK. The estimates are based on the output of a 
valuation model which uses previous sale prices, property attributes, information on similar 
properties in the area, changes in market prices and other local-level information.7 
Data from the Land Registry consists of realised sale prices of residential housing in England 
and Wales beginning in 1995. This allows me to explore how local inequality has changed over 
the last two decades. After excluding transfers under a power of sale and repossession, transfers 
to non-private individuals, and buy-to-lets, there are just over 24 million transactions lodged with 
the Land Registry between 1995 and 2019. Other transactions, such as right-to-buy purchases, 
are not included in the dataset.8 
I gather observations from the Land Registry into five year windows in order to increase the 
number of realised transactions per granular geographic area. Within each window, I remove 
repeated transactions for the same property in favour of the latest and adjust prices in line with 
inflation to the end of the window using the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) House Price 
Index (HPI) broken down by Local Authority District and property type.9 This results in 
estimates of inequality at every five year interval, from 1999 to 2019, with an average of roughly 




7 See Zoopla’s website for more information on their price estimates: https://help.zoopla.co.uk/hc/en-
gb/articles/360006701777-What-is-a-Zoopla-house-price-estimate-. 
8 For a complete list, see information provided on the UK government website: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/about-
the-price-paid-data#data-excluded-from-price-paid-data. 




I take the Gini coefficient as the preferred measure of inequality. This can be calculated for a 
given area as the mean absolute difference between each pair of observations divided by two 
times the mean housing value, or formally: 
𝐺 =
1/𝑛 ∑ |, 𝑦 − 𝑦 |
2𝑦
 
To see how the Gini compares with alternative measures of inequality, Figure A.1 in the Annex 
provides the correlation matrix for the Gini and a number of other measures at different levels of 
geographical aggregation, the LSOA and towns and city-level. In particular, I include decile 
ratios (90:10, 50:10, 90:50), top 1% concentration, and the coefficient of variation. The Gini is 
highly correlated with other measures, for example the correlation coefficient is 0.66 and 0.68 
between the Gini and top 1% measures at the LSOA and city levels respectively. 
I favour Zoopla data over the Land Registry for analysis of contemporary inequality given its 
vastly larger size for 2019 and because it covers the entire UK. Zoopla does not provide statistics 
for how accurate their estimates are, but I verify this using realised sale prices from the Land 
Registry for October through November 2019 (N = 37,275). The correlation coefficient between 
Zoopla estimates and actual prices is 0.94, and the mean percentage error is 1.64% – see Figure 
1. Moreover, the Gini coefficients from Zoopla and the Land Registry are very highly correlated 
at the LSOA-level (𝑟 = 0.9), providing assurance that Zoopla data accurately reflects the 




Figure 1: Relationship between Zoopla estimates and realised house prices 
 
Note: The figure shows Zoopla price estimates at September 2019 that were matched with 
realised transactions for the subsequent three months from the Land Registry (both log scale). 
The dashed gray line is the diagonal line of symmetry. 
A general concern with using housing values to measure local inequality is that the data does not 
allow us to distinguish between houses that are owned or rented, occupied or vacant. This 
therefore suggests that housing value inequality does not correspond with traditional objective 
inequality measures based on income or wealth. While I stress here the importance of a 
perceptually salient measure of inequality rather than one that is solely objective, I nevertheless 
address this concern by showing that, for larger geographical levels where sufficient data exists 
to estimate inequality (i.e. only as fine as the Parliamentary Constituency level), housing value 
inequality is strongly correlated with income inequality. I also estimate inequality using banded 




income inequality measure, I find a strong correlation with inequality derived from housing 
values. See these results in Table A.1 and Table A.2 in the Annex. 
2.4 Salience of housing value inequality 
Given the importance of perceptions of inequality for attitudes and behaviour (see, for example, 
Cruces et al., 2013), and in order to validate the salience of the measures detailed above, I turn to 
assessing whether individual perceptions of local inequality are linked to housing value 
inequality. 
I investigate this question using two surveys. First, I exploit Wave 3 of the British Election Study 
(BES) which asks respondents to estimate the level of income inequality in their local 
community on a scale from 1 (“Differences in income are very small”) to 7 (“Differences in 
income are very large”) (Fieldhouse, 2019). Wave 3 of BES provides a large sample size (N = 
12,193) and geographical markers at the Middle Super Output Area (MSOA), which are 
comprised of LSOAs and have an average population 7,787. However, BES respondents 
volunteer to participate and therefore the panel is non-representative of the UK population. 
Moreover, known correlates of inequality perceptions, notably Social Dominance Orientation 
(SDO, Ho et al. (2015)) and Personal Relative Deprivation (PRD; Callan et al. (2011)), are 
missing. Data for BES Wave 3 was collected in 2015, so I use the measure of inequality for 2014 
based on the Land Registry data.10 
To overcome the limitations of BES, and also to ensure the findings are robust, I recruited a 
panel of respondents from Qualtrics (N = 1,003) in October-November 2019 that is 
representative of the UK population on age, gender and income. To achieve representativeness 
on income, I use percentile data provided by HMRC’s Survey of Personal Incomes. I asked 
participants to rate the level of income inequality in their "local neighbourhood". Their response 
could range from 1-9, with 1 labelled “completely equal” and 9 "completely unequal". I ask 
participants to provide postcode information, and so I am able to link responses to LSOAs as 
well as MSOAs. I do not ask participants to delineate the boundaries of their "local 
neighbourhood", but rather leave it up to them to decide for themselves what exactly this 
constitutes and assume that LSOA and MSOA boundaries adequately proxy for respondent 
 





neighbourhood boundaries. While scholars studying context effects have argued for 
“personalised” neighbourhoods (Coulton et al., 2013; B. A. Lee et al., 2019), recent work has 
found that census-based neighbourhoods in the US are more closely aligned with subjective 
perceptions of local characteristics (Velez & Wong, 2017). 
Immediately after their numerical assessments, I provide respondents with a free-text box and 
ask them to explain why they responded in the way they did, i.e I obtain descriptions of what 
information individuals use in assessing local inequality. I then ask a series of further questions 
designed to serve as individual-level control variables: in particular, I ascertain SDO using the 
eight-item scale developed by Ho et al. (2015), and PRD using the five-item scale from Callan et 
al. (2011). I also ascertain political orientation (using an 11-point left-right scale), and 
demographic information (age, gender, education, and income) to include as controls. 
2.4.1 Multivariate analysis 
To analyse the relationship between housing value inequality and perceptions of inequality, I 
specify the following random intercept model to examine associations between housing value 
inequality and subjective assessments: 
𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋 + 𝛾𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝜁𝑍 + 𝜃 + 𝜖  
where 𝑦  is the subjective assessments of inequality for individual 𝑖 in area 𝑗, 𝛼 is the intercept, 
𝑋  is the vector of individual-level controls, 𝑍  is the vector of area-level controls (average 
property value and population density), 𝜃  is the random intercept error term, and 𝜖  is the 
individual error term. 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖  is housing value inequality for area 𝑗, and therefore 𝛾 is our 
coefficient of interest as the estimate of the effect of contextual inequality on subjective 
perceptions. For area level controls, I include the average property value and population density. 
For individual-level controls, I includes age, gender, education and political orientation. 
Additionally for the Qualtrics survey I include SDO and PRD. 
Table 1 provides results for the BES study. Column 1 is the Gini without area or individual-level 
control variables, and Column 2 includes controls. The coefficient on the Gini of housing values 
is statistically significant – there is an association between MSOA-level housing value inequality 




associated with an expected increase of 0.108 and 0.077 of a standard deviation respectively for 
Column 1 and 2. 
Table 1: Perceptions of local income inequality – British Election Study survey 
 Dependent variable: 
 Perceived local inequality 
 (1) (2) 
Gini 0.108*** 0.077*** 
 (0.010) (0.012) 
Avg house value  0.122*** 
  (0.012) 
Density  -0.016 
  (0.011) 
Income middle  0.013 
  (0.024) 
Income rich  0.032 
  (0.032) 
Left-right  -0.155*** 
  (0.011) 
Tertiary  0.110*** 
  (0.022) 
Female  0.011 
  (0.021) 
Age 55+  0.051* 
  (0.029) 
Age 35-55  0.045 
  (0.030) 
Constant -0.002 -0.093*** 
 (0.009) (0.033) 
Controls No Yes 
Observations 12,192 9,178 
Log Likelihood -17,233.300 -12,860.170 




Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 The table provides estimates for the relationship between local inequality and perceived local 
income inequality 





Table 2 provides the results for the Qualtrics survey. Columns 1 and 2 are for LSOA-level 
housing value inequality with and without the additional covariates (SDO and PRD), and 
Columns 3 and 4 are for the MSOA-level. I find the coefficient on the Gini to be significant and 
substantive in size for each model. Housing value inequality, at both the LSOA and MSOA level, 
is associated with perceptions of local inequality.11 The standardised coefficient estimates are 
similar in size as that found in analysis of the BES survey. 
Moreover, the inclusion of the additional controls does not affect the point estimates for housing 
value inequality. While SDO does not seem to be important, PRD is strongly associated with 















11 In unreported findings, I find that more aggregated measures of inequality are not associated with perceptions of 
UK-level inequality, a finding that is in line with research (e.g. Norton & Ariely, 2011) which finds that individual 
assessments of national-level inequality are very different from actual levels. On the other hand, city-level inequality 
is associate with perceptions of national-level inequality, which also conforms with other findings (e.g. 





Table 2: Perceptions of local income inequality – Qualtrics survey 
 Perceived local income inequality 
 LSOA LSOA LSOA MSOA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Gini 0.077** 0.085** 0.092** 0.092*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) 
Avg house value 0.016 0.024 0.027 0.033 
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Density 0.044* 0.042* 0.043* 0.037 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) 
Income middle -0.041 -0.029 -0.020 -0.004 
 (0.089) (0.088) (0.089) (0.088) 
Income rich 0.023 0.084 0.006 0.065 
 (0.110) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) 
Left-right -0.093*** -0.073** -0.100*** -0.079** 
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.031) (0.034) 
Tertiary 0.031 0.055 0.027 0.050 
 (0.067) (0.066) (0.066) (0.065) 
Female 0.055 0.050 0.068 0.062 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.069) 
Age 55+ 0.206*** 0.212*** 0.216*** 0.228*** 
 (0.077) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) 
Age 35-55 0.100 0.191** 0.096 0.182** 
 (0.090) (0.091) (0.090) (0.091) 
SDO  0.042  0.043 
  (0.035)  (0.034) 
PRD  -0.156***  -0.143*** 
  (0.032)  (0.032) 
Constant -0.291** -0.328*** -0.286** -0.312*** 
 (0.119) (0.118) (0.113) (0.112) 
Controls No Yes Yes No 
Observations 999 999 1,003 1,003 
Log Likelihood -1,420.085 -1,412.730 -1,425.736 -1,419.988 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,866.169 2,855.461 2,877.472 2,869.976 
Bayesian Inf. 
Crit. 
2,929.957 2,929.062 2,941.312 2,943.638 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 The table provides estimates for the relationship between local inequality and perceived local 
income inequality 




2.4.2 Text analysis 
These findings point to the relevance of housing value discrepancies for judgments about local 
inequality. But what environmental cues do people use when making assessments about 
economic inequality? Surprisingly, and despite a large volume of studies examining perceptions 
of inequality, this basic question has not been posed. I suppose that, because incomes are 
generally unobserved, people make inference about their neighbours’ income based on what they 
can observe, in particular the size and quality of their house (as well the car they drive and their 
visible consumption habits, such as the clothes they wear). I therefore provide the space for 
respondents to explain why they came to the judgments they did about local inequality in order 
to remedy this shortcoming and provide greater understanding. 
I first conduct some basic quantitative analysis of the text responses by creating dictionaries for 
housing-related and income-related words. For housing, I include: 'hous*', 'home*', 'propert*', 
'rent*', 'flat*', 'estate*', 'council*'. For income, I include: 'incom*', 'earn*', 'wage*', 'salar*', 'job*', 
'unemp*'.12 Table 3 provides the raw count for the housing and income dictionaries by text 
response. I find that housing-related words are used by participants nearly twice as frequently as 
income-related words when participants explain why they answered the numerical question on 
perceptions as they did. 
Figure 2 provides a frequency chart for the most utilised stemmed words. Peopl* is the most 
utilised term, providing support for the interpersonal channel being important for affecting 
people’s perceptions of local inequality (Phillips et al., 2020). Hous* is the second most 
frequently used stem, only slightly behind peopl*. This provides additional support for the 
relevance of housing discrepancies in local areas for people’s perceptions of inequality. 
Table 3: Raw counts for housing and income dictionaries 
 Housing related Income related 
Count 475 287 
 





Figure 2: Frequency charts for local inequality textual responses 
 
Note: The figure shows stemmed term frequencies for the textual responses asking respondents 
to describe how they assessed inequality in their local area (N = 1,003). 
However, the raw counts and frequencies do not reveal much about the context and semantic use 
of the word in question. In other words, we might not know whether a housing or income-related 
word denotes the relevance of that concept in making inequality assessments or the reverse. For 
example, a participant might mention ‘income’ in order to indicate that it does not form part of 




relevant extracts where either income or housing related words are being used. Some indicative 
examples include: 
“There’s a huge mix of council estates and multimillion pound houses next door to eachother.” 
“There’s areas with poor people and government housing and areas with fancy big houses.” 
“There are obviously some people who have a higher income as can be seen by the cars they drive 
and things like that.” 
“I don’t really know about other people’s income and wealth so can only really base it on state of 
properties.” 
These extracts suggest that housing is a crucial feature for people in making their assessments. 
Some respondents are explicit about how this works: they can only infer about other people’s 
income, and therefore income inequality, based on the things that they can directly observe. In 
other words, the local housing stock, rather than income, is salient for individuals when judging 
the level of local income inequality. 
2.5 An anatomy of local economic inequality in the UK 
Having developed the measures of local inequality based on housing value data and produced 
evidence as to the salient nature of these measures, I now turn to describing patterns of local 
inequality in the UK. I first focus on urban areas in the UK – i.e. inequality at the level of towns 
and cities. I combine all built-up areas13 in England and Wales with Settlements14 in Scotland 
and Northern Ireland that contain at least 10k residents in the 2011 census. Given the size of the 
data on housing values, I cover all towns and cities in the UK (N = 596), thereby expanding on 
the pioneering descriptive analysis of sub-national inequality in the UK by N. Lee et al. (2016), 
who use data on employee wages from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE; ONS 
(2019)) to estimate inequality for 60 British cities. 
Table 4 and Table 5 provides a ranking for the ten most equal and unequal areas separately for 
cities and towns. Towns as defined as areas with at least 10k residents but less than 100k (N = 
519), and cities are areas with 100k or more residents (N = 77). First, looking at cities, we see 
that Greater London is the most unequal with a Gini coefficient of 0.356, followed by Belfast 
 
13 These are geographical areas defined by the ONS and UK Ordnance Survey. Details available here: 
https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/articles/ref/builtupareas_userguidance.pdf. 
14 These are built-up area equivalents defined by the governments of Scotland and Northern Ireland respectively, and 






and three Scottish cities, Glasgow, Edinburgh and Aberdeen. The top four most unequal cities 
vary substantially in terms of median house price, which can be considered a proxy of median 
wealth, suggesting that inequality is not simply a product of overall economic success. Indeed, 
Belfast, Greater Glasgow, and Burnley (the 7th most unequal city) are relatively poor urban areas 
as well as being unequal. Looking at the most equal cities, Luton ranks last unequal with a Gini 
coefficient that is 57.3% the size of London’s. These rankings and absolute figures generally 
align with those of N. Lee et al. (2016), although the definition of city is different and I am using 
housing values rather than employee wages to estimate inequality. 
Turning to UK towns, Cobham (Elmbridge) is the most unequal, and indeed is 17.4% more 
unequal than London, whereas the least unequal town, New Addington, is about two times more 
equal than Luton, the most equal city. In general, the range of the Gini is far greater amongst 
towns than cities (0.309 versus 0.152). 
Next, turning to the neighbourhood-level, Figure 3 maps LSOA-level inequality in the UK. The 
neighbourhood Gini ranges from 0.018 to 0.649, with a mean value of 0.195 and standard 
deviation equal to 0.066. We can see from the map (Panel A) that the major cities and South East 
of England tend to have a mix of relatively equal and unequal LSOAs, whereas rural areas tend 
to display an average level of housing value inequality. To help see this, Panel B pulls out 
London. The UK capital contains the most unequal LSOAs in the country, with areas in the 













Table 4: Ranking of most and least unequal cities in the UK, 2019 
City Population Gini Median Top1 9:1 9:5 5:1 
Rank: Top 10 
Greater London 9,791,957 0.356 432,000 8.260 3.908 2.262 1.728 
Belfast 341,035 0.355 148,000 6.657 4.300 2.324 1.850 
Greater Glasgow 968,033 0.351 130,000 5.321 4.769 2.385 2.000 
Edinburgh 488,095 0.339 226,000 5.306 4.120 2.279 1.808 
Aberdeen 213,725 0.331 152,000 4.869 4.092 2.342 1.747 
Greater Manchester 2,551,155 0.327 149,000 5.766 3.890 2.141 1.817 
Burnley 151,732 0.326 87,000 4.707 4.239 2.241 1.891 
Falkirk 103,003 0.321 104,000 4.121 4.276 2.385 1.793 
Sheffield 683,577 0.316 136,000 4.908 3.844 2.176 1.766 
Accrington/Rossendale 126,031 0.316 102,000 4.672 3.930 2.196 1.789 
Rank: Bottom 10 
Crawley 181,620 0.231 298,000 3.737 2.677 1.752 1.528 
Chelmsford 110,655 0.230 332,000 3.352 2.854 1.711 1.668 
Worcester 102,290 0.229 202,000 3.387 2.732 1.718 1.591 
Gloucester 151,914 0.229 200,000 3.247 2.814 1.660 1.695 
York 154,123 0.227 214,000 3.857 2.549 1.692 1.507 
Swindon 187,059 0.227 199,000 3.195 2.766 1.696 1.631 
Lincoln 114,842 0.223 155,000 3.435 2.569 1.690 1.520 
Basingstoke 107,996 0.221 254,000 3.387 2.593 1.756 1.477 
Medway Towns 244,765 0.220 231,000 3.110 2.710 1.701 1.593 









Table 5: Ranking of most and least unequal towns in the UK, 2019 
Town Population Gini Median Top1 9:1 9:5 5:1 
Rank: Top 10 
Cobham (Elmbridge) 17,930 0.418 885,500 5.268 7.318 2.752 2.659 
Haslemere 14,291 0.372 434,000 5.149 5.581 2.675 2.087 
Sevenoaks 30,692 0.372 498,000 4.851 4.959 2.659 1.865 
Hamilton 82,220 0.366 101,000 5.730 5.078 2.564 1.980 
Beaconsfield 13,523 0.362 784,500 4.607 5.584 2.292 2.436 
Hawick 16,855 0.349 89,000 5.873 4.462 2.607 1.712 
Knutsford 13,191 0.348 314,000 6.334 4.396 2.156 2.039 
Macclesfield 63,177 0.347 198,000 7.284 3.965 2.303 1.722 
Cumbernauld 54,773 0.345 99,000 4.263 5.180 2.616 1.980 
Cookstown 17,339 0.341 130,000 6.232 4.073 2.074 1.964 
Rank: Bottom 10 
Haverhill 27,041 0.176 206,000 2.530 2.108 1.617 1.304 
Maghull 26,752 0.176 202,000 2.969 2.034 1.460 1.393 
Stanford-Le-Hope 28,971 0.169 294,000 2.737 2.243 1.442 1.556 
Amesbury 10,724 0.169 244,000 3.079 2.040 1.455 1.402 
Didcot 29,073 0.164 295,000 3.041 2.043 1.447 1.411 
Peacehaven 18,731 0.158 291,000 2.665 2.151 1.323 1.626 
Carterton 15,769 0.156 264,000 2.175 2.176 1.451 1.500 
Canvey Island 38,170 0.151 255,000 2.303 1.907 1.443 1.321 
Sheerness 11,938 0.149 169,000 2.466 2.009 1.308 1.536 




Figure 3: Map of LSOA-level inequality in the UK 
 
Note: Panel A provides shows neighbourhood (LSOA)-level Gini coefficients for the UK, and 
Panel B pulls out London. All estimates based on house price data from Zoopla for 2019. 
More generally, a neighbourhood-level view shows that urban areas contain both highly equal 
and highly unequal neighbourhoods, oftentimes existing side-by-side. This highlights that 
experiences of economic inequality, and thus also the potential consequences of inequality, are 
likely to vary substantially within cities. Taking an aggregated perspective obscures the wide 




unequal and equal neighbourhood in London in terms of the Gini coefficient (0.607) is far larger 
than the difference between that of the UK and Norway, exemplars of unequal and equal nations 
respectively, using the Gini of income inequality (0.10; OECD (2020)). This echoes findings in 
the US which uses census data on incomes – Wheeler & La Jeunesse (2006) show a much 
greater amount of variation in income inequality within urban neighbourhoods versus across. 
Figure 4 provides the distribution of neighbourhood-level inequality for each city in the UK. 
This figure reveals an interesting fact – inequality at the city-level is at the higher end of the 
neighbourhood range, and in all cases above the 75th percentile. What explains this? One reason 
might be that cities exhibit economic segregation by neighbourhood (Cheshire, 2007; Daniel 
Dorling et al., 2007; Meen & Gibb, 2005). In other words, neighbourhoods are more frequently 
equal and rich or equal and poor than they are unequal. Figure A.2 visualises this by mapping the 




Figure 4: Neighbourhood inequality by city in the UK, 2019 
 
Note: The figure shows inequality at the city-level (red dot) and within-city neighbourhood 




Next, I use the Land Registry data to describe changes in local inequality over time. 
Interestingly, inequality has reduced on average for cities, towns and LSOAs in England and 
Wales over the twenty year period from 1999 to 2019 (M = -0.025, -0.023, and -0.018 
respectively, SD = 0.022, 0.024, and 0.044). Table 6 and Table 7 rank changes in inequality for 
the top and bottom 10 cities and towns respectively by the largest absolute change in Gini. 
First, looking at the rankings for cities – the biggest increase in the Gini has been in Oxford, 
Blackpool, Cheltenham and Cambridge. Of these four cities, Blackpool stands out as being 
relatively poorer and is considered to be in decline. Oxford, Cambridge, and Cheltenham are, on 
the other hand, prosperous places that have been growing rapidly. This demonstrates that 
inequality can increase even if the overall economy is suffering in relative terms. Table 6 shows 
that Blackpool has seen a relatively larger increase in bottom end inequality (measured by the 
change in the 50:10 ratio). 
Figure 5 shows the change in the Gini coefficient for the MSOA-level. I map this spatial level 
due to a high percentage of missing values at the LSOA-level – 14% – when dropping areas with 
less than 50 observations in either 1999 or 2019. Panel A shows the spatial distribution of change 
for England and Wales, and Panel B pulls out London. The maps demonstrate that most MSOAs 
in England and Wales have seen a reduction in inequality (M = -0.022), oftentimes substantial. 
However, as the map of London demonstrates, change is not randomly spread in space but rather 
geographically concentrated. In particular, we can see that Central London has experienced 
increases in neighbourhood inequality versus declines in inequality in the periphery of the 
capital. Other parts of England have also seen notable increases in inequality, e.g. the North East, 
the Western part of Cornwall and the Manchester metropolitan region. 
How do changes in local inequality compare with more aggregate-level changes? To answer this, 
Figure 6 plots the change in UK inequality over the two decades using the housing value data. 
The time series shows that UK inequality has been static overall with a slight dip around the 
global financial crisis of 2008-9. The UK-level housing value inequality trend broadly aligns 
with that of other measures. For example, data from the World Inequality Database (WID) 
suggests that pre and post-tax income inequality has been static over the same period (see the 
data provided online here: https://wid.world/). Regarding aggregate wealth inequality, reliable 




assumptions (Advani, Bangham, et al., 2020; Alvaredo et al., 2016) or generally spotty and 
incomplete. Nevertheless, data from the WID, shows inequality of personal net wealth to also be 
generally flat between 1999-2019. 














Rank: Top 10 
Oxford 0.036 13.086 0.017 0.237 0.048 0.080 
Blackpool 0.014 4.937 0.004 0.368 0.053 0.142 
Cheltenham 0.013 4.168 0.007 0.159 -0.025 0.095 
Cambridge 0.012 4.358 0.001 0.170 0.008 0.079 
Sheffield 0.011 3.736 -0.002 0.374 0.126 0.068 
Liverpool 0.011 3.724 0.002 -0.099 0.101 -0.165 
Cardiff 0.005 1.957 -0.002 0.144 0.110 -0.025 
Teesside 0.004 1.323 -0.003 0.097 0.058 -0.015 
Grimsby 0.004 1.354 -0.003 0.254 -0.097 0.249 
Exeter 0.002 0.815 0.002 -0.006 -0.051 0.043 
Rank: Bottom 10 
Colchester -0.048 -17.085 -0.011 -0.468 -0.388 0.105 
Leicester -0.049 -17.399 -0.010 -0.698 -0.189 -0.207 
High Wycombe -0.051 -15.596 -0.007 -0.676 -0.384 0.005 
Blackburn -0.053 -15.326 -0.010 -1.314 -0.250 -0.373 
Telford -0.054 -18.662 -0.005 -0.889 -0.289 -0.192 
Hastings -0.054 -17.039 -0.008 -1.257 -0.266 -0.363 
Coventry -0.058 -19.950 -0.010 -0.858 -0.202 -0.284 
Medway Towns -0.059 -22.319 -0.006 -0.780 -0.339 -0.138 
Slough -0.061 -18.456 -0.022 -0.358 -0.312 0.081 




















Rank: Top 10 
Shildon 0.080 29.964 0.000 1.376 0.743 -0.042 
Ponteland 0.047 18.799 0.007 0.530 0.190 0.068 
Peterlee 0.044 14.110 0.002 1.997 0.124 0.752 
Stamford 0.037 15.067 0.005 0.412 0.120 0.121 
Llantwit Major 0.036 15.839 0.002 0.680 0.076 0.318 
Spennymoor 0.035 13.657 -0.007 1.507 -0.008 0.867 
Bishop Auckland 0.033 11.300 -0.002 1.202 -0.095 0.738 
Berwick-Upon-
Tweed 
0.033 12.204 0.001 0.358 0.267 -0.041 
Wells 0.032 14.101 -0.002 0.529 0.156 0.158 
Knutsford 0.030 9.096 0.016 0.277 -0.129 0.243 
Rank: Bottom 10 
Rushden -0.073 -25.491 -0.010 -1.162 -0.360 -0.301 
Market Warsop -0.073 -24.530 -0.012 -1.631 -0.190 -0.736 
Corby -0.074 -27.319 -0.024 -0.902 -0.257 -0.277 
Newhaven -0.074 -30.931 -0.009 -0.832 -0.245 -0.297 
Shirebrook -0.082 -30.748 0.005 -2.153 -0.376 -0.856 
Grays -0.082 -29.252 -0.008 -1.316 -0.454 -0.275 
Swanley -0.082 -31.787 -0.014 -0.644 -0.355 -0.053 
Wellingborough -0.086 -29.313 -0.006 -1.491 -0.420 -0.424 
South Ockendon -0.107 -39.151 -0.011 -1.617 -0.517 -0.404 




Figure 5: Change in MSOA inequality, England & Wales (1999 to 2019) 
 
Note: The figure shows change in the absolute value of the Gini coefficient of housing values 
between 1999-2019. Panel A shows England and Wales, and Panel B shows London. Areas with 




Figure 6: Change in UK inequality, 1999-2019 
 
Note: The figure shows UK-level housing value inequality from 1999 to 2019. 
2.6 Discussion and conclusion 
In this paper, I provide a novel and unique measure of local economic inequality in the UK. In 
the absence of high quality, granular information on incomes or wealth, I exploit two large 
datasets on the value of houses for a combined 26.6 million UK addresses. This data makes it 
possible to measure economic inequality at a hyper-local level for the first time. Clearly, 
estimates of inequality based on housing values do not correspond with more traditional 
approaches to measuring inequality, e.g. via surveys or administrative data providing information 
on actual income and wealth. For one, the housing data does not distinguish between houses that 
are owned or rented. Nevertheless, I argue that this does not matter from a perceptual 
perspective, and perceptions of inequality are key drivers of attitudes and behaviour. I test the 




what they observe around them in the form of housing, rather than by having actual information 
on incomes. 
I test whether local housing value inequality is associated with perceptions of income inequality 
using two surveys, Wave 3 of the British Election Study and a representative survey of UK 
respondents. I show that housing value inequality is indeed substantively associated with 
perceptions. This conclusion is buttressed by textual responses – local housing discrepancies are 
frequently mentioned as being a key feature used by individuals to estimate neighbourhood 
inequality, indeed more so than incomes. In other words, seeing housing value inequality (or lack 
thereof) affects people’s beliefs about local income inequality. This is an important finding, not 
only as it assuages concerns around using housing value data to measure inequality – individuals 
receive the ‘treatment’ – but also because it represents the first evidence of the importance of 
features of the built environment feeding into perceptions of economic inequality. 
The measures of local inequality allow me to describe neighbourhood-level variation, as well as 
that in towns and cities across the UK, providing the first multi-scalar exploration of the anatomy 
of local inequality in the UK of its kind. Rather than focus on one geographic level, I explicitly 
compare results for perceptions and patterns at different geographical scales and alternative ways 
of defining 'local'. This approach defends against issues arising from the Modifiable Areal Unit 
Problem (Openshaw, 1984), as well as providing a more nuanced understanding of the 
geography of inequality levels and changes in the UK. 
Of course, the built environment is only one influence on people’s perceptions of inequality. 
While the estimated relationship with perceptions is relatively large in size, representing 
approximately 10% of a standard deviation, slightly larger than the effect of political orientation, 
there are likely other important factors which I have not been able to include here, 
e.g. interpersonal networks and media influence. Another important factor might be the areas 
where individuals spend a lot of time outside their home neighbourhood, for example by 
travelling for work. Future research might try to take a comprehensive approach in understanding 
perceptions of inequality, exploring how different possible channels come together and interact 
with place-based and individual-level characteristics. 
The second half of this paper explores patterns of local inequality in the UK. What the data 




within urban settings. In other words, the lived experience of inequality is often itself unequal. 
Further analysis examining the dispersion of neighbourhood inequality within cities suggests a 
high degree of economic segregation – most neighbourhoods appear to be equal (either equal and 
rich or equal and poor). Further research is needed to understand the implications of this 
economic segregation across neighbourhoods and its impact on important behavioural outcomes. 
I also explore how local inequality has changed over the period 1999-2019. I find that inequality 
has declined on average across England and Wales in cities, towns and neighbourhoods. This 
average decline comes with a wide variance and spatial clustering – while most parts of England 
and Wales saw reductions in inequality, other parts saw substantive increases, especially in 
Central London and other urban agglomerations, such as Greater Manchester and the North East. 
This is a stark finding when compared with trends at the national level, where inequality 
(whether measured by housing values or incomes) has been broadly static over the same period 
of time. This highlights the benefits of taking a disaggregated view – there is much change 
happening beneath the surface. What explains these local patterns of inequality change in the 
UK? Some possible answers include structural trends in housing demand, with people 
increasingly preferring to live in city centers rather than suburbs. A carefully considered answer 
to this question is outside the scope of this paper but warrants scholarly attention. 
This paper uses a large volume of alternative data to estimate economic inequality. In that sense, 
the work fits in with other papers which use alternative data sources, for example images, to 
predict economic variables at local levels. For instance, research has utilised Google Street View 
and neural networks to accurately predict average neighbourhood income in the US (Gebru et al., 
2017) and multiple deprivation in the UK at the LSOA-level (Suel et al., 2019). Future work 
might seek to utilise these methods and data sources, perhaps combined with subjective 
assessments of inequality as presented here, or alternatively as elicited through other sources 
(Dubey et al., 2016; Naik et al., 2016), to estimate economic discrepancies at granular 
geographical levels. 
The measures developed here can be used to shed light on many research questions seeking to 
understand the consequences of economic inequality. For example, there is ongoing scholarly 
debate regarding whether inequality affects voter turnout (Cancela & Geys, 2016; Stockemer & 




social behaviour (Côté et al., 2015; Schmukle et al., 2019), to name a few. These studies have 
been generally confined to estimating the effects of spatially aggregated income inequality, and it 
is known that people widely misperceive aggregate levels of inequality (Gimpelson & Treisman, 
2018; Hauser & Norton, 2017; Norton & Ariely, 2011). Taking pro-social behaviour as an 
example, it is possible that the theorised relationship between inequality and charitable donation 
is, to some extent, washed out by the spatial resolution utilised. For example, (Côté et al., 2015) 
use US state-level inequality, but it is hard to imagine that individuals in Sacramento have 
similar experiences to those in San Francisco. Using instead the measure introduced here, or 
other spatially-granular and salient measures of inequality, would entail looking at the problem 






Figure A.1: Correlation matrix for inequality measures (LSOA-level) 
  Gini Coefficient of variation Top 1% Nine:ten Nine:five Five:ten 
LSOA        
 Gini 1.000 0.867 0.658 0.901 0.857 0.574 
 Coefficient of variation 0.867 1.000 0.851 0.717 0.735 0.394 
 Top 1% 0.658 0.851 1.000 0.482 0.533 0.213 
 Nine:ten 0.901 0.717 0.482 1.000 0.805 0.739 
 Nine:five 0.857 0.735 0.533 0.805 1.000 0.226 
 Five:ten 0.574 0.394 0.213 0.739 0.226 1.000 
Towns & Cities        
 Gini 1.000 0.839 0.768 0.940 0.912 0.641 
 Coefficient of variation 0.839 1.000 0.896 0.727 0.728 0.469 
 Top 1% 0.768 0.896 1.000 0.612 0.622 0.384 
 Nine:ten 0.940 0.727 0.612 1.000 0.856 0.793 
 Nine:five 0.912 0.728 0.622 0.856 1.000 0.375 
 Five:ten 0.641 0.469 0.384 0.793 0.375 1.000 
 
2.7.1 Relationship between housing value inequality and income inequality 
One objection to computing economic inequality based on housing values is that the value of a 
house oftentimes doesn’t correspond with the tenure of its inhabitants. Households who do not 
own their home outright cannot lay claim to its worth. One argument against this objection is that 
if a household lives in a property that is relatively high in value, the inhabitants will likely be 
relatively well off in economic terms whether they are renting or not, and vice versa. Because of 
this, I expect to see a strong association between housing value inequality and income inequality. 




that there is not sufficiently granular or detailed information on incomes in the UK. As a result, 
in evaluating how housing value inequality correlates with other measures of inequality, I am 
largely confined to more aggregated levels. 
I first examine how the Gini coefficient of housing values correlates with wage inequality 
calculated from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), a 1% sample of employees 
in the UK based on the PAYE register. The advantage of this dataset is that its size allows us to 
measure inequality down to the Parliamentary Constituency (PC) level (total number of areas = 
650), although this is expected to still be noisy, with an average of 189 observation per PC 
(which far less than the equivalent number for housing values, which is 35,341). Moreover, 
ASHE does not perfectly represent the income distribution as it does not capture the self-
employed or non-labour sources of income. 
Table A.1 provides univariate regression results for housing value inequality on income 
inequality derived from ASHE at different levels of aggregation, which we take as the PC and 
LAD – Columns 1 to 2 respectively. The coefficients are standardised to ease interpretation. The 
relationship is substantive – a 1 standard deviation increase in the Gini of housing value 
inequality is associated with a 0.546 and 0.58 standard deviation increase in the income Gini at 
the PC and LAD levels respectively. As we shouldn’t expect a measure based on housing values 
to be perfectly correlated with income inequality, the strong correlation between them, despite 
the noisiness of the income inequality measure, is reassuring and suggests that measures based 












Table A.1: Relationship between wage (ASHE) and housing value inequality 
 Dependent variable: 
 Gini income inequality 
 PC LAD 
 (1) (2) 
Gini housing value 0.546*** 0.580*** 
 (0.064) (0.083) 
Mean income observations per area 189.26 319.06 
Mean housing observations per area 35340.84 60134.93 
Observations 627 361 
R2 0.103 0.119 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
While neighbourhood-level inequality estimates do not exist outside this paper as far as I’m 
aware, attempts have been made to use ONS LSOA income estimates to construct inequality 
measures for larger areas (Rae & Nyanzu, 2019). The ONS provides the estimated percentage of 
households within each area with an income that falls within a range, with the data only covering 
England and Wales.15 The income bands are: 0; (0-5k]; (5k-10k]; (10k-15k]; (15k-20k]; (20k-
30k]; (30k-40k]; (40k-60k]; and over 60k. Therefore, one can calculate a Gini coefficient for 
each LSOA by taking the midpoint of the band and assigning it to households in proportion. 
This approach has at least two downsides. First, the highest income category is 60k and above, 
which is a rather low top end cutoff value, and it is therefore not clear what income to apply for 
the proportion of households above this value (Rae & Nyanzu (2019) take 70k). Second, research 
suggests the grouping of continuous values into a small number of bands results in substantial 
downward bias to the resulting estimated Gini (Van Ourti & Clarke, 2011). 
Nevertheless, I use the ONS LSOA income estimates for 2015-16 (the latest release as of this 
writing) and apply this approach to construct an alternative LSOA-level Gini. I then see how 
correlated the measures are with the Gini based on housing values. Table A.2 provides these 
 







results using univariate regression with standardised coefficients, indicating once more a strong 
correlation between housing and income inequality measures, despite the coarseness and top 
coding of the income groups in the latter. Column 1 of Table A.2 provides the correlation with 
the LSOA income Gini (0.56), and Colums 2 and 3 replicate the analysis for ASHE, i.e. taking 
inequality at the LAD and PC levels, using the banded income data (0.47 and 0.47 respectively). 
Table A.2: Relationship between income (PAYE) and housing values inequality 
 Dependent variable: 
 Gini PAYE income inequality 
 LSOA PC LAD 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Gini housing value 0.559*** 0.466*** 0.471*** 
 (0.004) (0.038) (0.050) 
Observations 34,740 533 317 
R2 0.313 0.221 0.223 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
2.7.2 Bivariate spatial analysis 
Areas that are relatively unequal or equal can vary in terms of median wealth. One reason to 
examine this bivariate spatial relationship is to evaluate the extent of neighbourhoods that are 
equal and poor versus equal and rich. To examine this variation and differentiate between area 
types, I map the relationship between inequality and median property value (log scale) in Figure 
A.2. I scale both variables so that they each have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1, and 
segment inequality and median value using quantiles method and contrasting colour scheme. 
Panel A of Figure A.2 shows the bivariate map for the UK. We can thus see a more nuanced 
representation of within-area inequality, with much of Wales, the Midlands and the North of 
England relatively unequal but poor as compared with the South of England and Scotland. It is 
mainly cities such as Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool and Cardiff which have LSOAs which 
are both poor and equal, while urban areas in the South West and London, as well as rural areas 
in the North of Scotland, are relatively equal and rich. 
Once again, I pull out London (Panel B of Figure A.2) to see that, given the uniformly high 




this visualisation to that of Figure 3. I therefore re-scale and re-segment London on its own to 
account for its position relative to other regions of the UK (Panel C). We thus are able to see 
pockets of inequality within the city’s relatively poor areas in the East, South and West. 






3 The determinants of local inequality 
Abstract: What leads some neighbourhoods to be more unequal than others? While a growing 
body of work investigates the determinants of sub-national inequality, studies generally do not 
go below the level of cities. There is therefore limited understanding of the causes of 
neighbourhood-level inequality. I investigate this question using granular measures of inequality 
in the UK based on housing values. I find that the determinants of neighbourhood inequality are 
mostly similar to those of urban areas in the UK and elsewhere – educational attainment in 
particular is a key factor. However, I also find that the presence of exogenous amenities, 
e.g. rivers, and listed buildings, are substantive drivers of inequality at the neighbourhood-level 
but not for urban areas as a whole, contrary to related work in other countries. 
3.1 Introduction 
Recent years have seen a growing interest in the determinants of urban and regional inequality, 
with papers covering the US (Florida & Mellander, 2016; Glaeser et al., 2009), UK (N. Lee et 
al., 2016) and Canada (Bolton & Breau, 2012; Marchand et al., 2020). Some recent work has 
examined the drivers of inequality at a more local level, for example Hortas-Rico & Rios (2019) 
explore municipalities across Spain, while other works have looked at specific cities in France 
(Najib, 2020) and South Africa (Hamann & Horn, 2021). There is currently no empirical 
evidence, however, for why some neighbourhoods are more unequal than others for the UK. 
What drives rich and poor to live side by side? 
This is an important question for a number of reasons. First, uncovering the determinants of local 
inequality provides insight into the how the lived experience of residents varies with inequality. 
For example, if inequality is associated with ethnic diversity then people living in less equal 
places are also more likely to be exposed to people of different backgrounds (see Chapter 6). 
Another example might be in relation to the kinds of amenities residents have access to. 
Moreover, by understanding how local inequality translates into daily experiences and 
observation (Suss, 2021), we might be able to uncover pathways through which inequality 
affects attitudes and behaviour. Second, understanding what factors explain why some places are 




pitfalls of economically diverse neighbourhoods (Cheshire, 2007; G. Galster, 2007; Meen & 
Gibb, 2005; Ostendorf et al., 2001), or in order to aid in avoiding social ills associated with 
neighbourhood inequality, e.g. crime (Morenoff et al., 2001; Whitworth, 2013). 
This paper explores the determinants of neighbourhood-level inequality in the UK. For 
inequality, I utilise unique data providing a granular picture of economic discrepancies based on 
housing values (see Chapter 2 of this thesis for details of the data and measure used). I merge 
this information with data on socio-demographic composition, housing tenure, and local 
amenities from the UK census, the Ordnance Survey, and other sources. I estimate spatial error 
models to explore how these characteristics relate to local inequality, producing a richer picture 
of the determinants of inequality in the UK than has been available to date. 
In line with studies at the urban and regional levels, I find that the composition of skills, proxied 
by the percent of adult residents with a university degree or above, is the most important factor 
determining neighbourhood inequality, however its relationship with inequality is non-linear and 
concave. Other less important but still significant demographic and labour market factors are: the 
share of workers employed in manufacturing occupations; the percent of females in employment; 
the ethnic composition of residents; and the age profile of the area. These findings are robust to 
different measures of local inequality and sub-sample analyses, i.e. whether looking solely at 
neighbourhoods within urban or rural areas. I find evidence that changes in these neighbourhood 
characteristics over the period 1991 and 2011 predict changes in local inequality over the period 
1999-2019, hinting at their potentially causal role. 
I also find that the concentration of housing tenure (i.e. whether homes are owned, mortgaged, 
privately or socially rented) is an important factor that is associated with lower neighbourhood 
inequality. Moreover, increased concentration of housing tenure within neighbourhoods between 
1991 and 2011 is the most important factor explaining changes in inequality over time. This 
finding, coupled with the fact that inequality has been declining on average across 
neighbourhoods in the UK (see Chapter 2), suggests that neighbourhoods are becoming more 
segregated within urban and rural areas alike. This might due to ineffective planning policies 
moving away from encouraging mixed development neighbourhoods, or it might be a result of 





I examine whether amenities matter for local inequality in the UK. There is evidence from the 
US to suggest that the presence of natural amenities are responsible for persistently high incomes 
in urban areas (S. Lee & Lin, 2018), and that modern amenities (e.g. cultural offerings) have 
fueled increases in urban inequality (Diamond, 2016). I examine whether the presence of 
‘historic/exogenous’ (e.g. rivers, listed buildings, world heritage sites) and ‘modern/endogenous’ 
(e.g. playgrounds, sports fields) amenities, identified by Brueckner et al. (1999), are drivers of 
local inequality in the UK. I find that amenities of both kinds are substantively associated with 
neighbourhood-level inequality – a one standard deviation increase in the presence of listed 
buildings, for example, is associated with a 10% increase in neighbourhood inequality, 
controlling for median house value and other important factors. Amenities are not important, 
however, when looking at urban areas in aggregate. 
Finally, I adopt a multi-scalar approach (Cavanaugh & Breau, 2018), comparing and contrasting 
the determinants of neighbourhood inequality with those of urban inequality. This analysis 
highlights certain shared determinants of inequality across these different levels of aggregation, 
including skills composition and ethnic diversity, but also determinants that only matter at the 
local or urban level, such as amenities and unemployment respectively. 
The rest of this paper is proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 details the data and methodology 
utilised, 3.3 provides the results, and 3.4 concludes with a discussion and overview of the policy 
implications. 
3.2 Data and methodology 
I gather data from the 1991 and 2011 UK census on known determinants of urban and regional 
level inequality at the neighbourhood-level (Glaeser et al., 2009; N. Lee et al., 2016; Marchand 
et al., 2020). In particular, I obtain data on demographic and labour market characteristics, skills, 
occupations, and housing tenure. For demographic and labour market characteristics, I include 
the natural log of neighbourhood population, the percent of adults unemployed, the percent of 
females that are employed, and the percent of workers that work part-time. I also include the 
percent of residents who are old (65 years and older) and young (under 18 years of age). I also 
include a measure of ethnic composition, taken as the percent of residents who self-identify as 
non-white. For skills, I take the percent of adult residents who have a university degree or above 




employed in manufacturing. Finally, I also include the natural log of the median house value for 
the area. 
I augment this data with information on the housing tenure composition of the neighbourhood. In 
particular, I include a measure of the concentration of housing tenure, broken down into four 
categories (owned outright, owned with a mortgage, private rented, and social rented), using the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), and the percent of housing that is socially rented (i.e. from 
the Local Authority or housing association). 
Lastly, I include a number of variables for amenities, covering both historical and modern types, 
as defined by Brueckner et al. (1999). For historical/exogenous amenities, I take rivers, listed 
buildings, world heritage sites, and registered parks and gardens. For modern amenities, I take 
green sites (which comprise playgrounds, sports sites, and other green spaces) and rail stations. 
Listed buildings, world heritage sites, and registered parks and gardens data are obtained from 
Heritage England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Information on green sites and rivers 
are retrieved from the Ordnance Survey.16 Locations of train stations in Great Britain are 
obtained from Pope (2017). Table 8 provides summary statistics. 
The inequality data is the same as that which was presented in Chapter 2, with the preferred 
measure taken as the Gini coefficient. In terms of spatial scale, the neighbourhood is defined 
once more as the LSOA (N = 41,729 for the entire UK), and the urban level is taken as all towns 
and cities in the UK (N = 596). 
Given the likelihood that our variables are not randomly spatially distributed, I perform a 
Moran’s I test to check for the presence of spatial autocorrelation. The null hypothesis is indeed 
rejected (𝑝 < 0.01), which indicates that a spatial regression model is warranted. As is typical, I 
fit both a spatial lag and spatial error model and perform a Lagrange Multiplier test to select 
between them, which indicates the superiority of the spatial error model. I therefore specify a 
spatial error model in the following form: 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋 + 𝛾𝑍 + 𝜖  
Where, 𝜖 = 𝜆∑ 𝑊 𝜖 + 𝜇  
 




𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖  is the estimated level of inequality in LSOA 𝑖, 𝑋 is the vector of determinants, 𝑍 are fixed 
effects for UK regions, 𝜆 is the spatial autocorrelation coefficient, 𝑊 is the spatial weight matrix, 
which I calculate using the Queen’s criterion with all adjoining neighbours receiving equal 
weight, and 𝜇  is the spatially autocorrelated error term. 
Table 8: Descriptive statistics for inequality determinants 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max 
Gini 41,742 0.195 0.066 0.018 0.145 0.238 0.649 
Top 1% 41,742 0.031 0.013 0.012 0.023 0.036 0.393 
Nine:ten 41,742 2.484 0.897 1.000 1.884 2.873 30.286 
Ln(Population) 42,619 7.250 0.341 4.990 7.178 7.438 9.024 
Median house price 41,742 12.266 0.603 10.571 11.828 12.679 15.339 
Unemployed (%) 42,619 4.473 2.511 0.181 2.597 5.814 20.464 
Female employed (%) 42,619 57.431 9.204 3.028 52.844 63.323 86.456 
Part-time employed (%) 42,619 0.138 0.027 0.008 0.125 0.156 0.278 
Aged 65+ (%) 42,619 16.736 7.205 0.000 11.549 21.272 73.762 
Aged under 18 (%) 42,619 20.060 4.536 0.541 17.495 22.581 47.062 
Uni Degree or above (%) 42,619 29.465 13.972 3.456 18.757 37.931 93.613 
Non-white (%) 42,619 11.567 17.200 0.000 1.855 12.533 99.281 
Manufacturing employed (%) 42,619 8.973 4.494 0.000 5.702 11.582 45.102 
Social rent (%) 42,619 18.244 17.805 0.000 4.200 27.700 98.400 
Housing tenure HHI 42,619 0.560 0.158 0.250 0.430 0.681 1.000 
Rivers 42,194 3.533 9.362 0.000 0.000 2.000 89.000 
Green sites 42,619 4.290 3.927 0 1 6 39 
Listed buildings 42,192 9.466 21.201 0.000 0.000 7.000 144.000 
Rail stations 42,619 0.068 0.287 0 0 0 10 
Parks and gardens 42,619 0.121 0.434 0 0 0 11 
World heritage sites 42,619 0.028 0.240 0 0 0 6 
 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Determinants of inequality at the neighbourhood level 
Table 9 provides the baseline results for the spatial error model with region fixed effects. 
Column 1 provides the simplest model, i.e. without squared terms or amenity variables. Column 
2 adds the squared terms, and Column 3 introduces the amenity variables. I standardise all 
variables so that the coefficient sizes are comparable. Across all models, I find that the single 




coefficient of 0.515 in Column 1. The relationship between skills and inequality is non-linear, 
however, with the coefficient on the squared term negative in Columns 2 and 3, reflecting a 
concave relationship. This makes intuitive sense – areas which have very few university 
graduates or are mostly comprised of university graduates are expected to be relatively equal, 
whereas those that contain a mix of low skilled and high skilled residents are expected to be 
more unequal. 
The second most important determinant is the concentration of housing tenure, with a coefficient 
of -0.37 in the full model with amenities. In other words, the more concentrated the area is in 
terms of housing tenure, the more equal. I also find a negative and substantively large coefficient 
for the ethnicity variable (𝛽 = -0.135 in Column 3). Next in terms of size are two amenity 
variables – green sites (𝛽 = 0.116) and listed buildings (𝛽 = 0.103). The coefficients on rivers, 
parks and gardens, and rail stations are also significant but relatively small in size. 
The older the population and the higher the share of those employed in manufacturing, the higher 
the level of inequality in the neighbourhood. As with skills, the squared term for the 
manufacturing variables is significant and negative, suggesting a concave relationship with 
inequality. Interestingly, the coefficient for the main effect of median house prices turns negative 
when introducing the amenity variables in Column 3. The share of houses in the neighbourhood 
that are social rented exhibits a similar non-linear and convex relationship with inequality. 
Column 4 provides the OLS model (i.e. without accounting for spatial effects) using the same 












Table 9: Determinants of neighbourhood-level inequality 
 Gini (2019) 
 Simple Non-linearities Amenities OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(Population) 0.116*** 0.094*** 0.033*** 0.042*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Ln(Median house price) 0.087*** 0.042*** -0.083*** -0.085*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) 
Ln(Median house price)^2  0.074*** 0.077*** 0.153*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Unemployed (%) 0.011 0.011 0.006 0.006 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Female employed (%) -0.027*** -0.082*** -0.075*** -0.041*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Part-time employed (%) -0.073*** -0.057*** -0.051*** -0.111*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Aged 65+ (%) 0.120*** 0.110*** 0.085*** 0.138*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Aged under 18 (%) -0.065*** -0.043*** -0.036*** 0.022*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Uni Degree or above (%) 0.515*** 0.769*** 0.731*** 0.652*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) 
Uni Degree or above (%)^2  -0.206*** -0.177*** -0.152*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Non-white (%) -0.075*** -0.174*** -0.135*** -0.133*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) 
Manufacturing employed (%) -0.007 0.076*** 0.083*** 0.113*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) 
Manufacturing employed (%)^2  -0.023*** -0.021*** -0.023*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Social rent (%) -0.037*** -0.159*** -0.082*** -0.081*** 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
Social rent (%)^2  0.089*** 0.046*** 0.031*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Housing tenure HHI -0.363*** -0.494*** -0.370*** -0.301*** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Rivers   0.047*** 0.066*** 
   (0.005) (0.005) 
Green sites   0.116*** 0.137*** 
   (0.004) (0.005) 
Listed buildings   0.103*** 0.112*** 
   (0.005) (0.005) 
Parks and gardens   0.023*** 0.025*** 
   (0.004) (0.004) 
World heritage sites   0.038 0.010 




Rail stations   0.015*** 0.022*** 
   (0.003) (0.004) 
Constant 0.109*** 0.117*** 0.072* -0.0004 
 (0.042) (0.040) (0.037) (0.021) 
Fixed effect Region Region Region Region 
Observations 41,742 41,742 40,948 40,948 
R2    0.471 
Log Likelihood -44,744.950 -43,377.060 -41,496.300  
sigma2 0.464 0.436 0.418  
Akaike Inf. Crit. 89,541.910 86,814.120 83,064.600  
Wald Test (df = 1) 12,621.610*** 10,934.950*** 9,787.671***  
LR Test (df = 1) 9,444.805*** 8,156.175*** 6,582.829***  
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
I next conduct a number of checks to see whether the factors explaining neighbourhood-level 
inequality are robust. First, because Table 9 included all LSOAs, Table A.3 in the Annex splits 
the data into sub-samples, looking separately at neighbourhoods within urban areas only 
(Column 1), towns and cities separately (Columns 2 and 3 respectively), and rural 
neighbourhoods (Column 4). The findings are consistent in all these models, albeit some of the 
coefficient sizes differ in intuitive ways. For example, the association between rivers and LSOA 
inequality is far smaller when looking at the rural only subset. Conversely, listed buildings are 
more strongly associated with neighbourhood inequality within cities, highlighting the 
importance of these amenities for drawing in wealthier inhabitants, thus increasing local 
inequality. 
Table A.4 in the Annex provides the results for alternative inequality measures, using the Top 
1% concentration and three percentile ratios, 90:10, 90:50 and 50:10. The findings vary 
somewhat depending on the measure of inequality used. The education variable continues the be 
the most important determinant except for when the outcome variable is the 90:50 ratio, where it 
is relatively much smaller. This is not that surprising – the percent of residents who are highly 
educated does not affect inequality in the top half of the distribution as much as it does for the 
bottom half or the top to bottom ratio. The coefficients on the amenity values are largely 
consistent regardless of inequality measure used. 
Finally, Table A.5 presents the results for a specification where instead of data from the 2011 




in Table 9 are persistent over time – the 1991 variables are strongly predictive of neighbourhood 
inequality in 2019. The percent of residents with a university degree in 1991 is the second most 
important factor for contemporary inequality levels, behind housing tenure concentration. 
3.3.2 Determinants of changes in neighbourhood inequality 
Table 10 presents regression results for both the neighbourhood and city-level where all variable 
are differenced between 2011 and 1991 (2019 and 1999 for the Gini). Amenities are omitted 
from Table 10 because they either do not change over time (e.g. rivers), or I am not able to 
obtain data for 1991 (e.g. green sites). The results reveal that both neighbourhoods and urban 
areas that saw an increase in skilled residents, as proxied by the percentage point change in 
adults with a university degree, experienced substantial increases in inequality (𝛽 = 0.066 and 
0.42 respectively for neighbourhoods and urban areas). The squared term is also positive and 
significant at the neighbourhood level, suggesting the effect is even stronger for areas which saw 
relatively large percentage point increases. 
On the other hand, areas that saw increases in the concentration of housing tenures at the 
neighbourhood level saw substantial decreases in inequality (𝛽 = -0.271). This provides 
suggestive evidence that the patterns of declining neighbourhood-level inequality is a result of 














Table 10: Change in inequality and determinants (1999 to 2019) at neighbourhood level 
 Gini change (1999-2019) 
 Neighbourhood Neighbourhood 
 (1) (2) 
Change Ln(Population) 0.0004 0.0002 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Change Ln(Median house price) -0.128*** -0.145*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) 
Change Ln(Median house price)^2  0.009*** 
  (0.002) 
Change Unemployed (%) -0.057*** -0.054*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
Change Female employed (%) -0.006 -0.0001 
 (0.009) (0.010) 
Change Part-time employed (%) -0.028*** -0.029*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
Change Aged 65+ (%) -0.039*** -0.035*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
Change Aged under 18 (%) 0.001 0.002 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
Change Uni Degree or above (%) 0.080*** 0.066*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) 
Change Uni Degree or above (%)^2  0.014*** 
  (0.005) 
Change Non-white (%) -0.018* -0.014 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
Change Manufacturing employed (%) 0.0004 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Change Manufacturing employed (%)^2  0.001 
  (0.004) 
Change Social rent (%) -0.024** -0.032*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) 
Change Social rent (%)^2  0.004 
  (0.008) 
Change Housing tenure HHI -0.271*** -0.271*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) 
Constant -0.134*** -0.161*** 
 (0.012) (0.015) 
Fixed effect None None 
Observations 27,885 27,885 
Log Likelihood -38,620.890 -38,606.810 




Akaike Inf. Crit. 77,271.770 77,251.610 
Wald Test (df = 1) 1,087.866*** 1,054.965*** 
LR Test (df = 1) 1,017.227*** 1,013.083*** 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
3.3.3 Determinants of inequality at the urban level 
Finally, I examine whether the same relationships exist at the urban level of aggregation – i.e. for 
all towns and cities in the UK. Table 11 presents these results using simple OLS as a Moran’s I 
test reveals a lack of spatial autocorrelation at this level (𝑝 = 0.75). Column 1 to 3 replicates the 
specifications in the main regression analysis of Table 9. 
As with the neighbourhood-level analysis, the proxy for skills composition is the single most 
important factor driving urban inequality in the UK (𝛽 = 0.86 in Column 3). Unlike the 
neighbourhood-level regressions, the coefficients for the housing tenure variables are not 
significant. Amenities are also no longer important. This is somewhat surprising, as the literature 
on the importance of amenities for affecting residential composition is generally situated at the 
urban level (Brueckner et al., 1999; Glaeser et al., 2008). 
There is again a convex relationship between median income and inequality, suggesting that 
poorer and richer cities tend to be more unequal than cities at the middle of the distribution in 
terms of median housing value. The unemployment rate, which was not significant at the 













Table 11: Determinants of urban inequality 
 Gini (2019) 
 Simple Non-linearities Amenities 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ln(Population) 0.268*** 0.259*** 0.254*** 
 (0.043) (0.044) (0.045) 
Ln(Median house price) -0.462*** -0.492*** -0.459*** 
 (0.083) (0.079) (0.082) 
Ln(Median house price)^2  0.210*** 0.203*** 
  (0.023) (0.023) 
Unemployed (%) 0.225*** 0.203*** 0.227*** 
 (0.051) (0.048) (0.051) 
Female employed (%) -0.061 -0.017 -0.021 
 (0.045) (0.046) (0.047) 
Part-time employed (%) -0.175*** -0.130*** -0.134*** 
 (0.039) (0.037) (0.038) 
Aged 65+ (%) 0.181*** 0.169*** 0.169*** 
 (0.040) (0.038) (0.039) 
Aged under 18 (%) 0.109*** 0.050 0.066 
 (0.038) (0.040) (0.041) 
Uni Degree or above (%) 0.881*** 0.861*** 0.860*** 
 (0.053) (0.055) (0.057) 
Uni Degree or above (%)^2  -0.078*** -0.086*** 
  (0.024) (0.025) 
Non-white (%) -0.075* -0.062 -0.068* 
 (0.040) (0.039) (0.041) 
Manufacturing employed (%) 0.076** 0.009 0.001 
 (0.034) (0.037) (0.038) 
Manufacturing employed (%)^2  0.033** 0.038** 
  (0.016) (0.017) 
Social rent (%) 0.204 0.082 0.289 
 (0.381) (0.398) (0.443) 
Social rent (%)^2  -0.006 -0.015 
  (0.009) (0.024) 
Housing tenure HHI -0.092 0.076 -0.349 
 (0.392) (0.372) (0.590) 
Rivers   0.180 
   (0.118) 
Green sites   -0.224 
   (0.376) 
Listed buildings   0.023 
   (0.112) 




   (0.209) 
World heritage sites   0.053 
   (0.108) 
Rail stations   0.173 
   (0.385) 
Constant 0.128 -0.267* -0.182 
 (0.139) (0.140) (0.148) 
Fixed effect level Region Region Region 
Observations 609 609 586 
R2 0.672 0.716 0.715 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
3.4 Discussion and conclusion 
In this paper, I provide the first examination of the determinants of neighbourhood inequality in 
the UK. Hitherto studies have focused only as far down as the urban level (N. Lee et al., 2016), 
whereas the data presented here allows me to adopt a multi-scalar approach, which I do down to 
the level of neighbourhoods. The results indicate that the determinants of inequality vary across 
the neighbourhood and urban levels, highlighting the importance of fine-grained analysis of the 
patterns and determinants of inequality. 
I find that, regardless of which geographical scale is chosen, the composition of skills is a key 
determinant affecting levels of inequality, albeit in a concave fashion. Where the determinants 
differ from the urban to the neighbourhood scale in relation to housing tenure and amenities. 
Neighbourhoods with high concentrations of tenure, e.g. home owners, are less economically 
diverse and more equal. Regarding amenities, both exogenous and endogenous varieties are 
substantive factors affecting neighbourhood inequality, although not at the level of cities. 
The findings here can be used to understand how the lived experiences of people varies by level 
of inequality. Individuals living in a neighbourhood with high levels of inequality are more likely 
to live among a people with mixed levels of education and ethnic backgrounds. They are also 
likely to live in places which have a mix of different housing tenures and include green sites and 
listed buildings. These factors may act as inputs into people’s perceptions of local inequality and 
impact upon their attitudes and behaviours as a result. 
These findings also provide policymakers and urban planners with potential tools to with which 




around the placement of green sites and the development of education and skills programmes. 
Future work should explore the longitudinal impact of such policies on local inequality, adopting 
quasi-experimental designs where possible, to provide further insight. 
The work is not without limitations, of course, and these suggest avenues for further research. 
First, this paper cannot account for population flows between neighbourhoods and urban areas. 
One response to extreme levels of neighbourhood inequality might be to simply move to a 
different location. While I don’t have access to detailed information on population flows between 
neighbourhoods, future work might rectify this by tapping alternative data sources which might 
provide this information. For example, the studies are increasingly using anonymised location 
data from mobile phones and other sources to identify people’s home and work locations (Athey 
et al., 2020; Couture et al., 2020; Dash et al., 2014; Davis et al., 2019). This type of data could 
potentially be used longitudinally to understand patterns of residential flows. 
Second, while the work presented here includes many determinants, from variables capturing 
socio-demographic compositions to amenities of a range of types, not all possible determinants 
of interest were included in this work. Future work could build upon the current investigation 
adding complementary data sources which capture features of the local environment including, 
for example, its ‘scenicness’ (Seresinhe et al., 2015) and coastal proximity (Garrett & Fleming, 
2019). Despite these limitations, the current work provides valuable insights to the social and 






Table A.3: Robustness check – sub-group analysis 
 Gini (2019) 
 Cities and Towns Cities Towns Rural 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(Population) 0.055*** 0.056*** 0.046*** -0.031** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
Ln(Median house price) -0.080*** -0.050*** -0.153*** -0.083*** 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.026) (0.025) 
Ln(Median house price)^2 0.071*** 0.050*** 0.108*** 0.132*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) 
Unemployed (%) 0.013 0.005 0.060*** 0.045** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.020) 
Female employed (%) -0.081*** -0.099*** -0.049*** -0.086*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.018) 
Part-time employed (%) -0.041*** -0.027*** -0.091*** -0.087*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) 
Aged 65+ (%) -0.026*** -0.022*** -0.060*** -0.119*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.014) 
Aged under 18 (%) 0.101*** 0.121*** 0.047*** -0.047*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.014) 
Uni Degree or above (%) 0.746*** 0.744*** 0.775*** 0.624*** 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.020) (0.023) 
Uni Degree or above (%)^2 -0.166*** -0.152*** -0.201*** -0.233*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.012) 
Non-white (%) -0.129*** -0.119*** -0.412*** 0.018 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.039) (0.062) 
Manufacturing employed (%) 0.096*** 0.104*** 0.039*** 0.061*** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) 
Manufacturing employed (%)^2 -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.012*** -0.022*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Social rent (%) -0.113*** -0.134*** -0.065*** 0.034 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.023) (0.026) 
Social rent (%)^2 0.064*** 0.084*** -0.010 -0.152*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.014) 
Housing tenure HHI -0.393*** -0.426*** -0.329*** -0.223*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.018) (0.019) 
Rivers 0.139*** 0.128*** 0.152*** 0.037*** 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.013) (0.005) 




 (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) 
Listed buildings 0.130*** 0.192*** 0.069*** 0.083*** 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.007) 
Parks and gardens 0.046*** 0.048*** 0.037*** 0.005 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006) 
World heritage sites 0.075* 0.083 0.067 -0.079 
 (0.044) (0.060) (0.058) (0.050) 
Rail stations 0.015*** 0.008 0.030*** 0.008 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) 
Constant 0.042 0.027 0.010 0.667*** 
 (0.040) (0.054) (0.057) (0.067) 
Fixed effect Region Region Region Region 
Observations 33,428 23,513 9,915 7,520 
Log Likelihood -34,315.500 -24,486.030 -9,486.545 -6,595.076 
sigma2 0.428 0.437 0.385 0.329 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 68,703.000 49,044.070 19,045.090 13,262.150 
Wald Test (df = 1) 7,336.933*** 3,689.491*** 793.022*** 588.867*** 
LR Test (df = 1) 5,240.560*** 4,337.195*** 688.682*** 524.263*** 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table A.4: Robustness check – alternative inequality measures 
 Gini (2019) 
 City FE Top 1% 90:10 90:50 50:10 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln(Population) -0.077*** 0.015** 0.023*** 0.006 0.014* 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Ln(Median house price) -0.256*** 0.247*** -0.723*** 1.121*** -0.228*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
Ln(Median house price)^2 0.109*** 0.100*** 0.082*** 0.065*** 0.106*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Unemployed (%) -0.006 0.010 -0.085*** 0.121*** -0.011 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Female employed (%) -0.067*** -0.063*** -0.078*** -0.022*** -0.053*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Part-time employed (%) -0.057*** -0.052*** -0.064*** -0.017** -0.069*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Aged 65+ (%) -0.049*** 0.009 0.013** -0.012* -0.027*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Aged under 18 (%) 0.040*** 0.106*** 0.040*** 0.133*** 0.079*** 




Uni Degree or above (%) 0.387*** 0.513*** 0.824*** 0.031*** 0.573*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Uni Degree or above (%)^2 -0.094*** -0.118*** -0.159*** -0.050*** -0.135*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Non-white (%) -0.058*** -0.123*** -0.169*** -0.020** -0.100*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
Manufacturing employed (%) 0.022** 0.105*** 0.011 0.178*** 0.053*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
Manufacturing employed (%)^2 -0.001 -0.023*** -0.010*** -0.034*** -0.009** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Social rent (%) -0.008 -0.165*** 0.127*** -0.384*** -0.016 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
Social rent (%)^2 0.049*** 0.068*** -0.030*** 0.134*** 0.026*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Housing tenure HHI -0.134*** -0.424*** -0.104*** -0.575*** -0.236*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Rivers 0.078*** 0.027*** 0.032*** 0.019*** 0.061*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Green sites 0.101*** 0.084*** 0.095*** 0.046*** 0.109*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Listed buildings 0.170*** 0.062*** 0.100*** -0.026*** 0.135*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Parks and gardens 0.040*** 0.026*** 0.038*** -0.007 0.030*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
World heritage sites -0.006 0.039 0.072* -0.002 0.012 
 (0.040) (0.038) (0.042) (0.040) (0.039) 
Rail stations 0.008* 0.015*** 0.004 0.024*** 0.014*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant -0.291*** 0.199*** -0.331*** 0.694*** -0.112*** 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.039) (0.035) (0.033) 
Fixed effect City Region Region Region Region 
Observations 40,948 40,948 40,948 40,948 40,948 
Log Likelihood -50,562.650 -44,576.960 -48,779.570 -48,191.200 -47,677.820 
sigma2 0.680 0.495 0.606 0.597 0.584 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 101,197.300 89,225.910 97,631.140 96,454.400 95,427.630 
Wald Test (df = 1) 1,929.638*** 5,202.095*** 10,848.010*** 3,174.323*** 3,103.537*** 
LR Test (df = 1) 1,738.642*** 4,458.277*** 4,284.793*** 2,558.225*** 2,840.244*** 






Table A.5: Robustness check – 1991 data 
 Gini (2019) 
 1991 data 
Ln(Population) 0.018*** 
 (0.004) 
Ln(Median house price) 0.239*** 
 (0.010) 
Ln(Median house price)^2 -0.009** 
 (0.004) 
Unemployed (%) -0.144*** 
 (0.011) 
Female employed (%) -0.190*** 
 (0.010) 
Part-time employed (%) -0.148*** 
 (0.008) 
Aged 65+ (%) -0.107*** 
 (0.009) 
Aged under 18 (%) -0.117*** 
 (0.011) 
Uni Degree or above (%) 0.271*** 
 (0.008) 
Uni Degree or above (%)^2 -0.047*** 
 (0.003) 
Non-white (%) -0.107*** 
 (0.009) 
Manufacturing employed (%) -0.051*** 
 (0.006) 
Manufacturing employed (%)^2 0.001 
 (0.003) 
Social rent (%) -0.357*** 
 (0.015) 
Social rent (%)^2 0.136*** 
 (0.008) 




Fixed effect Region 
Observations 29,317 
Log Likelihood -31,056.830 
sigma2 0.461 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 62,167.650 
Wald Test 5,451.698*** (df = 1) 
LR Test 4,328.355*** (df = 1) 






4 Local economic inequality leads higher income individuals to be 
more generous 
Abstract: There is ongoing debate about whether the relationship between income and pro-social 
behaviour depends on economic inequality. Studies investigating this question differ in their 
conclusions but are consistent in measuring inequality at aggregated geographic levels (i.e. at 
the state, region, or country-level). I hypothesise that local, more immediate manifestations of 
inequality are important for driving pro-social behaviour, and test the interaction between 
income and inequality using a much finer geographical resolution. I first analyse the charitable 
giving of US individuals and households, using ZIP-code level measures of inequality and data 
on tax deductible charitable donations reported to the IRS (N = 133,870). I then generalise the 
results to individuals in the UK using a large-scale household survey (N = 39,289) and 
neighbourhood-level inequality measures. In both samples I find robust evidence of a significant 
interaction effect, albeit in the opposite direction as that which has been postulated – higher 
local inequality leads higher income individuals to behave more pro-socially rather than less. 
Finally, I investigate whether greater contact between rich and poor in local unequal areas is 
driving the findings – respondents are significantly more likely to say they have at least some 
friends who have different incomes to themselves if they live in an unequal neighbourhood, but 
this does not mediate the relationship between inequality and pro-social behaviour. 
4.1 Introduction 
How does economic inequality affect pro-social behaviour? This question has become 
increasingly important as inequality has risen sharply over the last half-century in the US, UK 
and many other countries (Alvaredo et al., 2018; Piketty & Saez, 2014). Existing research 
situates the potential effect of inequality on pro-social behaviour within a larger, and largely 
inconclusive, debate on whether the rich are more or less generous than the poor (Andreoni et al., 
2017; Holland et al., 2012; Korndörfer et al., 2015; Piff et al., 2010, 2012). A notable paper finds 
that the relationship between income and pro-social behaviour depends on inequality, with a 
negative interaction between inequality at the US state-level and individual income (Côté et al., 
2015). However, more recent studies, using data on inequality at the state, region and country-




(Hermanni & Tutić, 2019) when looking at charitable giving and volunteering behaviour. 
Follow-up analysis using new survey data (Côté & Willer, 2020) has failed to provide clarity 
(Schmukle & Egloff, 2020). 
Understanding whether and how inequality affects pro-social behaviour is critical from a societal 
perspective. If higher inequality interacts negatively with income to reduce pro-social behaviour, 
for example reducing the amount of charitable giving, rising inequality might reinforce itself in 
the absence of countervailing forces (Duquette & Hargaden, 2019). In aggregate, charitable 
donations by individuals were estimated at over $300bn in the United States in 2019 according to 
Giving USA, with a large proportion of the total going to education, poverty alleviation, and 
other organisations which aid in reducing inequality.17 To put that figure into perspective, the 
amount the US government spends on poverty alleviation has been estimated at just under 
$400bn for 2018 (Shaefer et al., 2019). 
Scholars investigating the link between inequality and pro-social behaviour generally assume 
that macro-level inequality is the appropriate spatial unit of analysis, however there is good 
reason to believe it is not. Importantly, it is not clear whether individuals receive the macro-level 
inequality ‘treatment’ for two reasons. First, there is wide variation of local inequality within 
macro-level areas – for example, individuals in San Francisco and Sacramento, or London and 
Liverpool don’t experience the same level of inequality and generally live in very different 
contexts. Inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient on incomes, is 11% larger in San 
Francisco than Sacramento, and 17% larger in London relative to Liverpool based on the Gini 
coefficient of housing values.18 Using a single figure to represent multiple local contexts 
obscures variability in lived experiences (Suss, 2021). Figure 7 depicts this wide variation for the 
US by plotting income inequality at the state-level and by ZIP-code – sub-state areas that are 
better approximations of local communities than states (Velez & Wong, 2017; Wong et al., 
2020). 
Second, a nascent body of work calls into question whether actual levels of national inequality 
are accurately perceived. Indeed, perceptions tend to be far off from reality (Chambers et al., 
 
17 Information on charitable giving retrieved from Giving USA. 
18 Authors calculation from Gini coefficient at the county-level Bureau (2021) for the US, and housing value 




2014; Gimpelson & Treisman, 2018; Kiatpongsan & Norton, 2014; Norton & Ariely, 2011). This 
is important because perceptions of inequality rather than actual levels have been found to be 
more relevant for attitudes and behavior (Cruces et al., 2013; Hauser & Norton, 2017; A. Kuhn, 
2011). On the other hand, local measures of economic inequality have been shown to be 
associated with subjective perceptions of national inequality (Cruces et al., 2013; Minkoff & 
Lyons, 2019; Xu & Garand, 2010). This is because local contexts serve as important sources of 
information used by individuals to make sense of wider society (G. C. Galster, 2012). This is not 
only the case for distributional perceptions – in other domains as well, individuals utilise local 
information when forming judgments about macro variables, e.g. national economic performance 
or unemployment (Ansolabehere et al., 2014; Reeves & Gimpel, 2012; Weatherford, 1983). 
Thus, in so far as national assessments of inequality matter for pro-social behaviour, local 
inequality is likely to be an important influence through its influence on perceptions of national 
inequality. 
Local economic inequality is also likely to affect pro-social behaviour in and of itself. From a 
theoretical perspective, greater inequality is thought to increase the social distance between 
economic classes (Côté et al., 2015; Duquette & Hargaden, 2019), thereby attenuating support 
for poverty alleviation through charitable giving or redistributive policies on the part of the rich. 
In so far as rising aggregate inequality goes hand in hand with increasing residential segregation 
(Reardon & Bischoff, 2011), this should indeed result in greater social distance through the logic 
of greater physical distance. Less contact which arises through residential segregation along 
economic lines might allow negative stereotypes and stigmatisation to grow (Durante & Fiske, 
2017; Lamont et al., 2014). 
However, the social distance mechanism would suggest that greater inequality within local areas, 
where rich and poor have greater opportunity for interactions, could work instead to reduce 
social distance through greater inter-group contact (Allport et al., 1954; Pettigrew et al., 2011; 
Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). This contact could take the form of simple observations of those in 
relative need or through more economically heterogeneous friendship networks, helping to 
reduce stigmatisation and increasing empathy (Bailey et al., 2013). Recent experimental 
evidence provides suggestive evidence of a positive effect, with markers of inequality in local 




Experienced from a local perspective, economic inequality might therefore have a positive 
impact on pro-social behaviour. To date, however, there is almost no empirical research that 
investigates whether local inequality affects individual pro-social behaviour, either directly or 
when interacted with income. One exception is a study by A. A. Payne & Smith (2015), in which 
the authors investigate whether changes in income inequality at the level of Canadian urban areas 
and local communities affects changes in charitable giving. I build on this work here, exploring 
the effect local inequality has on pro-social behaviour across two studies in the US and UK. 
I first analyse tax data in the US on income and charitable donations at the ZIP-level (N = 
133,870), and second Wave 8 of a large household survey of UK residents, Understanding 
Society (N = 39,289), which contains questions on recent charitable giving and granular, 
neighborhood-level geographical markers. Across both these samples, I find robust evidence of a 
positive relationship between local inequality and both the amount donated to charity conditional 
on having donated something (i.e. the intensive margin), and on the likelihood of donating at all 
(i.e. the extensive margin). The estimated effect is substantive – for the UK a two standard 
deviation increase in local inequality is associated with an expected increase in the odds of 
giving by over 12%, for example. 
I also document significant interaction effects with income on the intensive margin in both the 
US and UK sample, as well as on the extensive margin in the US. In the US, the highest income 
group (over $200k in gross income), sees an expected 15% increase relative to the lowest income 
category ($25k or under). In order to mitigate endogeneity concerns stemming from selection 
effects – i.e. the possibility that higher-income, more pro-social individuals choose to live in 
areas of higher inequality – I restrict the UK sample to only those who live within a short 
distance (5 mile radius) of where they grew up (N = 2,312). The effect size grows larger when 
analysing this much smaller sample for both the intensive and extensive margins. 
I then explore whether positive inter-class contact is driving these results by exploiting a module 
on social networks in Wave 6 of Understanding Society. The survey asks what proportion of 
friends have a similar income to the respondent. I show that local economic inequality increases 
the likelihood of having some friends with dissimilar incomes to oneself, and that having an 
economically diverse group of friends is an important predictor of charitable giving. However, 




social behaviour, suggesting that local inequality has a positive impact on giving beyond its 
effect on friendship networks. 
In what follows I first detail the data and methodology in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 presents the 
results. And, finally, Section 4.4 concludes with a discussion of limitations and further research. 
Figure 7: US State and ZIP-level income inequality, 2014-18 
 
Note: The figure shows US state-level income inequality (red dot) and within-state ZIP-level 
income inequality (black dots). Inequality is measured using the Gini coefficient of incomes and 
obtained from the American Community Survey (Bureau, 2021). 
4.2 Data and methodology 
For the US, I test the interaction between inequality and income using data on charitable 
donations from tax returns provided by the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS, 2018). The data is 
disaggregated at the US ZIP-level and broken down by adjusted gross income bracket (6 groups 




$200,000+). This allows me to analyse variation in the extensive and intensive margins of 
charitable giving by income group and ZIP-code. In particular, I take the proportion of returns by 
income group which contain some charitable giving (M = 0.09), and the average amount donated 
per return conditional on some returns donating (M = $4,101, SD = $9,764). I obtain income 
inequality estimates from the American Community Survey (ACS) for the five year period 2014-
2018 for every ZIP-code area with at least 1,000 residents (Bureau, 2021). ZIP-code areas have a 
mean population of 14,041 (SD = 15,846). As indicated in Figure 7, ZIP-level inequality is 
highly dispersed (M = 0.43, SD = 0.06, Max. = 0.77, Min. = 0.02). 
To estimate the interaction effect, I use hierarchical linear modeling (via the lme4 package in R; 
Bates et al. (2015)), with income groups nested within ZIP-code areas. I take the logistic 
functional form for the proportion of returns since it varies between 0 and 1, and I logarithmise 
the amount donated since the values are strictly positive. I include state fixed effects and control 
for a number of important ZIP-level variables: median income, population density (residents / 
squared mile), the proportion of the population that is White, has a university degree or above, is 
below the poverty line, is young (under 18 years old), and old (65 years old and over). Table A.6 
in the Annex provides descriptive statistics for each of the variables used. 
While there are advantages to using administrative tax data over surveys, in particular the data 
covers all tax returns, there are admittedly also some downsides. The income groups provided by 
IRS data are top coded and coarse, with individuals and households subsumed into income 
groups. The findings here might therefore be prone to the ecological fallacy (Kramer, 1983; 
Openshaw, 1984), whereby associations observed at the group level are different from that of 
individuals. Finally, poorer households are more likely to take the standard deduction rather than 
itemise charitable donations (Neumayr & Pennerstorfer, 2020), which means that charitable 
giving is likely to be under-reported for lower income groups. While there is no reason to suspect 
that this itemisation differential by income group varies by level of inequality, I cannot rule this 
out. 
To provide further evidence regarding the relationship between income, local inequality and pro-
social behaviour, and to verify that the results generalises outside the US, I turn to a large-scale 
survey of UK households matched with neighborhood-level inequality measures. In particular, I 




39,289; gathered in 2016-17; University of Essex & Economic Research (2020)) with data on 
economic inequality at the neighborhood-level. Due to a lack of granular data on income or 
wealth (unlike the US, the UK does not gather this information as part of the decennial census), 
the UK inequality measures used here are based on housing values for around 23 million UK 
addresses (Suss, 2021). Neighborhoods are taken as the UK Middle Lower Super Output Area 
(MSOA) – census areas that are population weighted (M = 7,787, SD = 1,600) and meant to 
adhere to natural neighborhood boundaries.19 
Understanding Society asks respondents whether they gave money to charitable organisations in 
the last 12 months (M = 0.66) and, if so, how much was given (M = £241, SD = £623). Survey 
respondents also report their gross monthly income (M = £48,750, SD = £34,954) and other 
information that allows me to account for individual differences. I control for age, gender, 
education, ethnicity, political orientation (proxied by reported political party support), religiosity, 
and marital status. I also control for other neighbourhood-level factors: median house prices and 
population density, and I include fixed effects for UK region (see Table A.7 for full descriptive 
statistics). As with the US data, I use multilevel modelling with individual respondents nested 
within MSOAs to test the interaction between income and MSOA-level inequality. 
Wave 6 of Understanding Society (2014-2015) also contains a module on social support 
networks which allows me to investigate whether the relationship between inequality and pro-
social behaviour is mediated by social contact between different economic groups in the form of 
friendships. In particular, the survey asks respondents “What proportion of your friends have 
similar incomes to you?” which I dichotomise such that 0 = “all similar” and 1 = “more than 
half”, “about half” or “less than half.” Given Understanding Society is a longitudinal study, I 
carry these responses forward for individual respondents which appear in both waves. 
To examine whether economically diverse friendships mediate the relationship between local 
inequality and charitable giving, I first specify the same multilevel models used to analyse the 
 
19 MSOAs are built up from lower level geographies, known as Output Areas, which are, according to the UK’s 
Office for National Statistics “designed to … be as socially homogeneous as possible based on tenure of household 
and dwelling type” and "Urban/rural mixes were avoided where possible…[with] approximately regular shapes and 





Understanding Society sample but with the potential mediator as the outcome measure. I then 
simply compare the base models with and without the potential mediator as an additional control. 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Local inequality and charitable giving in the United States 
Table 12 provides the standardised coefficients for the main effects of inequality and income 
group as well as the interaction between them. The analysis reveals a significant positive direct 
relationship between local inequality and the extensive margin, as well as a positive interaction 
between income and inequality at the ZIP-level for both the proportion of returns per group with 
some donation and the average amount donated. Notably, the effect on the average amount 
donated is concentrated in the highest income group (exp(𝛽) = 1.21, 𝑝 < 0.01) with only 
moderately positive interaction terms or insignificant interaction terms for other income groups, 
and the lowest income category group has a negative, but substantively small, coefficient (exp(𝛽) 
= 0.99, 𝑝 < 0.05). Moreover, the main effect of income is also significant for each category, with 
higher income groups expected to donate in higher proportion and in greater absolute amounts. 
These findings contrast with those of Côté et al. (2015). Indeed, the effect is in the opposite 
direction, with the relationship between income and giving depending positively on the level of 
local inequality, both for the extensive and intensive margins. The full regression table is 
reported in the Annex – see Table A.8. 
In order to verify the robustness of these results, I run a number of checks. First, I alter the 
measure of inequality used. Rather than the Gini coefficient, I take the top 5% share of total 
income. Also, rather than using measures of inequality for 2014-2018, I use the Gini coefficients 
for each ZIP-code from 2007-2011 (the first 5-year window provided by the ACS at the ZIP-
level). Inequality is moderately persistent over time (0.62). Second, I examine sub-samples of the 
data, running regressions for small ZIP-code areas (which I define as less than 50k total 
population) and large ZIP-code areas (over 50k) separately. All these robustness checks find the 
same pattern of results for the relationship between inequality and charitable giving and the 
interaction between income and inequality (see Table A.9). 
I also examine whether the same interaction effect exists when income is interacted with state-
level inequality, replicating the spatial unit utilised by Côté et al. (2015) and Schmukle et al. 




is negative and significant for the extensive margin and insignificant for the intensive margin, 
except for the largest income group, where the coefficient is positive and significant but much 
smaller in size (exp(𝛽) = 1.06; 𝑝 < 0.05. This underlines the importance of the chosen spatial unit 
of analysis. Inequality measured at an aggregated level reaches the opposite conclusion or largely 
fails to detect an effect when there is one at the more localised and contextually relevant ZIP-
level. 
I also verify the results using the county-level as the geographical unit of analysis. The same 






















Table 12: Regression results for US ZIP-level inequality 
 Dependent variable: 
 Donated to charity Average amount donated 
 (1) (2) 
Inequality 0.175*** -0.008** 
 (0.008) (0.004) 
37,500 1.367*** 0.403*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
62,500 2.331*** 0.555*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
87,500 2.759*** 0.727*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
150,000 3.337*** 1.101*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
200,000+ 4.276*** 1.986*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
Inequality:37,500 -0.032*** 0.032*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
Inequality:62,500 -0.054*** 0.045*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
Inequality:87,500 0.005*** 0.023*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
Inequality:150,000 0.036*** -0.007* 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
Inequality:200,000+ 0.144*** 0.188*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
State fixed effect Y Y 
Random effect level ZIP ZIP 
Controls included Y Y 
Observations 128,101 78,732 
Log Likelihood -1,036,726.000 -20,646.750 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,073,592.000 41,435.500 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
4.3.2 Local inequality and charitable giving in the United Kingdom 
Figure 8 provides the coefficient estimates for the extensive and intensive margins of charitable 
giving in the UK sample. The main effect of inequality on propensity to donate is positive and 
significant for both, suggesting that inequality increases the likelihood of donating (exp(𝛽) = 




Furthermore, the results indicate that there is a significant interaction between income and 
inequality for the amount given conditional on giving (exp(𝛽) = 1.024, 𝑝 < 0.01), but not for the 
likelihood of giving (exp(𝛽) = 1.007, 𝑝 > 0.1). See Table A.12 for full results. 
To interpret the results, I plot the expected amount of charitable donations for those that reported 
donating in the previous 12 months as inequality is varied for different points in the income 
distribution (mean and +/- 1 standard deviation) – see Figure 9. One striking feature is apparent 
in the model describing the interaction between income and amount donated (Panel B of Figure 
9). At very low levels of local inequality the amount donated is roughly similar for all income 
levels, but at high levels of inequality the amount donated is expected to be far larger for higher 
incomes. 
I verify that these results are robust in a number of ways. First, I check whether these results hold 
for alternative measure of inequality – rather than the Gini coefficient, I take the top 1% share 
measure. Second, rather than taking the absolute amount donated to charity, I instead use the 
percentage of income donated to charity as the outcome measure. The results are consistent – see 
Table A.13 and Table A.14. 
I also check whether the relationship exists at different geographical levels of aggregation, both 
more granular and more aggregated than MSOAs. First, going more granular, I take the Lower 
Super Output Area (LSOA), which are constituent building blocks of MSOAs (population M = 
1,471; SD = 428). The main effect and interaction effect remain significant and positive for the 
amount donated, and only the main inequality effect is significant for the likelihood of donating 
– see Table A.15. Second, I go up to the Local Authority District (LAD) level (population M = 
161,138; SD = 109,066). The interaction is significant for both the likelihood of donating and 
amount given, albeit weaker statistically and substantively for the amount given (𝛽 = 1.033, 𝑝 < 
0.1), suggesting that some of the LADs are potentially too large such that the inequality measure 
is less contextually-relevant for individuals. See Table A.16 for these regression results. 
Next, I check whether these results generalise to other pro-social behaviours. For this, I test 
whether inequality interacts with income when self-reported volunteering behaviour is the 
outcome measure. Once more, I look at both the extensive margin (whether volunteered in the 
last 12 months – M = 0.18) and intensive margins (hours spent volunteering in the last 4 weeks – 




and significant for the likelihood of volunteering (𝛽 = 0.092, 𝑝 < 0.01). For the hours 
volunteered, the main inequality effect is negative and significant (𝛽 = -0.038, 𝑝 < 0.05) while 
the interaction term is positive and weakly significant (𝛽 = 0.023, 𝑝 < 0.1), providing some 
evidence of a general interaction between income and inequality on pro-social behavior – see 
Table A.17. 
Lastly, in order to mitigate endogeneity concerns, I restrict the sample to those who live within a 
5 mile radius of where they grew up. This reduces the sample dramatically (N = 2,958), but 
alleviates selection concerns, e.g. more generous and richer individuals choosing to live in areas 
that are also more unequal. The main inequality effect and interaction term for the amount 
donated remain statistically significant (𝑝 < 0.05) and are even more substantive when looking at 
the restricted sample (𝛽 = 0.146 and 0.076 respectively). However, the main effect on the 


















Figure 8: Standardised and exponentiated coefficient plot for the interaction between UK 
MSOA-level inequality and income on charitable donations 
 
Note: Regression models include MSOA-level random intercept, UK region fixed effects, and 
controls for age, gender, education, ethnicity, marital and employment status, political 
orientation, population density, median house price, and religiosity. N = 31,381 and 20,856 for 
the likelihood of donating and amount donated models respectively. See Table A.12 for full 




Figure 9: Interaction between inequality and income, UK data 
 
Note: Income is set at its mean value and above and below one standard deviation from the 
mean. All other continuous variables are fixed at their median value, other explanatory variables 
are fixed as follows: female, White, with a degree, employed, married, religious, supporter of the 
Liberal Democrats. Standard errors are calculated using 99 bootstrapped simulations with 95% 
confidence intervals plotted. 
4.3.3 Local inequality and friendship networks 
I now turn to investigating the mechanism behind the positive inequality-income interaction. In 
particular, I test whether differential friendship networks in equal and unequal areas might be 
driving the results. Column 1 of Table 13 regresses whether the respondent reported at least 
some friends with dissimilar incomes on the full set of variables. As expected, local inequality 
affects social networks, with the odds of having economically diverse friendship group 




< 0.05). Moreover, as Columns 2 and 3 demonstrate, having some friends with different incomes 
is an important factor affecting charitable giving, both in terms of the likelihood of donating and 
the amount donated. However, the friendship variable does not mediate the effect of inequality 
on giving, and the results for the main effect and interaction effect are roughly the same, albeit 
slightly weaker statistically and substantively.20 
Table 13: Likelihood of having friends with dissimilar incomes 
 Dependent variable: 
 Friends with dissimilar income? Donated to charity? Amount donated to charity 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Inequality 0.047** 0.036* 0.064*** 
 (0.022) (0.019) (0.013) 
Income 0.065*** 0.219*** 0.199*** 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.011) 
Friends with dissimilar income  0.165*** 0.218*** 
  (0.041) (0.028) 
Inequality : Income 0.014 0.006 0.018** 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.009) 
Region fixed effect Y Y Y 
Random effect level MSOA MSOA MSOA 
Control variables Y Y Y 
Observations 26,261 24,560 17,053 
Log Likelihood -11,086.990 -13,913.860 -28,519.520 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 22,227.980 27,883.720 57,097.030 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
4.4 Discussion and conclusion 
The results from this analysis are clear but contrary to what has been reported in a notable paper 
by Côté et al. (2015) on inequality and pro-social behaviour – I find robust evidence for a 
positive interaction between income and local inequality across two studies in the US and UK. 
Higher income individuals and households are generally more likely to donate and more 
generous in absolute terms when giving, and this effect is even larger in local contexts of high 
inequality for the average amount donated in the UK, and both the extensive and intensive 
 
20 I perform non-parametric causal mediation analysis (Imai et al., 2011) using the mediation package in R 




margins in the US. Moreover, I find that the interaction between income and inequality 
generalises to volunteering. In explaining their findings, Côté et al. (2015) argue that higher 
inequality might trigger a sense of entitlement amongst richer individuals. The results here 
suggest that the opposite is the case when looking at more granular measures of inequality – it 
appears as though local inequality induces greater social solidarity. 
The key contribution of this paper is to examine how local rather than macro manifestations of 
inequality interacts with income for pro-sociality. While national inequality has been the focus of 
scholars, the role of local contexts, both in shaping perceptions of national inequality (e.g. by 
providing distributional information that is generalised to wider society) and by altering attitudes 
and behaviour directly (e.g. by affecting the mix of people we frequently encounter and become 
friends with), has been less appreciated. 
What explains the positive interaction between income and inequality? While the arguments 
above suggest a few possible mechanisms, the data available allows me to investigate whether 
research on inter-group contact (Allport et al., 1954; Pettigrew et al., 2011; Pettigrew & Tropp, 
2006), operationalised here as contact between different income groups, provides one answer. 
While I find that local inequality is associated with an increase in the likelihood of having at 
least some friends with dissimilar incomes, and having an economically diverse social network is 
positively associated with charitable giving, the effect of local economic inequality is not 
mediated by this variable. This does not rule out that greater contact is a mechanism behind these 
findings, but that this might result in increased empathy and charitable giving via a route other 
than increased friendships (e.g. by casual encounters or observations of those relatively worse 
off). Another possible explanation for the positive interaction, one which I am unable to explore 
here, does not require greater empathy on the part of the rich, just a greater sense of 
responsibility. The observed effect might arise from the rich wanting to give back to society as a 
way of satisfying their conscience (Lloyd & Breeze, 2013) if they reside in local areas which is 
higher in inequality. 
This paper is not without limitations. First, while the findings presented above are robust to 
different specifications and sub-sample analyses, they fall short of identifying causal 
relationships. The biggest concern is that the findings arise from possible selection effects, 




preferences with respect to inequality, and that these choices are also correlated with charitable 
giving. I mitigate this concern by exploiting information from Understanding Society on whether 
respondents live within 5 miles of where they were living as adolescents or upon first arrival to 
the UK. The restrictions do not change the results, but it is possible that the individuals that 
remain within a close distance of where they grew up are only those comfortable with the 
neighbourhood who didn’t have reason to move. Since I cannot rule this out, I stop short of 
claiming that the observed relationships are causal. 
One way that scholars have tried to identify the causal effect of economic inequality on 
individual pro-social behaviour is by conducting experiments in the lab or online (for example, 
Côté et al., 2015; McCall et al., 2017). However, it is unlikely that the artificial conditions and 
simplified representations of economic inequality within lab contexts adequately proxy for real-
world experience (see also Schmukle et al., 2019 who make this same argument). Moreover, 
economic games, such as the canonical dictator game, which scholars have typically used to 
study pro-social preferences experimentally, have been shown to be poorly correlated with real-
world pro-social behaviour (Galizzi & Navarro-Martıńez, 2019). Therefore, in the absence of 
plausibly exogenous variation in economic inequality or a compelling instrumental variable, we 
have to rely on rigorously controlled observational data analysis to understand the effect of 
inequality on pro-social behaviour. 
Future work might provide additional evidence to support the findings here. For example, while I 
analyse data from two separate countries, given importance of national culture and norms for 
pro-social behaviours (Einolf, 2017), future work could address whether the findings here 
generalise to other contexts and cultures. Indeed, while the US and UK differ in many respects, 
for example in terms of political institutions and tax treatment of charitable giving, they are also 
be relatively similar in other ways, notably in terms of high macro-inequality levels. Moreover, 
the rich and poor live cheek-by-jowl in many US and UK cities like New York and London, 
whereas other countries might tend towards greater economic segregation in urban settings. 
Future work might therefore expand the set of countries examined and also consider explicitly 
how local segregation moderates the relationship between inequality and pro-social behaviour. 
The findings here suggest a positive implication of local economic inequality for pro-sociality. 




relationship, this is found to be an important determinant of charitable giving. Future work might 
therefore seek to shed further light on the mechanisms behind the positive interaction between 
local inequality and income for pro-sociality, perhaps by understanding how attitudes towards 
and reasons for charitable giving are affected by contextual economic discrepancies. 
Overall, this paper provides evidence that, at least at the local level, rising inequality does not 
reinforce itself through reduced donations to charitable organisations. Instead, local inequality 






Table A.6: Descriptive statistics for US data 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max 
Charity Volume 152,101 0.093 0.147 0.000 0.000 0.133 1.500 
Charity amount (log 
scale) 
157,347 2.727 3.734 0.000 0.000 4.800 16.193 
Gini (ZIP) 133,870 0.429 0.055 0.053 0.393 0.462 0.768 
Median income 133,762 61,410.360 25,638.160 9,570.000 44,672.000 71,439.000 250,001.000 
Population 133,964 14,221.680 15,880.750 1,000.000 2,594.000 21,411.000 122,814.000 
Population density (log 
scale) 
133,964 0.661 2.237 0.0001 0.016 0.523 58.905 
White (%) 133,964 0.812 0.203 0.000 0.737 0.958 1.000 
Poor (%) 133,916 0.051 0.032 0.000 0.028 0.067 0.436 
College degress (%) 133,964 0.184 0.117 0.000 0.101 0.234 0.859 
Age 65+ (%) 133,964 0.174 0.065 0.000 0.134 0.203 0.878 
Age less than 18 (%) 133,964 0.222 0.053 0.000 0.192 0.253 0.478 
 
Table A.7: Descriptive statistics for UK data 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max 
Charity given 34,826 0.662 0.473 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Charity amount 22,778 241.071 622.201 0.000 30.000 200.000 9,997.000 
Gini (MSOA) 36,715 0.220 0.056 0.068 0.180 0.258 0.507 
Income 38,769 48,750.340 34,954.140 0.000 24,349.920 64,058.040 1,032,787.000 
Age 39,275 48.778 18.735 16.000 34.000 63.000 102.000 
Female 39,289 0.544 0.498 0 0 1 1 
Degree 38,431 0.383 0.486 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
White 38,970 0.808 0.394 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Employed 37,535 0.567 0.496 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Married 37,507 0.530 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Religious 37,509 0.543 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Population 
density 
36,724 34.764 36.656 0.020 6.700 47.200 247.200 
Median house 
value (MSOA) 






Table A.8: Full multilevel regression results, US ZIP-level inequality 
 Dependent variable: 
 Proportion donated Donation amount 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Inequality 0.194*** 0.175*** 0.035*** -0.008** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) 
37,500 1.365*** 1.367*** 0.405*** 0.403*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
62,500 2.329*** 2.331*** 0.556*** 0.555*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
87,500 2.760*** 2.759*** 0.729*** 0.727*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
150,000 3.341*** 3.337*** 1.104*** 1.101*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
200,000+ 4.318*** 4.276*** 1.992*** 1.986*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Median income 0.611*** 0.612*** -0.091*** -0.091*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ln(Population) -0.013* -0.016** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) 
White (%) 0.020 0.016 -0.099*** -0.099*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.005) (0.005) 
Poor (%) 0.171*** 0.174*** -0.009** -0.011*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004) 
25+ with college degree (%) -0.188*** -0.191*** -0.014*** -0.016*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age 65+ (%) 0.322*** 0.324*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age less than 18 (%) 0.059*** 0.064*** 0.075*** 0.078*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.005) (0.005) 
Inequality:37,500  -0.032***  0.032*** 
  (0.002)  (0.004) 
Inequality:62,500  -0.054***  0.045*** 
  (0.002)  (0.004) 
Inequality:87,500  0.005***  0.023*** 
  (0.002)  (0.004) 
Inequality:150,000  0.036***  -0.007* 
  (0.002)  (0.004) 
Inequality:200,000+  0.144***  0.188*** 
  (0.002)  (0.004) 
Constant -4.858*** -4.852*** 1.339*** 1.343*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.013) (0.013) 
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y 
Random effect level ZIP-code ZIP-code ZIP-code ZIP-code 
Observations 128,101 128,101 78,732 78,732 
Log Likelihood -1,054,945.000 -1,036,726.000 -22,685.120 -20,646.750 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,110,020.000 2,073,592.000 45,502.240 41,435.500 





Table A.9: Robustness checks, US ZIP-level inequality 
 Dependent variable: 
















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Inequality 0.169*** -0.023*** 0.172*** -0.005 0.176*** -0.009** 0.035** 0.042*** 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.017) (0.015) 
37,500 1.370*** 0.404*** 1.369*** 0.403*** 1.366*** 0.398*** 1.376*** 0.477*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) 
62,500 2.335*** 0.555*** 2.334*** 0.555*** 2.313*** 0.552*** 2.405*** 0.598*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) 
87,500 2.765*** 0.727*** 2.761*** 0.727*** 2.714*** 0.727*** 2.954*** 0.730*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) 
150,000 3.342*** 1.102*** 3.339*** 1.101*** 3.291*** 1.105*** 3.544*** 1.028*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) 
200,000+ 4.276*** 1.983*** 4.273*** 1.984*** 4.240*** 1.993*** 4.446*** 1.889*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) 
Median income 0.586*** -0.093*** 0.595*** -0.093*** 0.628*** -0.089*** 0.140*** -0.040** 
 (0.009) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.026) (0.019) 
Ln(Population) -0.013* 0.006** -0.020** 0.007*** 0.015* 0.006** -0.102*** 0.004 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.016) (0.004) 
White (%) -0.003 -0.101*** 0.007 -0.102*** -0.020 -0.125*** -0.114*** -0.061*** 
 (0.016) (0.005) (0.017) (0.005) (0.018) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006) 
Poor (%) 0.218*** 0.004 0.182*** -0.015*** 0.164*** -0.015*** -0.143*** 0.001 
 (0.012) (0.004) (0.013) (0.004) (0.013) (0.005) (0.023) (0.009) 
25+ with college 
degree (%) 
-0.147*** -0.008* -0.180*** -0.018*** -0.205*** -0.025*** -0.016 -0.018** 
 (0.013) (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.014) (0.005) (0.021) (0.009) 
Age 65+ (%) 0.309*** 0.017*** 0.327*** 0.019*** 0.315*** 0.028*** 0.060*** 0.009 
 (0.014) (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.015) (0.005) (0.011) (0.006) 
Age less than 18 (%) 0.015 0.066*** 0.060*** 0.085*** 0.152*** 0.110*** 0.086*** 0.061*** 
 (0.015) (0.004) (0.016) (0.005) (0.016) (0.006) (0.014) (0.008) 
Inequality:37,500 -0.071*** 0.027*** -0.045*** 0.032*** -0.035*** 0.033*** -0.009** 0.028** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) 
Inequality:62,500 -0.111*** 0.040*** -0.071*** 0.047*** -0.061*** 0.046*** 0.002 0.034*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) 
Inequality:87,500 -0.065*** 0.026*** -0.015*** 0.026*** -0.004** 0.024*** 0.079*** 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) 
Inequality:150,000 -0.028*** 0.007* 0.021*** -0.005 0.027*** -0.005 0.107*** -0.029** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) 
Inequality:200,000+ 0.118*** 0.195*** 0.125*** 0.204*** 0.139*** 0.191*** 0.182*** 0.139*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) 
Constant -4.797*** 1.344*** -4.855*** 1.338*** -4.849*** 1.341*** -4.587*** 1.403*** 
 (0.042) (0.013) (0.043) (0.013) (0.044) (0.013) (0.162) (0.105) 
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Random effect level ZIP-code ZIP-code ZIP-code ZIP-code ZIP-code ZIP-code ZIP-code ZIP-code 
Observations 124,802 78,220 128,101 78,732 122,712 73,391 5,389 5,341 
Log Likelihood -1,017,460.000 -20,209.970 
-
1,035,115.000 
-20,178.920 -964,430.600 -20,078.200 -64,955.920 -227.801 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,035,060.000 40,561.940 2,070,370.000 40,499.830 1,929,001.000 40,298.400 130,031.800 577.602 




Table A.10: Full multilevel regression results, US state-level inequality 
 Dependent variable: 
 Proportion donated Donation amount 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Inequality -0.001 0.058 -0.014 -0.042 
 (0.086) (0.087) (0.056) (0.059) 
17,500 0.789*** 0.852*** 0.654*** 0.654*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.030) (0.030) 
37,500 1.804*** 1.835*** 1.033*** 1.033*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.030) (0.030) 
62,500 2.782*** 2.816*** 1.144*** 1.144*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.030) (0.030) 
87,500 3.276*** 3.290*** 1.283*** 1.283*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.030) (0.030) 
150,000 3.892*** 3.915*** 1.609*** 1.609*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.030) (0.030) 
200,000+ 5.015*** 5.077*** 2.947*** 2.947*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.030) (0.030) 
Median income 0.010 0.010 -0.234*** -0.234*** 
 (0.128) (0.128) (0.082) (0.082) 
Ln(Population) 0.111** 0.111** -0.030 -0.030 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.028) (0.028) 
White (%) -0.194*** -0.195*** -0.065** -0.065** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.033) (0.033) 
Poor (%) 0.077 0.078 -0.019 -0.019 
 (0.114) (0.115) (0.074) (0.074) 
25+ with college degree (%) 0.346*** 0.347*** 0.042 0.041 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.053) (0.053) 
Age 65+ (%) 0.157** 0.159** -0.104** -0.104** 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.043) (0.043) 
Age less than 18 (%) 0.243*** 0.245*** 0.024 0.024 
 (0.079) (0.079) (0.050) (0.050) 
Religious (%) -0.048 -0.048 0.035 0.035 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.029) (0.029) 
GOP support (%) -0.00002 -0.00002 0.037 0.036 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.028) (0.028) 
Inequality:17,500  -0.118***  0.049 
  (0.004)  (0.030) 
Inequality:37,500  -0.059***  0.058* 
  (0.003)  (0.030) 
Inequality:62,500  -0.064***  0.049 
  (0.003)  (0.030) 
Inequality:87,500  -0.024***  0.019 
  (0.003)  (0.030) 
Inequality:150,000  -0.042***  -0.036 
  (0.003)  (0.030) 
Inequality:200,000+  -0.111***  0.062** 
  (0.003)  (0.030) 
Constant -5.254*** -5.286*** 0.435*** 0.435*** 




Random effect level State State State State 
Observations 364 364 364 364 
Log Likelihood -104,678.100 -100,431.900 78.728 70.647 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 209,392.100 200,911.900 -119.456 -91.293 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table A.11: Full multilevel regression results, US county-level inequality 
 Dependent variable: 
 Proportion donated Donation amount 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Inequality 0.026*** 0.053*** 0.005 -0.042*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) 
17,500 0.782*** 0.842*** 0.583*** 0.579*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) 
37,500 1.791*** 1.813*** 0.961*** 0.956*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.009) 
62,500 2.766*** 2.791*** 1.151*** 1.147*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) 
87,500 3.259*** 3.263*** 1.333*** 1.329*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.010) 
150,000 3.857*** 3.867*** 1.690*** 1.685*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) 
200,000+ 4.945*** 4.943*** 2.601*** 2.597*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.009) 
Median income 0.138*** 0.141*** -0.120*** -0.121*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) 
Ln(Population) 0.184*** 0.184*** -0.038*** -0.038*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) 
White (%) -0.130*** -0.130*** -0.087*** -0.086*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) 
Poor (%) -0.072*** -0.071*** -0.012* -0.013* 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) 
25+ with college degree (%) 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age 65+ (%) 0.075*** 0.075*** -0.031*** -0.030*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
Age less than 18 (%) -0.029*** -0.029*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) 
Religious (%) 0.005 0.005 0.026*** 0.026*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) 
GOP support (%) -0.081*** -0.082*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) 
Inequality:17,500  -0.113***  0.035*** 
  (0.003)  (0.010) 




  (0.003)  (0.010) 
Inequality:62,500  -0.050***  0.056*** 
  (0.003)  (0.010) 
Inequality:87,500  -0.004  0.046*** 
  (0.003)  (0.010) 
Inequality:150,000  -0.018***  0.022** 
  (0.003)  (0.009) 
Inequality:200,000+  0.0005  0.096*** 
  (0.003)  (0.010) 
Constant -5.407*** -5.418*** 0.666*** 0.671*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.021) (0.021) 
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y 
Random effect level County County County County 
Observations 21,632 21,632 15,735 15,735 
Log Likelihood -302,815.400 -299,582.700 -1,283.499 -1,222.901 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 605,766.700 599,313.300 2,704.998 2,595.801 



















Table A.12: Full multilevel regression results, UK MSOA-level inequality 
 Dependent variable: 
 Donated to charity? Amount donated to charity (£) 
 (1) (2) 
Inequality 0.060*** 0.067*** 
 (0.017) (0.012) 
Income (£/year) 0.204*** 0.183*** 
 (0.017) (0.010) 
Age 0.021*** 0.021*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Male -0.316*** 0.098*** 
 (0.026) (0.018) 
Degree 0.564*** 0.494*** 
 (0.029) (0.019) 
White 0.259*** -0.130*** 
 (0.044) (0.032) 
Employed 0.322*** 0.208*** 
 (0.030) (0.022) 
Married 0.165*** 0.121*** 
 (0.029) (0.020) 
Religious 0.357*** 0.345*** 
 (0.029) (0.020) 
Labour -0.094*** -0.047** 
 (0.036) (0.024) 
Liberal Democrat 0.121** 0.171*** 
 (0.061) (0.036) 
Other political party -0.346*** -0.147*** 
 (0.037) (0.026) 
Population density 0.0002 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.0004) 
Median house value 0.152*** 0.088*** 
 (0.027) (0.017) 
Inequality:Income 0.007 0.024*** 
 (0.014) (0.008) 
Constant -0.703*** 2.728*** 
 (0.107) (0.078) 
Region fixed effect Y Y 
Random effect level MSOA MSOA 
Observations 31,381 20,856 
Log Likelihood -18,228.630 -35,033.820 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 36,511.270 70,123.640 




Table A.13: Top 1% inequality regression, UK MSOA-level inequality 
 Dependent variable: 
 Donated to charity? Amount donated to charity 
 (1) (2) 
Top 1% Inequality 0.040** 0.050*** 
 (0.016) (0.011) 
Income (£/year) 0.205*** 0.184*** 
 (0.017) (0.010) 
Age 0.021*** 0.021*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Male -0.316*** 0.098*** 
 (0.026) (0.018) 
Degree 0.566*** 0.497*** 
 (0.029) (0.019) 
White 0.262*** -0.124*** 
 (0.044) (0.032) 
Employed 0.320*** 0.206*** 
 (0.030) (0.022) 
Married 0.164*** 0.121*** 
 (0.029) (0.020) 
Religious 0.357*** 0.345*** 
 (0.029) (0.020) 
Labour -0.093*** -0.045* 
 (0.036) (0.024) 
Liberal Democrat 0.122** 0.173*** 
 (0.061) (0.036) 
Other political party -0.345*** -0.146*** 
 (0.037) (0.026) 
Population density 0.0001 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.0004) 
Median house value 0.174*** 0.108*** 
 (0.025) (0.016) 
Top 1% Inequality:Income 0.002 0.023*** 
 (0.014) (0.008) 
Constant -0.672*** 2.751*** 
 (0.106) (0.078) 
Region fixed effect Y Y 
Random effect level MSOA MSOA 
Observations 31,381 20,857 
Log Likelihood -18,231.950 -35,041.700 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 36,517.900 70,139.400 




Table A.14: Charitable donation (%), UK MSOA-level inequality 
 Dependent variable: 
 Donated to charity? Amount donated to charity 
 (1) (2) 
Inequality 0.074*** 0.071*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
Income (£/year) -0.361*** -0.365*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
Age 0.024*** 0.024*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Male 0.088*** 0.088*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) 
Degree 0.461*** 0.461*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) 
White -0.147*** -0.151*** 
 (0.032) (0.033) 
Employed 0.081*** 0.081*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) 
Married -0.041** -0.042** 
 (0.020) (0.020) 
Religious 0.350*** 0.350*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) 
Labour -0.053** -0.053** 
 (0.024) (0.024) 
Liberal Democrat 0.159*** 0.159*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) 
Other political party -0.135*** -0.135*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) 
Population density 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Median house value 0.096*** 0.093*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) 
Inequality:Income  0.023*** 
  (0.008) 
Constant -7.809*** -7.806*** 
 (0.080) (0.080) 
Region fixed effect Y Y 
Random effect level MSOA MSOA 
Observations 20,857 20,857 
Log Likelihood -35,498.650 -35,498.480 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 71,051.290 71,052.970 




Table A.16: UK LSOA and Local Authority District level regression 
 Dependent variable: 
 Donated to charity? Amount donated to charity Donated to charity? Amount donated to charity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Inequality 0.063*** 0.055*** 0.004 0.032* 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.023) (0.017) 
Income (£/year) 0.203*** 0.178*** 0.223*** 0.201*** 
 (0.017) (0.011) (0.016) (0.010) 
Age 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Male -0.321*** 0.096*** -0.308*** 0.093*** 
 (0.026) (0.018) (0.026) (0.019) 
Degree 0.553*** 0.476*** 0.599*** 0.536*** 
 (0.030) (0.019) (0.029) (0.020) 
White 0.265*** -0.144*** 0.317*** -0.133*** 
 (0.045) (0.032) (0.042) (0.031) 
Employed 0.326*** 0.214*** 0.313*** 0.180*** 
 (0.030) (0.022) (0.030) (0.023) 
Married 0.169*** 0.127*** 0.165*** 0.125*** 
 (0.029) (0.020) (0.029) (0.020) 
Religious 0.363*** 0.339*** 0.357*** 0.333*** 
 (0.030) (0.020) (0.029) (0.020) 
Labour -0.086** -0.041* -0.110*** -0.053** 
 (0.037) (0.024) (0.036) (0.024) 
Liberal Democrat 0.120* 0.162*** 0.131** 0.176*** 
 (0.063) (0.036) (0.062) (0.038) 
Other political party -0.336*** -0.143*** -0.354*** -0.159*** 
 (0.038) (0.026) (0.037) (0.027) 
Population density 0.0002 0.002*** -0.001 0.003*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Median house value 0.167*** 0.126*** 0.099** 0.020 
 (0.024) (0.014) (0.041) (0.029) 
Inequality:Income 0.007 0.025*** 0.042*** 0.016* 
 (0.015) (0.008) (0.014) (0.009) 
Constant -0.693*** 2.760*** -0.676*** 2.692*** 
 (0.106) (0.076) (0.132) (0.097) 
Region fixed effect Y Y Y Y 
Random effect level LSOA LSOA LAD LAD 
Observations 31,366 20,847 29,691 19,693 
Log Likelihood -18,162.930 -34,903.460 -17,355.310 -33,151.070 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 36,379.860 69,862.920 34,764.620 66,358.150 






Table A.17: Volunteering regression, UK MSOA-level inequality 
 Dependent variable: 
 Volunteered? Volunteered? Number of hours volunteered Number of hours volunteered 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Inequality 0.090*** 0.092*** -0.034* -0.038** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
Income (£/year) -0.006*** -0.006*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age -0.032 -0.032 0.068** 0.068** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) 
Male 0.676*** 0.676*** 0.040 0.041 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) 
Degree 0.327*** 0.329*** 0.002 0.002 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.052) (0.052) 
White -0.488*** -0.488*** -0.253*** -0.251*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Employed -0.014 -0.014 -0.066* -0.064* 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) 
Married 0.429*** 0.429*** 0.008 0.009 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) 
Religious -0.045 -0.045 0.064 0.064 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Labour 0.299*** 0.298*** 0.083 0.083 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.053) (0.053) 
Liberal Democrat -0.093** -0.094** 0.140*** 0.138*** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) 
Other political party 0.108*** 0.110*** -0.037** -0.048*** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
Population density -0.001* -0.001* -0.0003 -0.0004 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Median house value 0.169*** 0.170*** -0.013 -0.015 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024) 
Inequality:Income  -0.010  0.023* 
  (0.012)  (0.013) 
Constant -1.569*** -1.570*** 2.134*** 2.139*** 
 (0.120) (0.120) (0.121) (0.121) 
Region fixed effect Y Y Y Y 
Random effect level MSOA MSOA MSOA MSOA 
Observations 33,692 33,692 4,706 4,706 
Log Likelihood -15,455.560 -15,455.180 -6,787.869 -6,789.724 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 30,963.120 30,964.360 13,629.740 13,635.450 





Table A.18: Restricted sample regression, respondents living within 5 miles of where they 
grew up, UK MSOA-level inequality 
 Dependent variable: 
 Donated to charity? Amount donated to charity 
 (1) (2) 
Inequality 0.113* 0.146*** 
 (0.064) (0.048) 
Income (£/year) 0.191*** 0.224*** 
 (0.069) (0.044) 
Age 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) 
Male -0.136 0.092 
 (0.108) (0.081) 
Degree 0.519*** 0.152* 
 (0.115) (0.085) 
White 0.140 -0.310*** 
 (0.146) (0.111) 
Employed 0.451*** 0.167* 
 (0.114) (0.090) 
Married 0.378*** 0.413*** 
 (0.114) (0.089) 
Religious 0.315** 0.519*** 
 (0.140) (0.113) 
Labour -0.031 -0.189 
 (0.163) (0.116) 
Liberal Democrat 0.086 -0.119 
 (0.347) (0.224) 
Other political party -0.360** -0.103 
 (0.183) (0.138) 
Population density 0.002 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Median house value 0.039 -0.026 
 (0.091) (0.068) 
Inequality:Income 0.050 0.076*** 
 (0.052) (0.024) 
Constant -0.623 3.328*** 
 (0.610) (0.457) 
Region fixed effect Y Y 
Random effect level MSOA MSOA 
Observations 1,758 1,044 
Log Likelihood -1,112.673 -1,740.020 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,279.347 3,536.040 






5 Economic inequality and the spatial distribution of police stops 
and searches: evidence from London 
Abstract: We study the spatial distribution of stops and searches (S&S) in London in 2019. We 
hypothesise that – based on the interpretation of S&S as a tool of social control – economic 
inequality plays a role, with more unequal locations seeing higher volumes of stops. Using 
unique data on salient, spatially-granular economic inequality at the Lower Super Output Area 
(LSOA), we assess the relationship between inequality and the spatial concentration of searches. 
Results suggest a substantive positive association, even taking into account spatial effects, 
lagged crime rates and ethnic diversity. We also find that the effect of inequality depends on the 
level of affluence – the better off a location is, the stronger the effect of inequality on police stops 
and searches. 
5.1 Introduction 
Police powers to stop and search (S&S) members of the public remain controversial. With the 
promise of deterring crime, police organisations around the world are legally authorised to stop 
citizens, check their identities, and search their possessions (Weber & Bowling, 2014). On the 
one hand, S&S powers premise on the idea of repressing criminal behaviour and thus ensuring 
that all members of the public feel safe, but at the same time they reproduce social inequality and 
the dominance of some groups over others (Bradford & Loader, 2016; Delsol & Shiner, 2015). In 
England and Wales, S&S has been more or less used continuously since the 1980s – with lively 
reactions from the public whenever its use increases. 
Despite claims that such practices have some impact on crime, previous work has shown that this 
policy tends to be, at best, only slightly successful and overall a very ineffective tool for 
controlling offending behaviour (MacDonald et al., 2016; McCandless et al., 2016; Tiratelli et 
al., 2018). Moreover, S&S also comes with high costs, especially in terms of damages to police 
trustworthiness and legitimacy (Bradford, 2015, 2017). Given this apparent inefficacy as a 
crime-control strategy, previous work has suggested that the persistence of governmental 
reliance on S&S practices is more related to social order maintenance than to crime-fighting 
(Bradford & Loader, 2016; Tiratelli et al., 2018). Our goal is to further investigate aspects of this 




on London, UK, in 2019, we ask where in the city stops and searches are mostly concentrated 
and demonstrate that the the spatial heterogeneity of this type of police resource allocation helps 
reveal parts of the mechanisms of S&S as a tool of social control (Bradford & Loader, 2016; 
Choongh, 1998). 
Stop and search as a tool of social control is particularly expressed by the well documented 
literature on ethnic disproportionality (Bowling & Phillips, 2007; Quinton, 2015). Previous 
research has extensively demonstrated that Black, Asian, and Minority Ethnic (BAME) are 
disproportionately targeted by S&S practices when compared to overall demographics (Shiner et 
al., 2018). A common explanation for this disparity raises the issue of contextual circumstances 
that make some people “available” to be stopped and searched (see Philip AJ Waddington et al., 
2004) – suggesting that the comparisons should not be made with the overall population, but 
with the “available population” – although this argument is based on a “self-fulfilling 
methodology” (Bridges, 2015). After all, “street availability is influenced by police decisions 
where and when to do stops and searches, and these decisions heavily influence the people that 
are ‘available’ to be stopped and searched” (EHRC, 2010, p. 57). 
Building on this discussion, our focus is on where in London police officers decide to stop and 
search members of the public, rather than whom they stop and search. To do so, we use data at 
the level of Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs) in 2019. We hypothesise that, if S&S is indeed 
a tool of social control, the spatial distribution of S&S practices would reveal the filtering out of 
some locations. In particular, we expect that areas marked by economic discrepancies would see 
heightened S&S activity. We therefore draw on a novel measure of salient, spatially-granular 
economic inequality developed by Suss (2021), demonstrating that local inequality is directly 
associated with a higher volume of S&S – locations where the economically deprived and the 
well-off co-exist are the areas where police S&S activity is most common – even when previous 
crime rates are taken into account. 
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we set the scene and explain the legal context of S&S 
powers in England and Wales, review the studies that estimate the deterrent effect of S&S on 
crime rates, and discuss S&S as a tool of social control and the extent to which a focus on spatial 
patterns could contribute to the literature. Then we go on to present this study’s data, methods, 





5.2.1 Stop and search in England and Wales 
Police officers acting with suspicion against citizens might be one of the oldest practices 
involved in policing activities. In the UK, police powers to stop and search members of the 
public are currently regulated by various pieces of legislation, but the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) is probably the most significant (Bridges, 2015). PACE established 
legal powers of the police to stop and search a person (or vehicle) in a public space as long as 
officers have reasonable suspicion that the person is in possession of stolen goods, weapons, or 
other prohibited articles. More recent developments in the legislation have granted further 
powers to the police, allowing for ‘suspicion-less’ stop and searches under specific 
circumstances; notably, section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (hereafter 
s60), which allows senior police officers to authorise stop and search practices against any 
person in a particular locality for 24 hours (which can be extended) with the goal of fighting 
violence associated with specific events. Moreover, section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (s44) 
allows senior police officers to authorise stop and search without reasonable suspicion if deemed 
necessary to prevent acts of terrorism, though this has since been repealed. 
The use of police powers to stop and search citizens in England and Wales varies considerably 
across time and place (Bradford, 2017), even within London (Tiratelli et al., 2018). As Shiner & 
Delsol (2015) suggest, variations in the use of such powers are directly associated with the 
broader politics of crime control. With the promise of deterring future criminal behaviour, 
increases in the number of stop and searches – particularly the ‘suspicion-less’ variety – can be 
framed within a ‘toughening of crime control’ political ideology, which is more or less popular 
depending on the political climate. At the same time, previous research in the UK has identified 
high levels of ethnic disproportionality in the use of S&S powers (see Bowling & Phillips, 2007; 
Shiner et al., 2018). This study tackles this double aspect of policing – crime deterrence and 
social control, or “parking tickets and class repression” (Marenin, 1982) – by assessing where 
police stops and searches are concentrated in the UK capital. What can the spatial heterogeneity 




5.2.2 S&S as a strategy for crime deterrence? 
Police powers to stop and search members of the public are justified using a number of reasons. 
Notably, police reports often emphasise the importance of S&S to investigate crime and to 
apprehend weapons (MET, 2014). But one of the main motivations for the persistence of S&S is 
the promised deterrent effect on crime – the promise that increasing the number of police stops 
and searches will have a downstream effect on crimes, especially knife crime and drug offences 
(see May, 2014). 
Deterrence theory premises that rational individuals will be deterred from engaging in offensive 
behaviour should the costs (e.g., punishment) outweigh potential gains from their behaviour 
[becker1968crime]. Two important mechanisms are often listed as effective crime deterrents: the 
certainty and the severity of punishment (Apel & Nagin, 2011). In the case of S&S, the former is 
the theoretical foundation for its effectiveness: by increasing the number of police stops, 
potential criminals would perceive a higher likelihood of being caught and therefore be deterred 
from carrying knives or drugs. An important aspect of S&S is to therefore appear risky for 
potential offenders. Though theoretically sound, a sensible empirical question is: does it actually 
work? Is S&S effective in deterring crime (Delsol, 2015)? 
This was the primary question posed by Tiratelli et al. (2018). Using stop and search data for 
every borough in London from April 2004 to November 2014, the authors used lagged 
dependent variable models to estimate the effect of the number of stops and searches in one week 
or month on a number of crime rates in the following week or month, controlling for previous 
crime rates. They also relied on interrupted time series models to estimate the effect of the 
sudden increase in the use of ‘suspicion-less’ stops and searches (based on s60) between 2007 
and 2011 on subsequent crime rates. They found very little evidence that S&S has a deterrent 
effect on crime – there were no effects on robbery and theft, vehicle crime or criminal damage, 
very small or no effects on burglary, non-domestic violent crime and total crime. Only drug 
offences appeared to be somewhat affected by variations in S&S, though even in this case the 
causal mechanism is not clear (Tiratelli et al., 2018, pp. 1224–1225). Overall, the authors 
conclude that S&S practices have relatively little deterrent effect. 
Another London-based study was conducted by McCandless et al. (2016), who investigated the 




involved the increase of suspicion-less stop and searches based on s60 in some boroughs. The 
authors used difference-in-differences to assess the policy impact on knife crime comparing 
boroughs where the policy was implemented with boroughs where it was not. In summary, they 
found that the increase in s60-based stop and searches had no effect on police recorded crime. 
Other studies corroborate the lack of empirical evidence on the effect of similar policing 
strategies worldwide on crime rates, most notably in the context of New York City’s Stop, 
Question and Frisk (SQF) policy (Fagan, 2016; MacDonald et al., 2016; Rosenfeld & Fornango, 
2014; D. Smith et al., 2012). 
Taken together, there is no consensus on the effect of S&S on crime rates. Evidence points to 
heterogeneous impacts of this type of policy strategy depending on spatial differences and the 
type of crime (Weisburd et al., 2016), but overall studies find no or little decreases in most crime 
rates. Given the apparent ineffectiveness of stopping and searching members of the public, 
another question posed by the literature is around the persistence of S&S practices (Bradford, 
2015). Specifically, recent studies have investigated empirically whether interpretation of S&S 
practices as a tool of social control provides the explanation. 
5.2.3 S&S as a tool of social control? 
Previous studies find very little evidence that S&S practices have a deterrent effect on crime 
rates. Why, then, are S&S powers still so commonly used? Tiratelli et al. (2018) argue that, apart 
from officers’ beliefs that this is a useful tool of crime control, S&S practices are not solely 
about crime – “it is also a tool of order maintenance, used by police officers seeking to assert 
power and control in a situation or locale” (p. 1226). A large body of previous research on the 
cultural meaning of policing powers has suggested the interpretation of police as an institution of 
social ordering that provides identities to the policed depending on their position in structural 
relationships (see Bradford & Loader, 2016). In that sense, stop and search powers contribute to 
protect the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion (Peter AJ Waddington, 1999) as police contact 
contains status-relevant information about citizens (see Oliveira et al., 2020). 
The interpretation of S&S powers as a tool of social control is often linked to ethnic disparities, 
which have been extensively documented by previous research. Black, Asian, and minority 
ethnic (BAME) groups are more likely to be stopped and searched than their white counterparts 




of white people (Shiner et al., 2018). Even if official statistics alone can be limited in proving 
police discrimination (see Quinton, 2015), race disproportionality in S&S is certainly an 
indication of unlawful racial discrimination (Bowling & Phillips, 2007). Ethnic disparities in the 
police use of S&S powers is a social problem yet to be tackled, and one that has worsened as the 
overall number of S&S decreased over the last decade (Shiner et al., 2018). 
A common explanation for the disproportionate use of S&S powers focuses on contextual 
circumstances that make some people “available” for being stopped and searched (see Philip AJ 
Waddington et al., 2004). When compared to the “available population” (as opposed to 
comparing to the general population), there would be no or very little ethnic disparities 
(“available” meaning people who use public places when and where stops and searches take 
place (Miller et al., 2000)). However, a report from the Equality and Human Rights Commission 
(2010) characterised this study’s methodology as ‘self-fulfilling’ (Bridges, 2015) and counter-
argued that “street availability is influenced by police decisions where and when to do stops and 
searches and these decisions heavily influence the people that are ‘available’ to be stopped and 
searched” (EHRC, 2010, p. 57). 
This debate raises an important issue. If demonstrating who is stopped and searched is one of the 
ways in which the interpretation of S&S as a tool of social control finds empirical basis, 
investigating where the stops and searches happen might prove to be an important strategy to 
explain the mechanisms through which S&S powers are exercised. Studying the spatial 
distribution of S&S can explain how the “available population” are filtered out. 
To address this, we analyse stop and search data from London in 2019, aggregated by Lower 
Super Output Area (LSOA). LSOAs are areas designed for census purposes and to improve local 
statistics in England and Wales. They are also population-weighted, containing on average 1,691 
residents (SD = 263). To introduce the data, Figure 10 shows the spatial distribution of the 
number of stop and searches by LSOA – it is possible to see a highly heterogeneous distribution, 
with a higher concentration of stops in the Central, North East, and West parts of the UK 
capital.21 
 




Our question is what drives this spatial distribution. If not previous crime rates (i.e., S&S as a 
strategy for crime deterrence), what spatial features could influence police decisions where to 
stop and search members of the public? Our hypothesis – based on the interpretation of S&S as a 
tool of social control – is that economic inequality plays a role, with more unequal locations 
being more susceptible to S&S practices even when holding previous crime rates constant. 
According to a model of social control put forward by Choongh (1998), aspects of police 
behaviour and activity can be seen as seeking to ‘subordinate sections of society’ which are 
deemed inherently criminal (p. 623). The poor are one such section, and it is therefore in areas 
where the poor and rich live side-by-side where police are more likely to be primed to wield 
S&S as a tool of social control. 
To test this hypothesis, we use a novel measure of salient, spatially-granular economic inequality 
at the LSOA-level based on the estimated value of around 23 million UK residences (Suss, 
2021). One of the advantages of our measure is that it is more perceptible to individuals, given 
that it’s based on a major feature of the built environment used by individuals to make 
distributional assessments (i.e. quality of houses), as opposed to unobservable features 
(e.g. income of residents) (see Suss, 2021). Suss (2021) finds housing value inequality to be 
substantively associated with individual perceptions of local economic inequality in the UK 
across two surveys. This perceptual point is important because we believe that observing the 
juxtaposition of rich and poor is more likely to trigger the social control motive for S&S. Figure 
11 shows the spatial distribution of housing value inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient 
– a commonly used measure of economic inequality – for London in 2019 at the LSOA-level. 
5.3 Data and methods 
Our response variable consists of the number of stop and searches in 2019 by LSOA (N = 4,835). 
The distribution of S&S is highly skewed – 18.1% of locations had no more than 5 stops and 
searches in 2018, whereas a single LSOA had 2,123 of such police stops. The median number of 
stops is 20, while the average is 49.8 and the mode is just 5 – which speaks to the highly unequal 
distribution of S&S powers across Greater London. Figure 10 maps the spatial distribution of 
stops in London for 2019. 
Our main explanatory variable is a measure of economic inequality based on housing values. The 




The size of the data (approximately 23 million observations for the UK) allows us to measure 
economic discrepancies at a far more granular level than possible with conventional data sources 
(Suss, 2021). We estimate inequality down at the LSOA-level to match the S&S data (average of 
516 housing value observations per LSOA). The Gini coefficient ranges from 0.042 to 0.649, 
with a mean value of 0.198 – see Figure 11 for a map of inequality in London. 
Figure 10: Number of Stop and searches – London, 2019, LSOA-level 
 
Note: The figure shows the spatial distribution of police stops and searches for London, 2019. 




Figure 11: Housing value inequality – London, 2019, LSOA-level 
 
Note: The figure shows the spatial distribution of within-LSOA housing value inequality for 
London, 2019. Data on housing values comes from Zoopla and is discussed in Suss (2021). 
Areas with less than 50 observations are omitted (gray). 
5.3.1 Crime as an explanatory variable 
As discussed above, one of the stated promises of policing policies, such as the use of S&S 
powers, is the deterrent effect on crime. Though previous studies have demonstrated the 
relatively weak deterrent effects of S&S, police forces could potentially allocate their resources – 
including the decision as to where stop and search members of the public – based on previous 
crime rates, particularly those related to drug offences (see Tiratelli et al., 2018). If a given 
location had more drug-related offences registered in the previous year, it is reasonable to 
assume that police forces would prioritise such location over other, ‘less risky’ ones. At the same 




2016). As such, crime rates – particularly previous drug offences – could be confounding the 
association between local inequality and the number of S&S. 
In order to assess the role of crime, we include the following variables in the analysis: 
• Drug Offences in 2018 
We include the rate of drug offences per LSOA for 2018 as control variable (standardised by 
LSOA workplace population taken from the 2011 census). This is taken from data made publicly 
available by the UK police (https://data.police.uk/). Temporally lagged drug offences are our 
most important control variable, given that drugs is one of the primary reasons cited by police for 
performing S&S and the only type of offence moderately affected by variations in the use of 
S&S according to previous research (Tiratelli et al., 2018). 
• Multiple Deprivation Indices, Crime domain scores for 2019 
In order to control for the level of crime at the LSOA-level more generally, we include the crime 
domain scores from the 2019 Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD; Government (2015)). The 
score comprises four indicators, based on data from between 2016 and 2018, related to rates of 
violence, burglary, theft, and criminal damage. This index is another crucial control variable. 
Theoretically, police forces could decide on resource allocation – including S&S allocation – 
based on how violent neighbourhoods were in the past, which is also potentially associated with 
levels of salient inequality. Crime indicators confound the relationship between structural 
neighbourhood conditions and number of stop and searches. 
• Ethnic composition in 2011 
We include a measure of ethnic composition at the LSOA-level using data from the 2011 census. 
We construct this as the percent of residents who are non-White. In addition, we include a series 
of other control variables: 
• Multiple Deprivation Income scores for 2019 
We include the income domain score from the IMD. This comprises indicators for the number of 
families per area receiving income support, jobseeker’s allowance, employment and support 
allowance, and pension credit. For the detailed description of the domains and methodology, see 
Government (2015). 
• Average property value (log scale) 
We include the average property value for the area (logged). This, along with the income score, 




• Distance to nearest transport hub 
We introduce a measure of the distance (in meters) from each LSOA centroid and the nearest 
Transport for London (TfL) station (i.e. including underground, overground and rail services). 
• Density 
Finally, we control for population density (defined as the usual resident plus workplace 
population divided by hectares) from the 2011 UK census. Table 14 provides descriptive 
statistics for all variables. 
Table 14: Descriptive statistics for control variables 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max 
Stops 4,835 49.770 106.576 0 8 49 2,123 
Gini coefficient 4,835 0.198 0.086 0.042 0.136 0.246 0.649 
Average house value (thousands) 4,835 604.579 409.549 183 378 677 5,064 
Density (workday population / hectares) 4,835 136.985 117.792 2.200 68.450 174.400 1,432.300 
Income deprivation score 4,835 0.136 0.076 0.006 0.075 0.189 0.437 
Crime deprivation score 4,835 0.258 0.571 -2.354 -0.117 0.637 2.377 
Drugs rate (offenses / workplace population) 4,831 0.258 0.303 0.000 0.062 0.338 3.180 
Distance to nearest TfL station (meters) 4,835 404.474 445.071 0 72.0 585.4 4,927 
Non-white percentage 4,835 39.387 20.367 1.841 22.611 54.204 96.592 
5.3.2 Analytic strategy 
Theoretically, our hypothesis is that local economic inequality is one of the mechanisms that 
filter out the “available population” for S&S. But in order to properly assess this hypothesis, we 
need to take into account potential spatial dependency as well as other confounders (e.g. crime 
rates). It could be that LSOAs which are close to each other are similar in a number of observed 
and unobserved features, with police behaviour and structural conditions being just two of those 
features. The tests we perform in this paper aim to rule out alternative explanations for the spatial 
association between the number of S&S and salient inequality at LSOA-level. 
Our analytic approach is two-pronged. Our goal is to investigate whether there is a spatial 
association between the number of S&S and the level of economic inequality at the LSOA-level. 
First, we assess the extent to which the relationship between the two variables remain significant 
when controlling for spatial effects alongside all control variables described above. To do so, we 




(SDM).22 The SDM includes spatial lags – taken as the average of all adjoining LSOAs (i.e. the 
Queen configuration) – for the outcome and regressor variables. This accounts for possible 
dependence between, for example, stops and searches in any given area with the level of 
inequality and drugs crime rate in neighbouring LSOAs. More formally: 
𝑦 = 𝜌𝑊𝑦 + 𝛽𝑋 + 𝜆𝑊𝑋 + 𝜖  
where 𝑦  is the number of stops for area 𝑗, 𝑊 is the row-standardised spatial weight matrix (non-
zero elements indicate a neighbouring LSOA), 𝑋  is a vector of covariate values with associated 
𝛽 parameters to be estimated, 𝜌 and 𝜆 are the parameters for the dependent and independent 
spatial lags, and 𝜖  is the error term. 
Second, we employ negative binomial regression models to evaluate the relationship between 
police stops and inequality. Given that the number of S&S by LSOA is a count variable whose 
standard deviation exceeds the average (i.e. overdispersion), this model specification is well 
suited. However, we are unable to account for spatial effects using this model given the 
limitations that result from including the spatial lag in the exponential function (Glaser, 2017). 
The negative binomial model takes the form: 
𝑙𝑛(𝜇 ) = 𝛽 + 𝛽𝑋 + 𝜖  
where 𝜇  is the expected value of our outcome measure for area 𝑖 with variance 𝜇 + 𝜇 /𝜃, 𝛽  is 
the intercept, 𝑋  a vector of independent variables, and 𝛽 a vector of coefficients to be estimated 
(along with 𝜃) using maximum likelihood. 
5.4 Results 
First, we compare the OLS coefficient estimates with that of the SDM. The Moran’s I test 
statistic on the OLS residuals reveals spatial correlation (𝑝 < 0.01), but this is no longer the case 
when introducing the spatial lags – a Monte-Carlo simulation of Moran’s I reveals the SDM 
model residuals are not spatially correlated (𝑝 = 0.746; based on 1000 simulations). 
 
22 The SDM aligns with our theoretical expectations for the process that might create spatial dependence between 
the regressors and police stops, however we also explore the fit of other spatial regression models and whether these 




Table 15 displays the output from the OLS and Durbin models. Both models control for the 
average property value (log scale), income and crime deprivation scores, population density (log 
scale), the percent of non-White residents, distance to the nearest TfL station, and the 2018 rate 
of drug crimes. The coefficients for the spatial lags of the drug crime rate and TfL station 
distance are found to be significant (𝑝 < 0.01; not shown), as is 𝜌, the coefficient on the lag of 
the dependent variable (𝑝 < 0.01). Taking into account the spatial autocorrelation of neighboring 
LSOAs, we can see that the greater the level of economic inequality of a location, the higher the 
number of stops and searches – this is the case in both the OLS and the SDM models, with the 
size of the coefficient becoming slightly smaller in magnitude once spatial effects are taken into 
account. Specifically, considering Column 2 of Table 15, a standard deviation increase in the 



















Table 15: OLS and SDM regression results 
 Dependent variable: 
 Stop and searches, London (2019) 
 OLS Spatial 
  autoregressive 
 (1) (2) 
Gini 7.239*** 6.135*** 
 (2.051) (1.903) 
Avg value (log) -7.642*** -6.393** 
 (2.367) (2.544) 
Density (log) 15.275*** 8.041*** 
 (1.555) (2.240) 
Income deprivation -12.942*** -10.709*** 
 (2.036) (2.015) 
Crime deprivation 11.168*** 8.390*** 
 (1.663) (1.718) 
Drugs rate 43.682*** 41.770*** 
 (1.561) (1.583) 
Non-white (%) 0.956 8.389** 




 (1.428) (2.970) 
Rho  0.42 
Observations 4,831 4,831 
R2 0.246  
Adjusted R2 0.244  
Log Likelihood  -28,456.730 
sigma2  7,396.195 
Akaike Inf. Crit.  56,951.450 
Residual Std. Error 92.673 (df = 4822)  
F Statistic 196.252*** (df = 8; 4822)  
Wald Test  589.226*** (df = 1) 
LR Test  504.319*** (df = 1) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 







Next, we present the results for the negative binomial regression models in Table 16. Column 1 
just contains the inequality variable and Column 2 adds all the control variables. The results 
indicate that the coefficient on our measure of inequality is significant and slightly larger when 
introducing the controls. We can get a sense of the substantiveness of this effect by taking the 
exponent of the coefficient, known as the Incidence Rate Ratio (IRR). For Column 2, the IRR is 
1.34, which indicates that the expected number of stops is expected to increase by 34% for a one 
standard deviation increase in inequality, controlling for all other variables in the model. This is 
a large figure. To put it into perspective, the IRR for the rate of drug offences in 2017 is 1.56 and 
the crime deprivation score 1.23, so the expected percent increase in S&S stemming from 
inequality is over half of the effect of temporally lagged drug offences and 11 percentage points 
larger than the effect of the crime score. 
For a more complete picture of the substantiveness of the results, we calculate the marginal 
effects for Column 2 in Figure 12. We do so in two ways: first, the marginal effect when each 
covariate is at its average value, and second the average partial effect over every observation. 
From the first approach, we find that a one standard deviation increase in the level of inequality 
is expected to increase the number of stops by between (roughly) 7 and 13. The equivalent range 















Table 16: Negative binomial regression results 
 Dependent variable: 
 Stop and searches, London (2019) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Gini 0.178*** 0.292*** 0.271*** 
 (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) 
Avg value (log)  -0.193*** -0.213*** 
  (0.026) (0.027) 
Density (log)  0.230*** 0.232*** 
  (0.017) (0.017) 
Income deprivation  -0.027 -0.043* 
  (0.023) (0.023) 
Crime deprivation  0.208*** 0.204*** 
  (0.019) (0.019) 
Drugs rate  0.442*** 0.444*** 
  (0.017) (0.017) 
Non-white (%)  0.134*** 0.131*** 
  (0.019) (0.019) 
TfL station distance  -0.089*** -0.092*** 
  (0.016) (0.016) 
Gini : Income 
deprivation 
  -0.081*** 
   (0.017) 
Observations 4,831 4,831 4,831 
Log Likelihood -23,344.670 -22,102.930 -22,091.630 
theta 0.636*** (0.012) 0.974*** (0.019) 0.978*** (0.019) 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 46,693.340 44,223.860 44,203.250 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 All independent variables are standardised (mean equal to zero, standard deviation 





Figure 12: Marginal and average partial effect of inequality and other covariates on S&S 
 
Note: The figure shows the marginal effect and average partial effect for each covariate for 
Column 2 of Table 16 with 95% confidence intervals. 
Column 3 in Table 16 introduces an interaction term between inequality and the income 
deprivation score, which we find is negative and significant. This indicates that the effect of 
inequality on S&S depends on the local level of affluence, with the magnitude of the effect larger 
as affluence increases. This is a striking finding. It means that while there appears to be an effect 
of economic inequality on the number of police stops and searches, this effect is not 
homogeneous across LSOAs. When a given location is characterised by high levels of income 
deprivation (i.e. is relatively poorer), the relationship between economic inequality and police 
behaviour is weaker; when a location is relatively affluent, the expected effect of economic 
inequality on the number of S&S is much higher. Figure 13 plots the predicted number of stops 
for Column 2 as compared to Column 3 with the interaction term included and helps visualise the 




standard deviations below the mean income deprivation score), are expected to see 
approximately 5 times fewer police stops when inequality is low versus high (defined as two 
standard deviations below versus above the mean Gini value). 
Figure 13: Effect of interaction term on predicted S&S 
 
Note: The figure shows the how the predicted stops is affected by introducing a interaction term 
between inequality and income deprivation (Column 3 of Table 16). We fix all other covariates 
at their mean values. Shaded areas are 95% confidence intervals. 
Finally, we check whether our results are London-specific or whether the relationship between 
economic inequality and S&S generalises to other urban contexts. To evaluate this, we re-run the 
negative binomial specifications for other major cities in England: Birmingham, Liverpool and 
Manchester. Results can be found in Table A.19 of the Annex, but it suffices to say that they 
remain virtually unaltered – local economic inequality is associated with a higher number of 




5.5 Discussion and conclusion 
Criminologists have long studied the purpose and potential effects of police powers to stop and 
search members of the public. Either based on reasonable suspicion or completely “suspicion-
less” (such as those based on s60 in the UK), increases in the use of S&S powers are often 
followed by intense public discussions about the usefulness of such policies. Policymakers 
usually defend S&S practices praising its effective deterrent effects, especially on drug offences 
and knife crimes. However, previous work both in the UK and elsewhere has demonstrated that 
stopping and searching members of the public has at best a marginal effect on preventing future 
offending behaviour (MacDonald et al., 2016; McCandless et al., 2016). In London specifically, 
only drug offences appear to be affected by an increase in S&S practices, and only to a small 
extent (Tiratelli et al., 2018). Given this context, we ask: what justifies the persistence of this 
policing strategy? 
Previous research over decades has suggested that S&S is not solely about crime-fighting, it is 
also about social order maintenance – i.e. it is a tool used by officers to assert power and control 
(Choongh, 1998; Tiratelli et al., 2018). In this we paper we extend this argument by looking at 
the spatial distribution of searches in the city of London in 2019. Keeping previous crime rates 
and drug offences constant, we demonstrate that police officers tend to engage in more searches 
in more economically unequal locations – i.e. the decision regarding where to stop and search 
members of the public consists of yet another way for police to ascribe identity to the 
populations they police (Bradford & Loader, 2016, p. 1226). 
Focusing on the spatial distribution of S&S in London allowed us to assess the extent to which 
the number of searches by location is associated with various other spatially-relevant variables. 
We used data at LS0A-level and drew on a novel measure of salient, spatially-granular economic 
inequality as developed by Suss (2021). This data provides estimated housing values for around 
23 million addresses in the UK, allowing us to investigate the effects of local inequality at a level 
not before possible. Furthermore, using housing values rather than income figures is theoretically 
sound as it has been shown to substantively affect people’s perceptions of economic 
discrepancies (Suss, 2021). This unique measure of economic inequality allows us to investigate 




Additionally, investigating the spatial concentration of S&S also allowed us to provide an 
alternative explanation for the “available population” argument. Even if the high levels of ethnic 
disparities in S&S in the UK (Shiner et al., 2018) emerge as a consequence of the people who are 
on the streets when stops and searches happen, police officers still decide when and where to use 
their S&S powers. As our study shows, LSOAs characterised by higher levels of economic 
inequality are prioritised over other locations, which suggests – as expected – that police 
decisions are themselves responsible for filtering out the available population. 
We approached this issue using two complementary analytical strategies. First, we used Spatial 
Durbin models to analyse the spatial association between economic inequality and the number of 
S&S by LSOA whilst taking into account the number of S&S and other covariates in 
neighbouring LSOAs. This model was important as it allowed us to assess the extent to which 
there was an association between the two variables even when spatial effects were considered. 
The SDM showed that highly unequal locations saw higher volumes of searches, whereas more 
economically homogeneous locations do not see as many. Second, we investigated this further 
by using negative binomial regression models, given that the number of S&S by LSOA is a 
count variable. These regression models confirmed our results, showing that increases in the Gini 
coefficient are associated with significant and substantive increases in the number of searches by 
LSOA. 
Furthermore, we found a significant and negative interaction between economic inequality and 
income deprivation. This means that, whilst there is an association between inequality and the 
number of searches, the effect is not homogeneous. The more affluent an LSOA is – i.e. low 
levels of income deprivation – the stronger the effect of inequality on S&S. This is a striking 
result. The fact that income deprivation alone does not influence the spatial concentration of 
searches but economic inequality does suggests that local wealth alone is not a factor taken into 
account when officers decide to employ their S&S powers. Instead, the factor is the distribution 
of wealth. Whilst a homogeneously wealthy or poor neighbourhood will not stage as many 
searches, a heterogeneous location where the gap between wealthy and poor residents is large 
will have plenty. Among those heterogeneous locations, the wealthier the neighbourhood is, yet 
the more searches will occur. These results suggest that S&S powers are indeed employed as a 




Limitations should, of course, be acknowledged. First, we are not claiming causality. There 
could be omitted variable bias confounding the relationship between economic inequality and the 
number of searches by LSOA, given that we – obviously – did not randomly assign levels of 
inequality, nor did we engage in any particular identification strategy. Future research should 
employ quasi-experimental designs to potentially assess the causal effect of the association we 
found. Second, we only analysed data from London and other English cities. Other contexts, 
such as the Stop, Question, and Frisk policies in the US could have different spatial properties 
relative to those in the UK. Third, we did not distinguish between searches based on reasonable 
suspicion and ‘suspicion-less’ searches based on s60 – it is possible that they have different 
spatial distributions. We would welcome studies focusing on more nuanced analysis of S&S in 
the UK and elsewhere. Finally, we only analysed data from 2019 – future research could model 
time series assessing the extent to which structural neighbourhood conditions continuously 
influence the use of S&S powers. 
Despite these limitations, the results presented in this paper provide new and valuable evidence 
on the relationship between economic inequality and policing behaviour, and on S&S policies as 






Table 17: Stop and searches: Birmingham, Liverpool, and Manchester (2019) 
 Birmingham Liverpool Manchester 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gini 0.232*** 0.230*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.239*** 0.218*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.037) (0.037) (0.043) (0.044) 
Avg value 
(log) 
-0.127*** -0.143*** -0.135* -0.140** 0.019 0.017 
 (0.046) (0.048) (0.070) (0.071) (0.061) (0.064) 
Density (log) 0.209*** 0.211*** 0.030 0.030 0.390*** 0.292*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.036) (0.036) (0.049) (0.051) 
Income 
deprivation 
-0.058 -0.074 0.180*** 0.173*** -0.054 -0.031 
 (0.045) (0.047) (0.058) (0.062) (0.064) (0.067) 
Crime 
deprivation 
0.295*** 0.297*** 0.422*** 0.422*** 0.374*** 0.368*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.048) (0.048) (0.054) (0.055) 
Drugs rate 0.329*** 0.328*** 0.395*** 0.395*** 0.314*** 0.304*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.036) (0.036) (0.041) (0.041) 
Non-white (%) 0.339*** 0.342*** 0.183*** 0.184*** 0.171*** 0.196*** 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.043) (0.044) 
Rail station 
distance 
-0.307*** -0.306*** -0.171*** -0.172*** -0.147*** -0.123*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.031) (0.032) (0.041) (0.042) 
Gini : Income 
deprivation 
 -0.030  -0.014  -0.005 
  (0.027)  (0.035)  (0.041) 
Observations 1,680 1,680 910 910 1,673 1,673 
Log 
Likelihood 
-5,330.284 -5,329.669 -3,443.683 -3,443.595 -2,755.058 -2,760.043 
theta 1.201*** (0.049) 1.202*** (0.049) 1.352*** (0.068) 1.353*** (0.068) 0.580*** (0.034) 0.583*** (0.035) 
Akaike Inf. 
Crit. 
10,678.570 10,679.340 6,905.365 6,907.190 5,528.115 5,540.086 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 






6 Diversity, segregation, and support for Brexit 
Abstract: What effect does local economic inequality and ethnic diversity have on voting 
behaviour? This question is of increasing importance as many cities in the US, UK and other 
developed countries experience rising inequality and immigration. Using Brexit as a case study, 
and exploiting unique, hyper-localised data on economic inequality and migration, I explore the 
impact of neighbourhood composition on voting behaviour. I find evidence that both economic 
and ethnic diversity are associated with reduced support for Brexit. However, this effect is 
mitigated by segregation – neighborhoods that are more highly segregated tend to show greater 
support for Brexit. 
6.1 Introduction 
The UK’s decision to leave the EU – to ‘Brexit’ – in a referendum on 23rd June 2016 is widely 
considered a by-product of increasing economic and cultural divides. The economic narrative in 
the emerging academic literature is that Brexit was driven by the people and places ‘left behind’ 
(Colantone & Stanig, 2018; Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017; Hobolt, 2016; Rodrıǵuez-Pose, 2018). 
More specifically, those on the losing end of globalisation, i.e. with less education and residing 
in declining areas, were more likely to support Brexit. To make matters worse, austerity 
beginning in 2010, which disproportionately affected the people and places most affected by 
globalisation, ‘activated’ support for anti-EU politics (Fetzer, 2019). 
A second, compatible explanation focuses on the growth in cultural divisions. According to this 
account, long-term cultural changes in the UK (as well as the US and other Western societies), 
deriving in particular from increased immigration and ethnic diversity, resulted in countervailing 
conservative and nationalist reactions. In the UK, this has manifested itself as anti-immigrant and 
‘Eurosceptic’ attitudes, leading to the emergence of right-wing populist political parties (Carreras 
et al., 2019; Curtice, 2016; Kaufmann, 2016; McLaren, 2002; Norris & Inglehart, 2019) and the 
desire to ‘take back control.’ 
However, a close examination of the data reveals that there is more to the Brexit story. For one, 
as Danny Dorling (2016) points out, when accounting for differential population size, it becomes 




South of England, a world removed in compositional and contextual terms from the struggling 
post-industrial areas in Wales and the North of England most affected by globalisation and 
austerity. In other words, it is not only the places ‘left behind’ but also many that have done 
relatively well that voted for Brexit. For example, Upminster in East London voted 63% in 
favour of Leave with an £81,300 average yearly income in 2016.23 Conversely, many areas 
which might reasonably considered to be ‘left behind,’ for example Tottenham Hale in North 
East London voted overwhelmingly to Remain (84.5%).24 
Second, there are some notable inconsistencies in the cultural narrative as well. In particular, 
studies generally show, with some exceptions (Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017), that higher levels or 
changes in immigrant populations are related to less support for Brexit (Arnorsson & Zoega, 
2016; Becker et al., 2017; Colantone & Stanig, 2018). This is counterintuitive – we would expect 
anti-immigrant backlash to be higher in areas which have experienced more immigration. 
In this paper, I delve further into the geography of Brexit to address these inconsistencies. In 
particular, investigate the local contextual drivers of the vote to leave the EU, and shed light on 
the counterintuitive findings in relation to left behind and anti-immigrant backlash explanations 
put forward in the literature. In particular, I examine whether important contextual attributes 
hitherto unexamined – local diversity and segregation – relate to support for Brexit. Diversity 
refers to compositional variety within a local area (i.e. the variety of different types of economic 
and social groups), whereas segregation measures its spatial arrangement. To understand what is 
driving differential voting and support patterns with regards Brexit, I examine the effects of 
diversity and segregation for two different attributes – economic and ethnic. 
Why would diversity matter? Academics differ on the answer to this question – diversity is 
thought to either increase inter-group conflict (‘conflict theory’) (Blalock, 1967) or reduce it 
(‘contact theory’) (Allport et al., 1954). On the one hand, proponents of conflict theory argue that 
ethnic diversity increases the opportunity for inter-group strife. This is a central plank in the 
 
23 Average income figure from ONS small-area (MSOA) estimates for 2016 merged into 2016 electoral wards. Data 
is available publicly here: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/earningsandworkinghours/datasets/smallareain
comeestimatesformiddlelayersuperoutputareasenglandandwales. 






cultural narrative around Brexit. From an economic perspective, diverse neighbourhoods are, by 
definition, economically unequal, and this therefore might make inequalities salient (H. J. Smith 
et al., 2012) and heighten class conflict (Newman et al., 2015), reducing support for the 
‘establishment.’ On the other hand, contact theory suggests that diversity reduces the distance 
between different ethnic and economic groups, fostering social networks and mitigating 
stigmatisation (Allport et al., 1954; Danny Dorling, 2017). Taken together, local diversity might 
affect support for Brexit by heightening economic and cultural tensions (the ‘conflict’ 
hypothesis) or by fostering greater cross-group understanding, thereby mitigating the economic 
and cultural rationales considered to be drivers of Brexit support (the ‘contact’ hypothesis). 
The empirical evidence relating neighbourhood ethnic and foreign composition and political 
outcomes is mixed. While some find a positive effect between diversity and populist sentiment 
(Harmon, 2018; Newman et al., 2018; Putnam, 2007; Reny & Newman, 2018), other find no 
impact (Hill et al., 2019), or that increased diversity reduces populist support and promotes 
social cohesion (Kaufmann, 2017; Sturgis et al., 2014). Regarding Brexit in particular, one study 
surveyed 400 UK citizens just prior to the referendum in 2016, finding that inter-group contact 
was associated with support for Brexit, although the direction depended on whether the contact 
was subjectively rated as positive or negative (Meleady et al., 2017). Recent work looking at 
residential context and far-right voting in France suggests that the chosen geographic scale is 
important, with positive (negative) effects found for the neighbourhood (department) level 
(Vasilopoulos et al., 2021). This provides motivation to explore the role of ethnic diversity and 
segregation on support for Brexit, and to explicitly vary the geographic unit of analysis. 
In terms of economic diversity, the empirical evidence is limited. In the US, Newman et al. 
(2015) finds local inequality increases class awareness and conflict, while in the UK and other 
European countries there is mixed evidence for the policy of mixed housing conferring benefits 
(Arthurson, 2002; Bolt et al., 2010; Cheshire, 2007; G. Galster, 2007; Meen & Gibb, 2005; 
Ostendorf et al., 2001). Granular information on economic heterogeneity in the UK is limited 
(Suss, 2021), which might explain why there is a lack of studies which examine local economic 
diversity and its impacts. 
Importantly, if there is a positive ‘contact’ effect arising from diversity, it can be undermined by 




potentially beneficial contact and interaction to occur (Sturgis et al., 2014) and can make it more 
difficult to escape poverty (Kearns & Parkinson, 2001; see, for example, Massey & Denton, 
1989). So, when evaluating how diversity affects support for Brexit, it is important to also 
account for the degree of segregation within communities. 
The analysis in this paper makes use of fine-grained measures of local economic diversity and 
segregation based on a large dataset of housing values (Suss, 2021), as well as measures of 
immigration and ethnicity from the 2011 Census. I merge these data with information on the 
actual Leave vote from the UK Electoral Commission, as well as individuals’ stated levels of 
support for Brexit in Wave 8 of Understanding Society, a large UK household survey. 
By way of preview of the results, I find robust evidence to support contact theory, particularly 
for ethnic diversity. First, using aggregate-level data on the Leave vote, I present between-area 
regressions and control for a battery of other known determinants of the Leave vote, 
demonstrating substantive associations for within-area diversity and segregation on the share of 
Brexit voters. This holds for both economic and ethnic variables, and the estimates are 
substantive in size – a one standard deviation increase in economic (ethnic) diversity at the Ward 
level is associated with a 0.81 (5.61) percentage point reduction in the Leave vote. On the other 
hand, economic (ethnic) segregation is associated with a 0.85 (1.6) percentage point increase in 
the Leave vote. The same pattern of results, albeit with slightly reduced point estimates, is found 
at the Local Authority level. 
Second, using individual-level data on support for Brexit, I find that greater ethnic diversity 
within neighbourhoods leads to substantially higher odds of supporting Remain, and this holds 
even at more aggregated geographic levels. Segregation has the opposite effect, with more highly 
segregated neighbourhoods leading individuals to be more supportive of Brexit. Regarding 
economic diversity and segregation, I find weaker evidence at the individual-level. I also 
investigate to what extent these contextual effects interact with political orientation, proxied by 
political party support. The results here are striking and shed light on why Brexit opened up 
cleavages within established political parties. The segregation effect appears to be operating 
through supporters of the Labour Party, whereas the diversity effect is broad-based. 
While I control for important individual level determinants of pro-Brexit sentiment, and the 




around endogeneity nevertheless persist, particularly around self-selection – i.e. the possibility 
that Brexit supporting individuals are more likely to relocate to areas which are less 
economically and socially diverse. I mitigate this concern by restricting the sample to only those 
that lived in the same address for 20+ years and to those that live within a 5 mile radius of where 
they grew up. 
This paper proceeds as follows: 6.2 details the data sources and measures; 6.3 describes the 
methods; 6.4 provides the results and discussion; and 6.5 concludes. 
6.2 Data and Measures 
6.2.1 Brexit 
I obtain data on the actual Leave vote from the UK Electoral Commission.25 Figure 14 provides 
the breakdown of the vote for Great Britain (Northern Ireland is excluded because vote tallies are 
not provided at lower geographical levels). 
 





Figure 14: Proportion Leave by LAD 
 
6.2.2 Diversity and Segregation 
For measures of economic diversity and segregation, I use a novel source of highly-granular data 
on housing values constructed by Suss (2021). This dataset is based on information for 
approximately 23 million residential addresses from the online property aggregator Zoopla, 
allowing for statistically reliable measures to be computed at spatially granular levels, down to 
the Output Area level (the lowest level census geography in the UK). Moreover, Suss (2021) 
shows that measures of inequality derived from this data are robustly associated with people’s 
subjective perceptions of local economic discrepancies. 
For immigration and ethnicity, I use census data from 2011 provided by the ONS. For 
immigration composition, I take data on country of birth, broken down into the following four 




accession countries (post-2005), and outside UK and EU. For ethnic groups, I select the broad 
census categories: White, Black, Asian, Mixed, and Other (ONS, 2016). 
To measure diversity, I use the reverse of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) concentration 
index, as follows: 
𝐻𝐻𝐼 = 1 − 𝑠  
where 𝑠  is the share of economic or social group 𝑖 out of the total number of groups in the area 
𝑛. Higher numbers represent areas that are more diverse. For economic diversity, I discretise the 
housing value data, rounding all values to the nearest 250k. This results in the possibility of a 
different number of groups for each area, and so I normalise the score (so that it ranges from 0 to 
1). The 𝐻𝐻𝐼 is often used in studies exploring both economic and ethnic diversity. For example, 
Minkoff & Lyons (2019) use this measure when examining whether income diversity is related 
to perceptions of inequality, and Sturgis et al. (2014) when looking at neighbourhood ethnic 
composition in London. 
For segregation, I use the Multigroup Entropy Index (MEI) (Reardon & Firebaugh, 2002; Sturgis 
et al., 2014; Theil, 1972). This compares the composition of sub-units within an area to surmise 







Where 𝑇 is the population count for the target area and 𝑡  for its sub-units, 𝐸 and 𝑒  is the entropy 
score for the larger area and sub-units respectively, calculated as (for 𝑒 ): 




where 𝑠  is the share of economic or social group 𝑖 out of the total number of groups 𝑛 in the 
sub-unit 𝑗. The calculation for 𝐸 is therefore simply 𝐸 = ∑ 𝑠 𝑙𝑛( ). The 𝑀𝐸𝐼 ranges from 0 




6.2.3 Neighbourhood Definition 
I take the Middle Super Output Area (MSOA) as neighbourhood boundaries (population M = 
7787.24, SD = 1599.63). MSOAs have a number of properties which are advantageous for 
approximating neighbourhoods. First, perfectly nested within them are lower level geographies, 
namely Lower Level Super Output Areas (LSOAs) and Output Areas (OAs), which are in turn 
built up from postcode blocks. This enables me to easily calculate the MEI by taking the sub-
units to be OAs. Second, MSOAs are population-weighted and stable over time. In contrast, 
other local boundaries, for example electoral Wards, tend to shift boundaries frequently and vary 
far more in terms of population, and so therefore are not comparable across the UK. I 
nevertheless measure diversity and segregation at the Ward and LAD levels as well since these 
are the administrative areas at which the actual referendum vote was counted. I can therefore 
conduct between-area regressions to examine how the Leave votes relates to the measures of 
diversity and segregation, whereas for individual-level results I’m confined to self-reported 
support for Brexit rather than actual voting behaviour. 
To provide some indication of the spatial distribution of diversity and segregation, I map out the 
various measures for select cities in England: Birmingham, Bradford and London. Each of these 
areas were polarised in terms of Brexit: some Wards saw some areas strongly supporting Leave 
while others strongly supported Remain. A pairwise correlation analysis (Figure 15) reveals that 
the ethnic measures are highly correlated with their immigrant counterparts, so I drop the latter 
going forward in favour of diversity and segregation for country of origin given that the topic 




















Figure 15: Correlation matrix for diversity and segregation measures, MSOA-level 
 
6.3 Analytic strategy 
I first examine between area relationships using data from the UK’s Electoral Commission on the 
proportion of those voting Leave at the Local Authority District (LAD) level. LADs are 
relatively large spatial units (population M = 161,138, SD = 109,066), in some cases 
encompassing both urban and rural areas, and therefore not ideal for representing local contexts. 
Thankfully, some local authorities have released data on the referendum result for individual 
electoral Wards (N = 1,283). Wards are often commensurate with the neighbourhood level in 
terms of size, with the average population close to that of MSOAs (6,658). However, as noted 
earlier, Wards vary far more than MSOAs in terms of population (SD = 4,467, Min. = 136, and 
Max. = 33,937) and so do not always equate to the common sense definition of neighbourhoods. 




I complement the aggregate-level vote data with a battery of control variables which have been 
shown to be important in other work on the determinants of Brexit. In particular, the area’s 
average property price, population size, the percent of residents with no educational 
qualifications, the percent of residents not born in the UK, the change in the percent of residents 
not born in the UK (2001-2011), the growth in migrants from EU accession countries (2005-
2015), the level of austerity cuts per worker, the percentage of residents who are old (60+), and 
the growth in mean hourly pay (2005-2015) (Ansell & Adler, 2019; Beatty & Fothergill, 2018; 
Becker et al., 2017; Fetzer, 2019; ONS, 2016). See Table A.20 and Table A.21 for descriptive 
statistics at the LAD and Ward levels, respectively. To estimate the relationship between 
diversity and segregation on aggregate vote Leave, I run simple OLS regressions including 
region fixed effects. Importantly, group-level behaviour might not correspond with individual 
behaviour – i.e. it might be subject to the ecological fallacy (see, for example, Kramer, 1983; 
Openshaw, 1984). Therefore, I also turn to individual-level data on support for Brexit. 
For individual-level data, I use Wave 8 of Understanding Society (University of Essex & 
Research, 2019), the UK’s large-scale household longitudinal survey (N = 34,272). Data was 
collected prior to and after the referendum on June 23rd 2016, and the survey included the exact 
same question posed in the referendum: 
“Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European 
Union?” 
The survey provides relevant demographic information (age, education, gender, ethnicity, 
housing tenure), and, perhaps most importantly, the political party a respondent feels closest to, 
which proxies for political orientation and attitudes towards immigration (Kaufmann & Harris, 
2015). I am therefore able to control for important individual differences that have been linked to 
support for Leave (see Becker et al. (2017) and Ansell & Adler (2019) for the importance of 
housing tenure). Table A.22 in the Annex provides descriptive statistics for the individual-level 
dataset. The survey also includes geographic identifiers, allowing me to place each respondent 
within their respective MSOA neighbourhood. 
I model support for Brexit at the individual level using multilevel regression and restricted 
maximum likelihood estimation (via the lme4 package in R; Bates et al. (2015)). Individuals are 
nested within neighbourhoods (defined in the base models as the MSOA-level). I also include 




affect support for Brexit and relate to economic diversity and segregation, for example 
differences in austerity cuts and public service provision. 
One of the major concerns with identifying the causal effect of diversity and segregation on 
voting behaviour is self-selection. Individuals are free to move to neighbourhoods populated 
with like-minded or ethnically-similar residents. Kaufmann & Harris (2015) provide an empirical 
analysis of migration patterns by political orientation using 19 waves of Understanding Society 
and its predecessor, the British Household Panel Survey. They find that self-selection should not 
be a concern given that moving to areas of less diversity is no more likely for those who can be 
considered to be anti-immigration. Other studies similarly find that self-selection is not a major 
concern, in both the UK (Gallego et al., 2016) and US (Cho et al., 2013). On the other hand, 
work by N. Lee et al. (2018) finds that residential immobility is a factor explaining support for 
Brexit. 
I carry out additional analysis to mitigate selection concerns. First, I restrict the sample to those 
that have not moved for 20 years or more and to those living within a 5 mile radius of where they 
were living as adolescents (N = 9,210 and 2,312 respectively). 
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Aggregate-level results 
Figure 19 presents the standardised and exponentiated coefficients for the full LAD and Ward-
level regressions. Both models include control variables and region fixed effects. The results 
indicate that diversity, both economic and in terms of country of origin, is statistically significant 
and negatively related to the Leave vote. Conversely, economic and social segregation is 
positively associated with the Leave vote. See the full results in Table A.23 of the Annex. 
The coefficients are also substantive in size. A one standard deviation increase in economic 
diversity at the LAD-level is associated with a 1.67 percentage point decrease in the Leave vote. 
On the other hand, an increase in within-LAD economic segregation is expected to increase the 
Leave vote by 2.08 percentage points. In terms of immigrant diversity, a one standard deviation 
increase is expected to decrease the Leave vote by 2.34, whereas a one standard deviation 




I repeat the same OLS between-area regressions at the Ward level. Although the data at the 
Ward-level is incomplete (not all LADs provide a Ward-level breakdown), the overall number of 
Wards exceeds that of LADs for a total of 1070. I am still able to control for the median property 
price (an indicator of average wealth), population size, percent of residents with no qualification, 
per cent of non-UK born residents and per cent of residents who are over 60 years old, but I can 
no longer control for hourly pay growth and the growth in migrants from EU accession countries. 
The results are presented in Table A.24. I find similar results – more diversity is associated with 
higher support for Remain, while more segregation the opposite. In terms of substantiveness, the 
coefficient for immigration diversity is qualitatively larger, with a central estimate of -5.61, 



















Figure 19: Standardised and exponentiated regression coefficients, between-area 
regressions for diversity and segregation on the Brexit vote 
 
Note: OLS regression coefficients the effect of within-area economic and country of origin 
diversity and segregation on the Leave vote (%), England and Wales. Control variables include 
the Ward average property price (log scale), population size (log scale), the percent of adult 
residents with no qualification, the number of migrants (2011), the change in the number of 
migrants (2001-2011), the percent of the population aged 60+, and region fixed effects. All 
coefficients are exponentiated and standardised. Error bars are for 95% confidence level. See 
Table A.23 and Table A.24 for full results. 
6.4.2 Individual-level results 
I now turn to evaluating the effect of diversity and segregation on support for Brexit using 
individual-level data. Figure 20 provides the baseline results for the full model, i.e. including all 




in Table A.25 in the Annex). I find that, as opposed to the between-area regression results, the 
coefficient on economic diversity and segregation are not significantly different from 0, once 
immigrant diversity and segregation are controlled for. 
Conversely, I find that neighbourhood immigrant diversity and segregation are both significant 
and substantive in size. A one standard deviation increase in neighbourhood immigrant diversity 
is associated with an expected 20% reduction in the odds of supporting Brexit. On the other 
hand, a one standard deviation increase in segregation is associated with a 6% increase in the 
odds of supporting Brexit. 
To verify the robustness of these results, and to mitigate concerns arising from the Modifiable 
Areal Unit Problem (Wong et al., 2012), I alter the geographical unit of analysis, both more 
disaggregated than MSOAs (LSOAs) and more aggregated (in alignment with the between-area 
regressions; Wards and LADs). Figure 21 provides the coefficient plot for these results. At the 
LSOA level, the estimates for both migrant diversity and segregation are similar, but at the 
aggregated levels only diversity remains significant, with an estimate that is broadly similar in 
size. In other words, immigrant diversity appears to reduce support for Brexit regardless of 
geographical level employed. This is contrary to work which finds that diversity exerts opposing 
effects at local and aggregated levels (Kaufmann & Harris, 2015; Tam Cho & Baer, 2011). On 
the other hand, the coefficient on immigrant segregation is attenuated above the MSOA level, 
becoming weaker at the Ward level (exp(𝛽) = 1.04, 𝑝 < 0.1) and insignificant at the LAD level. 
While the economic variables were both insignificant at the MSOA level, economic segregation 





Figure 20: Effect of neighbourhood diversity and segregation on support for Brexit 
 
Note: The figure provides coefficient estimates for a multilevel regression model of diversity and 
segregation on support for Brexit. Random intercepts are included at the MSOA level. Controls 
include: age, gender, education, ethnicity, political party support, household income, housing 
tenure, median housing value, and population density, as well as fixed effects at the LAD-level. 
All coefficient estimates are exponentiated and standardised. Error bars are for 95% confidence 








Figure 21: Effect of neighbourhood diversity and segregation at different geographical 
levels on support for Brexit 
 
Note: The figure provides coefficient estimates for a multilevel regression model of diversity and 
segregation on support for Brexit. Random intercepts are included at the LSOA, Ward, and LAD 
levels respectively. Controls include: age, gender, education, ethnicity, political party support, 
household income, housing tenure, median housing value, and population density, as well as 
fixed effects at the LAD-level. All variables are exponentiated and standardised. Error bars are 
for 95% confidence intervals. See full results in Table A.26 of the Annex. 
6.4.3 Diversity, segregation and political party support 
Next, I examine whether there is an interaction between party support, ethnic group, and 
household income and neighbourhood diversity and segregation. Table 18 provides the results. 
Interestingly, country of origin diversity appears to have a broad based effect, with no statistical 




the interaction term on the ‘Other’ party category – comprising the Liberal Democrats, Scottish 
Nationalist Party, Green Party, and other smaller political parties, is statistically significant and 
negative. In other words, greater diversity is expected to reduce support for Brexit across all 
political parties. 
On the other hand, neighbourhood immigrant segregation appears to affect supporters of the 
Labour Party and the Other category. While the main term is indistinguishable from zero, The 
interaction term for both these categories are positive and statistically significant. At the mean 
value of segregation, a Labour supporter is expected to be 57% less likely to support Brexit 
relative to a supporter of the Conservatives, holding all other variables constant. However, if the 
Labour supporter is living in a neighbourhood that is two standard deviations above the mean in 



















Table 18: Diversity and segregation interacted, MSOA-level 
 Should UK leave EU? 
 Interacted with: 
 Party support 
 (1) (2) 
Migrant Diversity -0.196*** (0.049)  
Migrant Segregation  0.002 (0.031) 
Age 0.329*** (0.018) 0.332*** (0.018) 
Male 0.154*** (0.028) 0.152*** (0.028) 
Degree -0.656*** (0.030) -0.656*** (0.030) 
Household Income -0.148*** (0.017) -0.149*** (0.017) 
Black -0.180** (0.089) -0.135 (0.089) 
Other -0.151 (0.103) -0.102 (0.103) 
White 0.253*** (0.062) 0.342*** (0.059) 
Own -0.121*** (0.039) -0.130*** (0.039) 
Rent Private 0.186*** (0.043) 0.160*** (0.043) 
Rent Social 0.458*** (0.060) 0.445*** (0.060) 
Labour -0.851*** (0.038) -0.848*** (0.037) 
Other -0.642*** (0.040) -0.631*** (0.039) 
UKIP 1.802*** (0.096) 1.856*** (0.086) 
Median property value -0.234*** (0.037) -0.201*** (0.037) 
Population density 0.010 (0.029) -0.027 (0.029) 
Migrant Diversity : Labour -0.003 (0.040)  
Migrant Diversity : Other 
Party 
-0.122*** (0.044)  
Migrant Diversity : UKIP -0.029 (0.122)  
Migrant Segregation : 
Labour 
 0.094*** (0.036) 
Migrant Segregation : Other 
Party 
 0.124*** (0.038) 
Migrant Segregation : UKIP  -0.135 (0.082) 
Constant 0.937** (0.454) 1.017** (0.453) 
Random Intercept MSOA MSOA 
Fixed Effects LAD LAD 
Observations 27,984 27,984 
Log Likelihood -16,059.720 -16,071.910 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 32,853.450 32,877.830 
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 35,877.300 35,901.680 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 Random intercept regression of support for Brexit on diversity and segregation interacted with 
political party support. 





6.4.4 Additional robustness checks 
I perform a number of additional checks to see whether the results hold. First, in order to 
mitigate concerns around self-selection into neighbourhoods, I restrict the sample to only those 
that have lived at the same address for at least 20 years. Second, I saturate the multilevel model 
with additional controls, in particular I add further contextual variables at the neighbourhood 
level – the local unemployment rate, the percent of adult residents with no qualification, the 
percent working in manufacturing industries and financial industries, the concentration of 
housing tenure (using the HHI), and finally the percent of houses in the local area which are 
socially rented (Ansell & Adler, 2019). None of these additional checks affect the findings with 
respect to country of origin diversity and segregation – see Table A.27 in the Annex for these 
additional robustness checks. 
6.5 Discussion and conclusion 
The decision by the UK electorate to Leave the EU has had monumental and historic 
implications. What drove voters to vote in the way they did? The current literature has 
constructed two narratives to answer this question. First, the ‘left behind’ narrative suggests that 
widening economic inequality induced a backlash amongst those on the losing end. Second, the 
cultural narrative argues that voting Brexit constituted a reaction against increased ethnic 
diversity and immigration. 
In this paper, I dig deeper into these narratives by exploring how local levels of economic and 
ethnic diversity and segregation affects support for Brexit. In so doing, I build on a growing body 
of work which explores how neighbourhood composition affects political attitudes, in particular 
support for far-right or populist parties (Bowyer, 2008; see, for example, Evans & Ivaldi, 2020; 
Savelkoul et al., 2017; Vasilopoulos et al., 2021). My contributions to this body of work are two-
fold. First, I am the first to examine this in relation to Brexit at multiple geographic levels, with a 
focus on the neighbourhood level. Second, I also explore economic diversity and segregation, 
exploiting a unique data on housing values at the neighbourhood level in the UK. 
Taken together, the findings suggest that if the economic inequality and cultural backlash stories 
are indeed important drivers of Brexit support, then it appears that this does not result from 
within local-area exposure to inequality and immigrants. Rather, the results presented here 




(increases) support for Brexit, albeit the findings for the country of origin diversity are the most 
consistent, existing at a range of levels and across specifications. 
While at a first glance these results might seem inconsistent with the narratives surrounding 
Brexit, they might instead be compatible and suggest that the backlash is likely operating across 
geographical areas in the UK rather than within (see Evans & Ivaldi, 2020 for evidence of this 
with populist voting in France). This makes sense from the perspective of contact theory – 
prejudices against immigrants or the wealthy is harder to sustain if you regularly come into 
contact with representatives of this category, especially if that contact is in the form of 
friendships (Brannon & Walton, 2013; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Enhanced knowledge, reduced 
anxiety and increased empathy and perspective taking are all understood to represent pathways 
through which contact reduce prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). On the other hand, if you 
live in areas that are more economically and ethnically homogeneous, and if those areas have 
seen absolute and relative economic decline (Bolet, 2021; Carreras et al., 2019), then it might be 
easier easier to blame the ‘elite’ or immigrants. 
While individuals voted to Leave the EU for a multitude of reasons, it is clear from other 
research that anti-immigration sentiment was an important determinant (Stockemer et al., 2018; 
Vlandas, 2016). From that perspective, the findings here might suggest that contextual diversity 
– by promoting positive inter-group contact (Laurence & Bentley, 2018; Meleady et al., 2017) – 
contributed to reducing anti-immigrant sentiment, and thus support for Brexit along with it. 
However, given the constraints in the data – I unfortunately do not observe attitudes towards 
immigrants, instead proxying this by their political party support – future work might delve into 
the mechanisms behind these findings. 
Moreover, contextual exposure to diversity is (obviously) not randomly assigned. I thus stop 
short of declaring that these relationships are causal, but I note that it does not appear that the 
results are driven by self-selection – the results hold when restricting the sample to those that are 
relatively immobile, either living within a short distance of where they grew up or at the same 
address for over 20 years (see also Kaufmann & Harris, 2015). While randomly assigning inter-
group contact in a lab or field setting is unlikely to match real-life inter-group contact, quasi-




Overall, the work presented here provides insight into the role of neighbourhood composition in 
shaping support for Brexit. These insights not only help to uncover the drivers of the outcome of 







Table A.20: Descriptive statistics, LAD-level 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max 
Leave (%) 380 53.141 10.416 21.380 47.158 60.360 75.560 
Economic Diversity 380 0.532 0.117 0.243 0.452 0.594 0.923 
Economic Segregation 380 0.369 0.090 0.082 0.304 0.422 0.644 
Immigrant Diversity 348 0.177 0.132 0.039 0.086 0.208 0.618 
Immigrant Segregation 348 0.088 0.037 0.032 0.061 0.108 0.233 
Average Property Price 380 296,763.600 183,624.600 102,347.600 178,685.900 352,005.000 2,018,094.000 
Population 348 161,112.900 109,013.900 2,203.000 93,888.000 199,823.200 1,071,722.000 
No qualifications % 380 20.579 7.835 0.171 17.600 25.400 36.000 
Non-UK born % 380 0.115 0.033 0.065 0.094 0.123 0.260 
Non-UK born change 348 -4.684 11.396 -39.575 -12.235 1.759 33.010 
Migrant EU Accession 
growth 
380 0.017 0.017 -0.004 0.007 0.020 0.121 
Austerity cuts / worker 378 447.780 121.925 177.000 340.000 534.500 914.000 
Over 60 % 380 0.240 0.050 0.084 0.214 0.274 0.380 
Mean hourly pay growth 380 0.231 0.161 -0.238 0.177 0.275 2.899 
 
Table A.21: Descriptive statistics, Ward-level 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max 
Leave (%) 1,283 52.34 14.30 12.16 43.09 63.83 82.51 
Economic Diversity 8,334 0.53 0.18 0.004 0.39 0.66 1.00 
Economic Segregation 8,334 0.25 0.12 0.00 0.16 0.31 0.76 
Immigrant Diversity 7,981 0.15 0.14 0.02 0.06 0.18 0.67 
Immigrant Segregation 7,981 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.36 
Average Property Price 8,350 298,251.80 198,610.20 58,809.79 173,210.60 365,321.70 3,547,146.00 
Population 7,981 6,657.93 4,467.15 136.00 3,294.00 8,971.00 33,937.00 
No qualifications % 6,499 21.47 8.83 0.06 16.50 27.00 54.80 
Non-UK born % 8,334 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.71 
Non-UK born change 7,981 -2.27 23.16 -83.96 -16.56 10.51 297.83 







Table A.22: Descriptive statistics, individual-level 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max 
Leave support 34,272 0.42 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Economic Diversity 36,724 0.52 0.18 0.01 0.39 0.65 1.00 
Economic Segregation 36,724 0.27 0.10 0.03 0.20 0.32 0.83 
Migrant Diversity 33,526 0.21 0.18 0.02 0.07 0.33 0.66 
Migrant Segregation 33,526 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.34 
Age 39,275 48.78 18.73 16.00 34.00 63.00 102.00 
Male 39,289 0.46 0.50 0 0 1 1 
Degree 38,431 1.38 0.49 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 
Household Income 38,769 4,062.53 2,912.84 0.00 2,029.16 5,338.17 86,065.62 
White 38,970 0.81 0.39 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Own 38,488 0.71 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Labour 22,670 0.57 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Median property value 36,715 251,370.90 150,880.60 52,997.81 140,974.10 322,997.50 2,197,955.00 


















Table A.23: Between LAD regression 
 Leave vote (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Economic Diversity -1.278***  -1.665***    -1.673*** 
 (0.338)  (0.336)    (0.330) 
Economic Segregation  1.622*** 2.103***    2.076*** 
  (0.423) (0.420)    (0.417) 
Immigrant Diversity    -1.687**  -2.183*** -2.339*** 
    (0.803)  (0.818) (0.774) 
Immigrant Segregation     0.801** 1.049*** 0.897** 
     (0.394) (0.402) (0.381) 
Average Property Price 0.007 -0.727 0.492 -0.547 -0.866* -0.415 0.997* 
 (0.514) (0.457) (0.505) (0.490) (0.463) (0.489) (0.524) 
Population -1.317*** -1.564*** -1.490*** -1.298*** -1.504*** -1.389*** -1.438*** 
 (0.286) (0.288) (0.279) (0.294) (0.294) (0.294) (0.280) 
No qualifications % 11.384*** 11.220*** 10.938*** 11.381*** 10.739*** 10.301*** 9.851*** 
 (0.987) (0.989) (0.957) (1.004) (1.075) (1.077) (1.020) 
Non-UK born % -2.438*** -1.946*** -2.213*** -1.893*** -2.306*** -1.974*** -1.962*** 
 (0.356) (0.355) (0.347) (0.380) (0.360) (0.378) (0.367) 
Non-UK born change -0.724** -0.971*** -0.792*** -0.854*** -0.868*** -0.828*** -0.736** 
 (0.316) (0.314) (0.305) (0.318) (0.318) (0.315) (0.301) 
Migrant EU Accession 
growth 
0.591* 0.841*** 0.734** 1.186*** 0.645** 1.251*** 1.333*** 
 (0.322) (0.323) (0.312) (0.398) (0.327) (0.396) (0.377) 
Austerity cuts / worker -1.357*** -1.600*** -1.641*** -1.289** -1.235** -1.076** -1.355*** 
 (0.517) (0.520) (0.502) (0.527) (0.530) (0.528) (0.503) 
Over 60 % -0.122 0.664 0.686* -0.416 0.133 -0.382 0.219 
 (0.369) (0.405) (0.391) (0.424) (0.378) (0.421) (0.425) 
Mean hourly pay growth -0.884* -0.904* -1.104** -0.793 -0.606 -0.599 -0.972** 
 (0.501) (0.501) (0.486) (0.508) (0.514) (0.509) (0.485) 
Constant 52.217*** 53.347*** 52.867*** 52.728*** 53.179*** 53.322*** 53.362*** 
 (0.825) (0.829) (0.807) (0.826) (0.856) (0.850) (0.819) 
Region fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 
R2 0.817 0.817 0.830 0.811 0.811 0.815 0.836 
Adjusted R2 0.806 0.806 0.819 0.800 0.800 0.804 0.825 
Residual Std. Error 
4.315 (df = 
326) 
4.313 (df = 
326) 
4.164 (df = 
325) 
4.379 (df = 
326) 
4.381 (df = 
326) 
4.340 (df = 
325) 
4.101 (df = 
323) 








Table A.24: Between Ward regression 
 Leave vote (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Economic 
Diversity 
-0.582**  -0.808***    -0.806*** 
 (0.288)  (0.289)    (0.248) 
Economic 
Segregation 
 1.282*** 1.425***    0.852*** 
  (0.302) (0.306)    (0.264) 
Immigrant 
Diversity 
   -5.991***  -5.685*** -5.607*** 
    (0.320)  (0.318) (0.316) 
Immigrant 
Segregation 
    2.345*** 1.639*** 1.598*** 
     (0.292) (0.259) (0.259) 
Average Property 
Price 
-4.935*** -5.111*** -4.648*** -4.366*** -5.094*** -4.298*** -3.771*** 
 (0.392) (0.358) (0.393) (0.315) (0.349) (0.309) (0.339) 
Population -2.601*** -2.787*** -2.767*** -1.839*** -2.360*** -1.692*** -1.774*** 
 (0.256) (0.256) (0.256) (0.226) (0.251) (0.223) (0.224) 
No qualifications 
% 
6.280*** 6.276*** 6.262*** 6.552*** 5.561*** 6.029*** 6.017*** 
 (0.382) (0.380) (0.379) (0.332) (0.383) (0.337) (0.334) 
Non-UK born % -1.216*** -1.226*** -1.205*** -0.270 -1.687*** -0.639** -0.620** 
 (0.318) (0.316) (0.315) (0.281) (0.315) (0.282) (0.280) 
Non-UK born 
change 
-1.088*** -0.976*** -0.952*** -0.681*** -1.078*** -0.689*** -0.604** 
 (0.292) (0.291) (0.290) (0.254) (0.284) (0.250) (0.249) 
Over 60 % 4.364*** 4.200*** 4.231*** 0.475 3.934*** 0.395 0.411 
 (0.409) (0.407) (0.406) (0.410) (0.400) (0.403) (0.400) 
Constant 53.348*** 53.180*** 53.079*** 54.190*** 54.334*** 54.800*** 54.549*** 
 (0.705) (0.701) (0.700) (0.613) (0.695) (0.609) (0.608) 
Region fixed 
effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1,070 1,070 1,070 1,070 1,070 1,070 1,070 
R2 0.743 0.746 0.748 0.806 0.757 0.813 0.816 
Adjusted R2 0.739 0.743 0.744 0.803 0.753 0.810 0.813 
Residual Std. 
Error 
7.396 (df = 
1054) 
7.348 (df = 
1054) 
7.324 (df = 
1053) 
6.420 (df = 
1054) 
7.194 (df = 
1054) 
6.304 (df = 
1053) 
6.257 (df = 
1051) 






Table A.25: Effect of neighbourhood diversity and segregation on support for Brexit, 
Individual-level 
 Should UK leave the EU? 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Economic Diversity 0.027 0.017   0.023 
 (0.020) (0.020)   (0.022) 
Economic Segregation  0.060***   0.035 
  (0.020)   (0.022) 
Migrant Diversity   -0.235*** -0.233*** -0.228*** 
   (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Migrant Segregation    0.062*** 0.057** 
    (0.023) (0.023) 
Age 0.323*** 0.323*** 0.329*** 0.329*** 0.328*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Male 0.177*** 0.177*** 0.153*** 0.154*** 0.154*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Degree -0.638*** -0.638*** -0.655*** -0.654*** -0.654*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Household Income -0.152*** -0.153*** -0.148*** -0.149*** -0.149*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Black -0.154* -0.160* -0.180** -0.181** -0.185** 
 (0.088) (0.088) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) 
Other -0.125 -0.128 -0.161 -0.165 -0.166 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) 
White 0.329*** 0.319*** 0.248*** 0.239*** 0.236*** 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) 
Own -0.122*** -0.122*** -0.123*** -0.121*** -0.122*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Rent Private 0.166*** 0.169*** 0.183*** 0.183*** 0.183*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Rent Social 0.443*** 0.440*** 0.456*** 0.458*** 0.456*** 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
Labour -0.860*** -0.860*** -0.838*** -0.838*** -0.838*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Other -0.607*** -0.606*** -0.622*** -0.621*** -0.621*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
UKIP 1.794*** 1.794*** 1.809*** 1.810*** 1.810*** 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) 
Median property value -0.218*** -0.203*** -0.231*** -0.218*** -0.225*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) 
Population density -0.006 -0.017 0.011 0.019 0.015 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) 
Constant 1.069** 1.032** 0.915** 0.855* 0.834* 
 (0.454) (0.454) (0.454) (0.454) (0.454) 




Fixed Effects LAD LAD LAD LAD LAD 
Observations 30,842 30,842 27,984 27,984 27,984 
Log Likelihood -17,682.820 -17,677.870 -16,065.990 -16,062.180 -16,059.830 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 36,157.650 36,149.740 32,859.970 32,854.360 32,853.670 
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 39,458.950 39,459.380 35,859.110 35,861.740 35,877.520 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table A.26: Effect of neighbourhood diversity and segregation at different geographic 
levels on support for Brexit 
 Should UK leave EU? 
 LSOA Ward LAD 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Economic Diversity 0.005 (0.021) -0.002 (0.021) -0.028 (0.030) 
Economic Segregation -0.008 (0.020) 0.037 (0.024) 0.081** (0.040) 
Migrant Diversity -0.203*** (0.039) -0.238*** (0.033) -0.182*** (0.049) 
Migrant Segregation 0.048** (0.022) 0.042* (0.023) 0.054 (0.037) 
Age 0.346*** (0.019) 0.328*** (0.018) 0.316*** (0.017) 
Male 0.168*** (0.029) 0.154*** (0.028) 0.144*** (0.027) 
Degree -0.639*** (0.032) -0.666*** (0.030) -0.690*** (0.029) 
Household Income -0.157*** (0.019) -0.145*** (0.017) -0.157*** (0.016) 
Black -0.177* (0.096) -0.196** (0.087) -0.102 (0.082) 
Other -0.171 (0.110) -0.181* (0.102) -0.124 (0.097) 
White 0.222*** (0.068) 0.205*** (0.059) 0.343*** (0.052) 
Own -0.129*** (0.043) -0.126*** (0.039) -0.150*** (0.036) 
Rent Private 0.193*** (0.048) 0.186*** (0.043) 0.160*** (0.040) 
Rent Social 0.475*** (0.066) 0.450*** (0.059) 0.453*** (0.055) 
Labour -0.848*** (0.040) -0.848*** (0.036) -0.827*** (0.034) 
Other -0.636*** (0.041) -0.633*** (0.038) -0.615*** (0.036) 
UKIP 1.793*** (0.087) 1.793*** (0.083) 1.825*** (0.081) 
Median property value -0.161*** (0.033) -0.199*** (0.032) -0.075 (0.053) 
Population density 0.010 (0.026) 0.026 (0.027) 0.007 (0.044) 
Constant 1.043** (0.478) 0.174** (0.086) 0.119 (0.090) 
Random Intercept LSOA Ward LAD 
Fixed Effects LAD Region Region 
Observations 27,970 27,984 27,992 
Log Likelihood -15,881.790 -16,309.460 -16,509.410 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 32,497.580 32,678.910 33,078.820 
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 35,521.250 32,926.090 33,326.010 





Table A.27: Additional robustness checks 
 Should UK leave the EU? 
 Lived in address 20+ 
years 




 (1) (2) (3) 
Economic Diversity -0.067 -0.086 0.023 
 (0.041) (0.093) (0.022) 
Economic Segregation 0.016 -0.027 0.030 
 (0.041) (0.078) (0.022) 
Migrant Diversity -0.201*** -0.265* -0.190*** 
 (0.076) (0.143) (0.046) 
Migrant Segregation 0.096** 0.047 0.047** 
 (0.044) (0.113) (0.023) 
Age 0.224*** 0.511*** 0.328*** 
 (0.045) (0.096) (0.018) 
Male 0.176*** 0.205 0.155*** 
 (0.057) (0.129) (0.028) 
Degree -0.733*** -0.179 -0.640*** 
 (0.064) (0.142) (0.030) 
Household Income -0.122*** -0.201** -0.148*** 
 (0.037) (0.083) (0.017) 
Black -0.126 -0.375* -0.163* 
 (0.197) (0.199) (0.089) 
Other 0.097 -0.396 -0.140 
 (0.253) (0.264) (0.103) 
White 0.333** -0.320 0.271*** 
 (0.138) (0.212) (0.062) 
Own -0.135 -0.201 -0.123*** 
 (0.083) (0.183) (0.039) 
Rent Private 0.299** 0.282 0.186*** 
 (0.123) (0.184) (0.043) 
Rent Social 0.344** -0.149 0.431*** 
 (0.138) (0.218) (0.060) 
Labour -0.969*** -0.287 -0.842*** 
 (0.072) (0.198) (0.037) 
Other -0.705*** -0.329 -0.623*** 
 (0.083) (0.229) (0.039) 
UKIP 1.958*** 2.435*** 1.803*** 
 (0.176) (0.635) (0.083) 
Median property value -0.070 -0.309** -0.126** 
 (0.069) (0.156) (0.049) 
Population density 0.071 -0.061 -0.003 




Unemployed (%)   2.142 
   (2.171) 
No Qualification (%)   1.717*** 
   (0.425) 
Manufacturing (%)   0.151 
   (0.929) 
Finance (%)   1.081 
   (1.263) 
Tenure Concentration 
(HHI) 
  0.057** 
   (0.027) 
Social Rented (%)   -0.0002 
   (0.0005) 
Constant 2.635** 19.831 0.040 
 (1.157) (10,754.150) (0.492) 
Random Intercept MSOA MSOA MSOA 
Fixed Effects LAD LAD LAD 
Observations 6,877 1,585 27,984 
Log Likelihood -3,904.419 -784.787 -16,040.080 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 8,534.838 2,027.573 32,826.160 
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 11,016.280 3,256.923 35,899.450 






7 Critical discussion and conclusion 
Economic inequality is a topic that has been extensively studied in the social sciences. Recent 
years have seen a renewed emphasis on measurement, with scholars taking a local-perspective, 
operationalising inequality at relatively fine geographical resolutions and finding the impact of 
micro-manifestations of economic inequality to be important for individual behaviour and 
outcomes (see, for example, Chetty & Hendren, 2018b). This movement towards local inequality 
has happened primarily in the North America, where income data is provided as part of the 
census. Some countries, notably the UK, do not collect extensive income information from its 
residents, thereby making it impossible to reliably measure economic inequality at the local 
level. 
In Chapter 2, I remedy this important measurement gap by exploiting a large, unique dataset on 
the value of over 26 million UK residences. This data makes it possible to measure economic 
inequality in the UK at a hyper-local level for the first time, allowing me to describe 
neighbourhood-level variation in inequality. Importantly, I evaluate whether neighbourhood 
housing value inequality is a salient measure of economic inequality using the British Election 
Study and a representative survey of UK respondents. I show that this is indeed the case – 
housing value inequality is associated with perceptions of income inequality. This conclusion is 
buttressed by textual responses – local housing discrepancies are frequently mentioned as being a 
key feature used by individuals to estimate neighbourhood inequality. In other words, seeing 
housing value inequality affects people’s beliefs about local economic inequality. I then examine 
the patterns of local inequality for the whole of the UK, from the city down to the neighbourhood 
level. I find a prevalence of extreme levels of inequality side-by-side with areas of relative 
equality within urban settings. In other words, the lived experience of inequality is often 
unequal. 
In Chapter 3, I turn to analysing of the determinants of neighbourhood and urban inequality for 
the UK. I find that, while there are commonalities across spatial levels, there are also important 
differences in the factors driving higher inequality, notable amenities and the unemployment 
rate. Chapter 3 is the first paper investigates the determinants of inequality at the neighbourhood 




in neighbourhood dynamics. Moreover, taken together with Chapter 2, the analysis is important 
in that it provides insight into how local inequality is experienced in a multifaceted fashion. In 
other words, neighbourhood inequality is not simply marked by economic discrepancies, but also 
by heterogeneous ethnic backgrounds, education levels, and housing tenures, as well as in terms 
of the sorts of amenities that are present. This advances our understanding of the lived 
experiences of inequality and can help inform future work on the implications of neighbourhood 
inequality for individual and social outcomes. 
Chapters 4 to 6 use the measure developed in Chapter 2 to shed light on the consequences of 
inequality. In particular, Chapter 4 aims to clarify what effect inequality has on pro-social 
behaviour, both the main effect and when interacted with income. Chapter 5 seeks to understand 
why police stop and search activity persists even though the empirical evidence suggests it 
doesn’t mitigate crime, taking a spatial perspective. And, finally, Chapter 6 explores whether 
economic inequality, operationalised through a related measure – diversity, along with ethnic 
diversity affect political outcomes, using Brexit as the case study. These chapters therefore cover 
a range of individual and group behaviours, from the private to the civic spheres. 
I find that the consequences of inequality are both positive and negative depending on the 
behaviour analysed. On the positive side, Chapter 4 provides strong evidence that local 
inequality leads to more generosity, especially for higher income individuals and households. On 
the other hand, local inequality is associated with a substantively higher number of police stops 
and searches without clear evidence that this policy reduces or deters crime. Local economic 
(and ethnic) heterogeneity also appears to reduce support for Brexit, suggesting that anti-
immigrant sentiment is lessened through inter-group contact. In sum – the answer to the question 
of whether local inequality is good or bad is: it depends. 
Importantly, across the various papers of this thesis, I take a multi-scalar approach to measuring 
inequality and evaluating its consequences. Rather than focus on one geographic level, I either 
verify the robustness of the results by looking at how they vary when taking a more granular or 
aggregated perspective (e.g. Chapter 6 on Brexit), or I explicitly compare findings at different 
geographical levels (e.g. Chapter 3 on the determinants of local inequality). This is typically not 
done in empirical research which explores the consequences of economic inequality. Instead, 




(e.g. data availability). As a result, there is usually no critical discussion as to the theoretical 
pathways through which inequality at the chosen level might affect outcomes. Not explicitly 
considering whether the spatial scale is appropriate potentially weakens the analysis 
(e.g. selecting the macro-scale when a more localised level would be more appropriate), and 
there could be concerns around the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (Wong et al., 2012). For 
example, as covered in Chapter 4, Côté et al. (2015) and Schmukle et al. (2019) do not comment 
on why the macro-level is appropriate for investigating the effect of inequality on pro-social 
behaviour, and there are good theoretical reasons to suspect that local inequality might matter 
more, i.e. contact theory (Allport et al., 1954). 
Furthermore, as this thesis demonstrates across papers, and as others have also shown elsewhere 
(Ifcher et al., 2019; B. A. Lee et al., 2008; Reardon et al., 2008; e.g. Vasilopoulos et al., 2021) 
the contextual variable of interest might have opposing effects depending on whether it is 
operationalised at the neighbourhood, local authority, or national level. Indeed, this seems to be 
the case for pro-social behaviour, with some evidence presented here (Chapter 4) that state-level 
inequality does exert a negative effect on the extensive margin of charitable giving, whereas at 
the local level the opposite is true. On the other hand, Chapter 6 shows that country of origin 
diversity is substantively negatively associated with support for Brexit, and this result holds 
regardless of the spatial level chosen, from the LSOA up to the Local Authority level. 
That said, there are still a number of limitations to note regarding the selection of spatial levels in 
this thesis. First, neighbourhoods are by definition subjective and contingent on individual 
conceptualisation. While the LSOA/MSOA boundaries are meant to align with natural 
boundaries (e.g. bounded by major roads), it is not clear whether they conform to individual 
conceptions. Ideally, studies investigating the effects of local inequality would construct ‘ego-
centric’ neighbourhoods (B. A. Lee et al., 2019), for example by defining specific 
neighbourhoods for each individual according to subjective maps (Campbell et al., 2009; Catney 
et al., 2019; Pinchak et al., 2020; Wong et al., 2012), revealed patterns of behaviour (Athey et al., 
2020; Louail et al., 2014), or a set radius (e.g. 400m; Duncan et al. (2014); Hartung & Hillmert 
(2019)). 
Second, the main definition of UK neighbourhood used in this thesis varies across papers. In 




MSOA. The differing conceptualisations are used mainly to align multiple sources of data 
(e.g. the MSOA-level is close in size to the Ward-level, for which there is data on the Brexit vote 
– see Chapter 6). As the default, however, I choose to focus on the LSOA – e.g. see the 
description of patterns of economic inequality in Chapter 2, and where the MSOA is used as the 
base neighbourhood, I verify that the results hold also for the LSOA level where possible – see 
Chapters 4 and 6, and Section 2.4. 
Third, given this thesis focuses on one country – the UK, it is not clear whether the findings can 
be generalised to other national contexts. The sole exception is regarding the relationship 
between pro-social behaviour and local inequality – Chapter 8 presents evidence from the US 
alongside the UK. The UK (and US) have relatively high levels of inequality, as well as specific 
institutional and cultural contexts, compared with other developed nations. This therefore 
suggests that cross-county comparative analysis is warranted to establish how these national-
level attributes might affect the empirical findings presented here. 
The UK might also differ in important ways from other countries with regards sub-national 
patterns of inequality, for example as result of urban and social housing policy which results in 
distinctive patterns of economic segregation or integration across neighbourhoods. This calls for 
further research to compare UK with other countries, for example by replicating the findings of 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 for other countries, ideally with comparable local inequality measures 
down to the neighbourhood-level for different contexts. 
The other papers in this thesis can also be built on through further research to address the point 
on generalisability. For example, an obvious next step would be to try to replicate the results on 
police stop and search behaviour presented in Chapter 5 using data from other countries where 
police hold similar powers (e.g. the US). While the Chapter 4 on pro-social behaviour covers 
both the UK and US, the findings could in principle be broadened to many more countries where 
sufficiently granular micro data on inequality and charitable giving is available. And finally, 
though the findings presented in Chapter 6 can be situated within an existing literature which 
investigates the role of inequality and ethnic heterogeneity on anti-immigrant or far-right 
sentiment in different countries (Bowyer, 2008; see, for example, Evans & Ivaldi, 2020; 




particularly as the rise in populism does not appear to be abating in many countries around the 
world as of this writing. 
The thread running through this thesis is that local contexts matter. Specifically, the level of 
neighbourhood inequality has consequences. However, neighbourhood inequality is unlikely the 
only relevant experience individuals have with inequality. Indeed, as briefly discussed in 2.4, 
information affecting people’s perceptions of local and national inequality likely come from a 
number of sources, with local contexts being only one influence. Other sources are likely to be 
the media, and social networks (which are only partly influenced by neighbourhoods). Moreover, 
individuals commute to work (e.g. going from Luton to London everyday), travel for other 
reasons, both within urban areas and internationally, and thereby absorb far more information 
about inequality than what they are exposed to within the neighbourhoods they live in. My claim 
in this thesis is not that local contexts are the only influence, nor that they are the most important 
influence, just that they are an influence. The findings across papers clearly testify to this, 
contributing to our understanding of the consequences of local inequality. 
However, while I conduct a number of robustness checks in each paper to mitigate endogeneity 
concerns, for example restricting the data to those that live within the same 5 mile radius of 
where they grew up (Chapter 4), I nevertheless do not have randomly assigned local inequality in 
any of the studies, nor do I have quasi-experimental data. Therefore, a general weakness of this 
thesis is a lack of clear-cut causal identification. While there is a large literature which varies 
inequality in artificial lab settings, it is not clear that these experiments adequately represent the 
real-world, both in terms of inequality exposure and the behaviours studied (see Galizzi & 
Navarro-Martıńez, 2019 for social preference games in particular). This, therefore, means that 
future work is warranted, in particular that which can exploit naturally occurring exogenous 
variation in inequality, or that utilises compelling instruments to shed light on the consequences 
of local inequality for individuals and society. 
More generally, future work could use the measures and data developed for this thesis to answer 
other important research questions related to the determinants or consequences of local 
inequality. Indeed, I have made the inequality data available online for download here: 




sorts of contextually and perceptually-relevant data might be used to explore neighbourhood-
level inequality in other countries. 
The contexts within which people spend much of their lives, the neighbourhoods and 
environments where they act and react are important influences on their lived experiences. 
Economic discrepancies manifest and social comparison processes happen at the micro-level, 
and therefore understanding inequality’s effects on important economic, political and social 
behaviours requires corresponding measurement. In exploring the patterns, the determinants and 
(some of) the consequences of economic disparities within neighbourhoods in the UK in this 
thesis, I provide conclusive evidence of the need to and the benefits of examining economic 
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